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Dramatic Disorder in the Courts
Editorial
New York Daily News
November 7, 2005
Last week, Merck slipped
the noose in a trial that hung on whether the executives in
charge of protecting the drug company's customers messed around
for so long that people had heart troubles because of the
foot-dragging that preceded Vioxx's removal from the market.
After the victory in a
case brought by a man who had taken Vioxx and suffered a heart
attack, the company's stock went up. Now, it seems Merck might
duck $50 million in liabilities in the thousands of suits filed
against it.
According to the lawyer
representing the plaintiff, the company's legal team won not
with science, but with the good old mud-slinging tactic of
attacking his client. Here is where the legal system always
seems porous: If the attorneys on either side have enough skill
at drama, victory is theirs.
This means that our
legal system can hinge on a good performance at key moments of
decision. It also means that juries can be considered more
audiences than citizens given to fair judgment, which trashes
everything the law should be about.
At the same time, we
should know that once litigations become successful, the
monkey-see-monkey-do response sets in and our courts get filled
with as many frivolous suits as important ones. Since there is
no liability for wasting the time of the state and the money of
the defendant, these cases continue to pile up.
What to do? We are in
quite a pickle because there is no reason people should assume
goodwill on the part of executives who are too often concerned
more with profit than quality, or danger to the public. This
has, of course, changed a good deal in the automobile industry
because, after years of playing from the bottom of the deck and
wearing down plaintiffs, blood was drawn and the game changed.
Now, entire lines of vehicles are recalled if a dangerous flaw
is discovered because the industry knows the average jury might
feel it should avenge the most recent victims and make up for
all those who were not rewarded in the past.
But this new victory by
a drug company that might itself face many court dates because
of irresponsible executives brings us to a particular place.
Since Americans have only so much patience with tragedy and tend
to swallow whole almost all conspiracy theories, we are always
eager to blame someone for whatever went wrong. If the defendant
is not guilty, the plaintiff must be, and if neither one of them
can be left holding the bag, we blame it on the system, hold our
noses and walk away shaking our heads.
So what are we to do
when faced with circumstances such as the ones in the Merck
case? We should try and stick to the facts and draw all
conclusions from them. The less willingness to be swayed by
drama, the better.
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Merck
Wins Big in Vioxx Trial
By Lisa Brennan
New York Lawyer
New Jersey Law Journal
November 4, 2005
The nation's second trial
over health effects of the drug Vioxx got swamped in New Jersey on
Thursday, as a jury categorically rejected claims that failure to
warn about the painkiller's risks caused a user's heart attack.
The jury found, 8-1, that
Merck & Co. properly alerted prescribing physicians to a link
between Vioxx and an increased risk of cardiovascular events, and
found unanimously that there were no consumer fraud violations in
the way Merck marketed Vioxx to physicians.
As a result, the jury never
reached the question of proximate causation of postal worker
Frederick "Mike" Humeston's heart attack.
The verdict, rendered after
eight hours of deliberation, is a victory on several fronts for the
Whitehouse Station, N.J., drugmaker and its lawyers. It likely will
deter suits by plaintiffs like Humeston, who have short-term
exposure to Vioxx and who are still alive.
The verdict also resonated
on Wall Street, where Merck shares rose 6 percent after the verdict,
a welcome comeback after the stock plummeted in the wake of a $253
million verdict in the first Vioxx trial in Angleton, Texas, in
August.
The verdict enables Merck
to overcome the risk of collateral estoppel on the failure-to-warn
issue. Had the jury found in the plaintiff's favor on that count,
the drugmaker could have been precluded from retrying the issue of
adequacy of its warnings. About half of the nation's 6,400 Vioxx
cases are venued in New Jersey.
"Collateral estoppel as a
risk is completely off the table," says John Brenner of Newark's
McCarter & English, who is not involved in Vioxx cases but defends
pharmaceutical companies. "This victory is very significant to
Merck."
Moreover, the verdict
showed Merck's prowess in winning litigation on the ground. The
company overcame a series of negative rulings by and friction with
Atlantic County Superior Court Judge Carol Higbee throughout the
eight-week trial, especially over the admissibility of certain
scientific studies.
The trial, and even the
pretrial conferences, had been marked by skirmishes between Higbee
and Merck lawyer Diane Sullivan, of Dechert in Philadelphia. The
judge delivered a major blow when she struck the testimony of
Merck's lead witness, finding he had "materially changed" what he
had been expected to say based upon his deposition.
