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Ousted
Bankruptcy Judge Loses His Bid to Win Reinstatement
By Shannon P. Duffy
New York Lawyer
The Legal Intelligencer
September 13, 2006
A federal appeals court in
Washington has dismissed a suit filed by former Philadelphia
Bankruptcy Judge David A. Scholl - who in 2000 was denied an
appointment to a second 14-year term - finding that Scholl may not
sue to win his job back because such a case would improperly intrude
on the deliberations of the judges of the 3rd U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals.
Scholl, who is now in
private practice, had won the first two rounds in the litigation
when Judge Lawrence M. Baskir of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims
refused to dismiss the case.
But now a unanimous
three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit has issued a writ of mandamus ordering Baskir to dismiss the
case, finding that he never had jurisdiction to hear such a claim.
"We see no point in
subjecting the judges and employees of the 3rd Circuit to discovery
into the court's decision-making process in . . . a case that
clearly, as a matter of law, should be dismissed," the panel said.
Although mandamus petitions
are rarely granted, the court said it was appropriate in Scholl's
case because "without ordering dismissal of Mr. Scholl's case
through our mandamus power, the internal deliberations of the 3rd
Circuit could be subject to discovery. The government is correct
that this would cause a concrete and imminent harm that cannot be
remedied after the fact."
The court's 20-page opinion
in Scholl v. United States was authored by Judge Alvin
Anthony Schall and joined by Judges Arthur J. Gajarsa and Sharon
Prost.
Scholl filed the suit in
August 2000, claiming that the process used by the 3rd Circuit in
denying him a second term had violated his constitutional right to
due process. The suit sought compensation and reinstatement.
In 2002 and again in 2004,
Scholl won significant rulings in his favor when Baskir rejected the
government's motions for dismissal.
In his first opinion in
Scholl, Baskir ruled that Scholl had "a firm right to be
reappointed" unless the 3rd Circuit judges who refused to reappoint
him could state reasons that the judge failed to perform up to the
standards of federal bankruptcy judges.
Scholl claimed in the suit
that, under the reappointment regulations set forth by the Judicial
Conference of the United States, he was entitled to be renamed to
the bench by the 3rd Circuit judges.
His lawyer, Cletus P.
Lyman, cited the procedures established in 1984 by the Judicial
Conference of the United States - the governing body of the federal
courts - that apply to the selection, appointment and reappointment
of federal bankruptcy judges.
Under those regulations,
Lyman said, reappointment "should not be denied unless the incumbent
has failed to perform the duties of a bankruptcy judge according to
the high standards of performance regularly met by United States
bankruptcy judges."
Baskir found that Scholl
had a valid claim, noting that the key phrase in the regulations
imposes on the 3rd Circuit judges the duty to explain how Scholl
fell short of "high standards of performance" before they refused to
reappoint him.
"The appeals court's
authority to reappoint is specifically limited in this regulation by
the inclusion of a negative limitation and a condition subsequent,"
Baskir wrote. "We believe that, read together, this language, 'not
be denied unless' - had the effect of converting what might
otherwise be read as a directory suggestion - 'should,' standing
alone - into a mandatory legal requirement."
When Scholl's lawyers
demanded discovery - including the notes of the 3rd Circuit judges
in their deliberations - Baskir granted the motion.
At that point, Deputy
Assistant Attorney General Gregory G. Katsas asked Baskir to certify
an immediate appeal, arguing that Scholl's case presented questions
of first impression and that the discovery he was seeking "would
involve a sensitive and potentially burdensome inquiry into the
basis for the decision of the 3rd Circuit judges."
Baskir refused to certify
an interlocutory appeal and ordered Katsas to file all of the 3rd
Circuit's documents under seal for an in camera review.
Katsas then filed a
petition for writ of mandamus, urging the Federal Circuit to reverse
all of Baskir's rulings.
In his brief, Katsas argued
that Congress vested the power to appoint bankruptcy judges
exclusively in the courts of appeals, and declined to provide
would-be judicial officers with a private right of action.
Allowing the Article I
judges of Court of Federal Claims to review those decisions by
Article III judges "would raise serious Appointments Clause and
separation-of-powers problems," Katsas argued.
And Baskir's decision to
grant Scholl's motion to compel discovery "has now imposed an
additional, concrete and imminent harm on the 3rd Circuit, by
requiring it to turn over for in-camera review documents containing
circuit judges' internal deliberations and other privileged and
confidential communications," Katsas wrote.
Scholl's lawyers argued
that the government had failed to satisfy the rigorous test for
winning a writ of mandamus since it cannot show that Baskir's
rulings are "clearly and indisputably incorrect."
The Federal Circuit
disagreed, finding that Baskir never should have entertained
jurisdiction over Scholl's case because it fails to state a valid
claim.
Under the Tucker Act, the
court said, the Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction over claims
for money damages, but the plaintiff must also "point to a
substantive right to money damages."
Scholl's lawyers pointed to
the pay statute for bankruptcy judges, and argued that the judges of
the 3rd Circuit deprived him of the pay he was entitled to when they
violated his right to due process in the reappointment process.
But the Federal Circuit
panel found that when Scholl's term as a bankruptcy judge ended, "he
no longer was entitled to the pay mandated by [the statute]."
Scholl's lawyers insisted
that his nonreappointment was "a form of discharge."
The court disagreed, saying
"it is simply incorrect to say that nonreappointment is a form of
discharge. Nonreappointment and discharge are two entirely different
things."
The panel also explicitly
rejected Baskir's ruling that the regulations of the Judicial
Conference provided Scholl with a "firm right" to be reappointed
unless "he had failed to perform according to high standards."
Instead, the court said,
the regulations "simply provided circuit courts with guidance in the
process for the reappointment of incumbent bankruptcy judges. There
is nothing in the language of [the regulations] that indicates the
provision was intended to provide incumbent bankruptcy judges with
the benefit of a firm right to reappointment."
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