At the center of the
defense strategy was a memo by two Food and Drug Administration
officials, concluding that short-term Vioxx use poses no greater
risk of heart attack than similar pain relievers. Higbee first found
the memo scientifically flawed, then allowed part of it in.
During the trial, some
observing plaintiffs lawyers said that Humeston's lead attorney,
Christopher Seeger, erred in putting emphasis on the complicated
scientific issues, rather than on marketing practices. They also
criticized the decision not to call David Egilman, a Brown
University epidemiologist who had been expected to testify that
scientific studies showed risks from short-term Vioxx use.
Seeger, of Seeger Weiss in
Newark, told reporters he was devastated by the verdict and sad for
his clients, Humeston and his wife, Mary. Seeger has several hundred
other Vioxx cases and he pledged to keep fighting.
Other plaintiffs lawyers
who have banded to litigate future Vioxx cases in state courts said
Thursday that the defense verdict would not have negative
implications for their strategy.
"Everyone knew from the
beginning that this was a difficult medical case and that Merck
would present a vigorous and well-orchestrated defense focusing on
the plaintiff," said spokesman Christopher Placitella of Cohen,
Placitella & Roth in Red Bank. "There will be wins and losses during
the course of this litigation for both sides, depending upon the
facts as presented in individual cases."
Placitella noted that the
first six asbestos cases were lost before asbestos companies'
conduct was fully explained. "That is not the case here. One jury
has already found the drugmaker's conduct so reprehensible that they
awarded $250 million," he said. "The liability evidence introduced
was compelling."
Vioxx is the brand name for
a painkiller Merck introduced in 1999. It is in a class of drugs
known as Cox-2 inhibitors. More than 20 million Americans took the
drug, making it one of Merck's biggest sellers, grossing $2.5
billion annually. In September 2004, Merck withdrew Vioxx from the
market based on studies that showed it caused heart attacks and
strokes after prolonged usage -- 18 months or more.
The recall triggered an
avalanche of litigation against the drugmaker. The next Vioxx case
is scheduled to go to trial on Nov. 21 before a federal judge in the
Eastern District of Louisiana, who has been temporarily relocated to
Houston.
Pfizer
Mounts Grueling Beauty Contest
By Eriq Gardner
Corporate Counsel
New York Lawyer
November 3, 2005
It was a cold day for a beauty contest. On a blustery morning
last December, a small army of product liability lawyers tried not
to slip on the ice as they made their way to the Plaza Hotel in New
York. The largest pharmaceutical corporation in the world, Pfizer
Inc, had rented a ballroom in the grand old hotel and summoned them.
Allen Waxman, Pfizer's litigation chief, told the hundreds of
lawyers that the company was beginning an intense nine-month
competition among its product liability outside counsel. Pfizer
wanted the 103 firms in attendance which included many that had
worked with Pfizer before and some that had not to compete
against each other for some 20 coveted spots as preferred providers.
As he spoke, Mr. Waxman brandished a 50-page Request For Information
form and outlined the elaborate vetting process.
A midwinter beauty pageant does not sound like such a great idea.
But for Pfizer's legal department, the timing could not have been
better. Company lawyers were staggering under the heavy litigation
burden that Pfizer assumed from acquiring other pharmaceutical
businesses. At the same time, Merck & Co., Inc.'s recall of Vioxx
last year had Big Pharma's adversaries personal injury lawyers,
securities class action attorneys, state attorneys general, and
others dragging drug corporations into court to answer for the ways
their products are developed and marketed. Pfizer alone has faced
more than 10,000 lawsuits in the past few years over its drugs and
their alleged side effects. Mr. Waxman said the hundreds of firms
representing Pfizer on product liability work were a nightmare to
manage. The legal department thought that it would benefit, both
operationally and financially, from working more closely with a
smaller group of firms, though lawyers there refuse to put a dollar
amount on any potential savings.
How would Pfizer pick its preferred providers? As part of "P3,"
Pfizer-speak for Pfizer Partnering Program, the company demanded to
know each firm's history of handling product litigation, its
minority hiring statistics, and whether it had ever represented a
generic drugmaker, as well as details of any alternative fee
arrangements it had with other clients. On paper with documentation.
That was the easy part. After sending in their replies, finalists
traveled to Pfizer's New York headquarters, where small panels
composed of company lawyers and outside consultants grilled them on
their answers. Then came a fee review from a Pfizer procurement
executive known for wrangling discounts on copy paper and paper
clips. One law firm partner, echoing the sentiments of others, would
later call the selection experience "the most painful ever."
Finally, in late September, the drug company announced its
choices. Prominent national product litigation players made the cut,
including Dechert; Kaye Scholer; Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher &
Flom; and Reed Smith. That is not surprising. But Pfizer made some
other notable choices. Smaller litigation boutiques like New
Orleans-based Irwin Fritchie Urquhart & Moore and Los Angeles-based
O'Donnell Shaeffer Mortimer were in. And the company rejected
well-known heavyweights, even though some had played historically
large roles in Pfizer litigation.
The delisted firms include Alston & Bird; Arnold & Porter; Gibson,
Dunn & Crutcher; Jones Day; and Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw. Frederick
Paulmann IV, a Pfizer senior corporate counsel who oversaw the P3
competition, said Pfizer's lawyers looked for geographical
diversity, but each firm is not assigned to a specific region. The
drug company also insists that its firms are on equal footing with
one another; even some of the smaller firms may be asked to play a
role in national cases.
'Eliminate Subjectivity'
Mr. Paulmann added that P3's goal was to "totally eliminate
subjectivity" from the process. "We can't effectively put four
catchers on the field at one time, even if each is an All-Star," he
said. And the way to cut three of them? Make them show off and
"measure the quality of the individual players . . . by a reasoned
assessment of objective markers."
Pfizer is not the first company to initiate an elaborate
"partnering" process for its outside counsel. Most notably, E.I. du
Pont de Nemours and Company; Motorola, Inc.; and Sears, Roebuck and
Co. all have instituted some form of "convergence" working closely
with a relatively small, select group of firms and, in return,
getting a break on their fees. Two years ago, Shell Oil Company
created a stir by inviting dozens of law firms to its Houston
headquarters for a beauty contest, and requiring them to answer
detailed questions about their (lack of) minority hiring. Last year
Tyco International Ltd. rattled the legal community by becoming one
of the first large companies to outsource all its product liability
work via an RFP and a "reverse auction" (firms bid for the work; the
lowest bidder typically wins). Shook, Hardy won by bidding a low
18-month fixed fee for Tyco's entire product liability portfolio.
In all, according to Peter Zeughauser, a legal consultant at Newport
Beach, Calif.-based Zeughauser Group, more than 200 companies have
attempted to run "partnership" competitions of some kind. Most, he
said, conduct them with the idea of realizing savings in legal
costs, and "in the better competitions, the number of competing
firms is relatively small, usually between four and eight firms."
Commenting on Pfizer's beauty pageant, he said: "Two consultants,
nine months, and a 50-page RFI? . . . It sounds to me like it was
overlawyered."
Mounting Litigation
If that is true, blame Mr. Waxman, 43, who walked into Pfizer's
legal department in January 2003 from Washington, D.C.-based
Williams & Connolly. There, he had defended some of America's
largest pharmaceutical companies, including Wyeth, Warner-Lambert
Company, and Bayer Corporation, in litigation over products like
Norplant, Rezulin, and Baycol, respectively.
The Harvard Law School-educated lawyer, with his trial fame and
outsider's perspective, did not exactly fit in with his new
colleagues at Pfizer. But that did not matter to general counsel
Jeffrey Kindler, who believed that only an outsider could get on top
of the company's mounting litigation problem. "There was no doubt
that he was the guy to make some moves that needed to be made here,"
said Mr. Kindler, who was also a partner at Williams & Connolly
before going in-house.
Mr. Kindler has his own reasons for wanting to make a splash. In
February he was promoted to vice-
chairman of Pfizer, and joined two other senior executives on a
newly formed Pfizer executive committee. Company watchers say that
Mr. Kindler and his fellow vice-chairmen, Karen Katen and David
Shedlarz, are in a runoff to succeed outgoing CEO Henry McKinnell,
Jr. Trimming legal costs significantly can only help burnish Mr.
Kindler's star. A Pfizer spokesperson denied that the P3 process is
a vehicle to advance Mr. Kindler's CEO chances, saying, "It's just
so not so." She added that Pfizer is trying to cut $4 billion in
costs, and that the legal department is doing its part.
Mr. Waxman began to reorganize the department shortly after he took
over. Two management consulting firms, Chicago-based Huron
Consulting Group and Boston-based Axia Consulting, recommended
untangling the responsibilities of the department's lawyers. Now the
in-house litigation team has separate groups that specialize in
managing commercial litigation and defending government claims. The
consultants also urged Pfizer to draft more rigorous litigation
budgets early in the case process.
In late 2003 Mr. Waxman began formal discussions with his litigation
group about what they wanted from their outside product liability
counsel. Over the next several months the lawyers decided to winnow
their product liability defense counsel down to about 20 firms.
An Intensive Review
The RFI was the first stage. It ran to 50 pages, divided into 12
sections. The first part asked for a list of all prior litigation
handled, familiarity using various case assessment techniques, prior
use of alternative fee structures, and a detailed list of attorney
training. Pfizer wanted references from other clients, too.
The middle section demanded more creative thinking. Pfizer asked for
the firm's thoughts on the pharmaceutical business, and how the firm
demonstrated the company's core values. A sample question: "It is
often said that the industry is not doing a good job of representing
itself in the public domain. Do you agree? If so, what do you think
the industry and Pfizer should be doing differently?"
The last section focused on money. Here, Pfizer pushed the envelope
of what clients ask of service providers. Pfizer wanted law firms to
include monthly budget forecasts for representing Pfizer, annual
revenue breakdowns for the firm, and the percentage of revenue
derived from a firm's top client. Pfizer also asked for what it
calls "most favored nations" status, meaning it wanted rates no
higher than those charged to a firm's largest and most influential
non-pro bono client. And Pfizer asked the firms whether they would
be willing to freeze their rates from the inception of a matter
until its conclusion.
Providing those answers was not easy. Some firms brought in outside
consultants and accountants. Steven Glickstein, a partner at New
York-based Kaye Scholer, said his firm had 25 partners devoting
"hundreds of manhours" to the project. (Kaye Scholer made the final
list.)
Some firms went beyond the normal marketing department drafting.
Hunton & Williams, which Pfizer said did "not have a great deal of
pharmaceutical experience," hired a jury consultant to conduct a
focus group on how jurors view pharmaceutical issues. There were
testaments, too. DLA Piper Rudnick Gray Cary's response included a
1997 letter from New York state judge W. Denis Donovan to the firm
complimenting one of its product liability attorneys as "undoubtedly
the finest, most proficient, best prepared, and most gentlemanly
trial lawyer, I, in my 27 years as a judge and justice, ever
witnessed." (The extra efforts paid off. Both firms were chosen.)
New York Interviews
The first cut came in March. From the original 103 firms, Pfizer
pared the list to 43. Then, through May and July, lawyers from those
firms traveled to New York for a cross-examination by a phalanx of
Pfizer lawyers and its consultants. The sessions caused more than a
little internal friction. For instance, Pfizer suggested that firms
bring six or fewer lawyers to the table, including one person whom
the firm considered a rising superstar. Lawyers at one giant firm
argued over whom to take. "You can't imagine the amount of
politicking this raised," said an insider there who requested
anonymity.
The sessions got pretty lively. Many of the slick PowerPoint
presentations were ignored as Pfizer's inquisitors pressed lawyers
on their RFI responses. Chuck Socha, a partner at Denver's Socha,
Perczak, Setter & Anderson, said his questioners wanted to know how
his small firm, which had never handled Pfizer business before,
could possibly handle litigation from Utah all the way up to
Washington State. "They said, 'You have a 14-member team. What makes
you think you're capable of running the region?' "We have skins on
the wall," Mr. Socha said he responded, pointing to its vigorous
defenses in asbestos and silica litigation. (Socha, Perczak made the
final list.)
'A Lot Expected'
This fall Pfizer contacted the 24 firms that made the final list.
Later this year lawyers from the winning firms will travel to
Pfizer's research & development labs in Groton, Conn., to take a
tour of the labs and meet with its litigation team, including Mr.
Waxman, Mr. Paulmann, and Sandra Phillips, a Pfizer assistant
general counsel and section chief for product litigation. "I want
these folks to see the lifeblood of this company and to understand
in a much more intimate fashion what's going on here, what's
driving us, what are we doing as a company," said Mr. Waxman.
But the winning firms cannot rest easy. "The feedback I've gotten
from the firms was 'This was painful. This was long. It was
arduous,'" Mr. Waxman said. But he stressed the outcome: "Better
relationships, better value there's a lot expected at this point."
Eriq Gardner is a writer for Corporate Counsel magazine, an
affiliate of the New York Law Journal. A version of this article
will appear in the December issue of the magazine.
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