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Clients
Must Pay Taxes On Lawyers' Contingency Fees
By Tony Mauro
Legal Times
New York Lawyer
January 25, 2005
WASHINGTON 覧 In a pair of
cases with potential pocketbook impact on lawyers and their clients,
the U.S. Supreme Court ruled yesterday that the contingent fee
portion of lawsuit settlements and awards is taxable to the client,
even if the money goes directly to the attorney.
The initial reaction to the
8-0 decision was more muted than expected because a law passed by
Congress last fall limits the ruling's implications. The decision
will not doom the contingent fee system, which fuels a broad range
of private litigation.
While the cases 覧
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Banks and Commissioner of
Internal Revenue v. Banaitis 覧 were pending last fall, Congress
passed a provision allowing taxpayers who win awards in employment,
whistleblower and civil rights litigation not to count attorney fees
and court costs as taxable income. Congress already allows this for
lawyer fees in personal injury cases.
In addition, Justice
Anthony Kennedy, in his opinion for the Court, explicitly said he
was not ruling on the tax implications of other federal laws that
provide attorney's fees, some of which exceed the award the
plaintiff receives.
But in other types of
commercial litigation under federal and state law, experts forecast
more costly settlements in light of yesterday's ruling because
winning plaintiffs may insist that the extra tax they have to pay be
tacked onto the settlement.
"Congress preempted the
worst possible impact of today's rulings," said Jennifer Brown,
legal director of Legal Momentum, formerly the NOW Legal Defense and
Education Fund, which worried that a ruling against the taxpayer
would discourage public interest litigation. "But we are still
concerned about other cases in which the contingency fee offers the
only means of access to the courts for people of ordinary means."
Jeffrey White, a lawyer for
the Association of Trial Lawyers of America, said, "Now, in some
cases, when both sides sit down to discuss settlement, you'll have
to evaluate the tax consequences on the individual plaintiff and
maybe hire a tax consultant. It will get a lot more complicated."
Supreme Court Reviews Taxes on Contingency Fees
Marcia Coyle
The National Law Journal
November 9, 2004
Although it seems unfair to require taxpayers to pay taxes on lawyer
contingency fees paid out of a court award or settlement, the law
may not be on their side, some justices suggested during U.S.
Supreme Court arguments last week.
The high court on Nov. 1 took up two consolidated appeals by the
government on an issue that has split the circuit courts: whether
taxpayers are required to include in their gross income the portion
of damages recovery that is used to pay an attorney under a
contingency fee agreement. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Banks, No. 03-892; Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Banaitis, No. 03-907.
An unusual coalition of business, trial lawyers and civil rights
groups is urging the justices to rule against the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS), which argued -- and lost in the courts below -- that
the entire recovery must be included in a taxpayer's gross income.
In Banks, John W. Banks settled an employment discrimination
lawsuit for $464,000 and paid $150,000 of that settlement to his
lawyer. In Banaitis, Sigitas Banaitis and his former bank
employers settled his job-related claims for nearly $9 million,
about $4 million of which went to Banaitis' lawyers.
The IRS said the entire recovery must be included in gross income
and the legal fees could be an itemized deduction. But the
alternative minimum tax, which generally kicks in with higher
awards, applied to the Banks and Banaitis recoveries. The attorney
fees were not deductible, and the alternative tax resulted in a
significantly higher tax assessment for each man.
A 'Sweeping' Definition
During arguments, Assistant to the Solicitor General David B.
Salmons told the justices that the law's definition of gross income
is "sweeping." He argued that income is taxed to the person who
earns it, and here the client was at all relevant times in control
of the underlying source of income.
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor called "appalling" the situation where a
plaintiff may end up paying more in taxes than he or she received in
a recovery.
Salmons conceded such situations occur, but he added, "The proper
result is to go to Congress."
Banaitis' counsel, Philip N. Jones of Portland, Ore.'s Duffy Kekel,
and Banks' attorney, James R. Carty of Los Angeles, offered the
court several alternatives to the government's position. They argued
that a contingency fee arrangement is similar to a joint venture in
which each party is taxed on only his or her share of the resulting
income. They also argued, among other things, that Oregon law gives
lawyers a strong property interest in contingent fees
But Justice Stephen G. Breyer, voicing the dissatisfaction that some
of his colleagues also expressed with those arguments, said: "Your
problem is that maybe the equities are there, but what is the theory
of law?" He pressed for "precise form of words" that would govern
the contingency fee relationship.Lawyers' Fees No
Longer Face Double Tax Under New Law
Lawyers' Fees
No Longer Face Double Tax Under New Law
By Tony Mauro
New York Lawyer
New York Law Journal
October 14, 2004
WASHINGTON 覧 Amidst all
the corporate tax benefits enacted by the Senate on Monday, one
little-noticed provision may turn out to be a boon for civil rights
plaintiffs, public interest groups, whistleblowers and even trial
lawyers.
The American Jobs Creation
Act of 2004, which now heads to President George W. Bush for
signature, contains a section ending the "double taxation" of lawyer
contingent fees in several types of litigation. The Internal Revenue
Service has favored double taxation for years, and its policy is the
subject of two cases set for argument at the U.S. Supreme Court Nov.
1.
Until now, the IRS required
a victorious civil rights or other plaintiff who won, for example, a
damage award of $100,000 to pay taxes on the entire amount, even
though a contingent fee of $30,000 went to the plaintiff's attorney,
and even though the attorney would pay taxes on that $30,000. The
government's theory was that the entire award went to the client and
should be taxed to the client, no matter where a chunk of the award
ended up.
This double taxation has
been challenged in court, with mixed success, as a powerful
disincentive for public interest and civil rights litigation. A bill
to fix the problem, the Civil Rights Tax Relief Act, has languished
in Congress for nearly five years without success until this week.
"I am proud to say today we
are putting a permanent provision in law that will protect people
who risk their health and safety to help the government identify and
prosecute fraud, and others who fight to protect their civil
rights," said Representative Deborah Pryce, R-Ohio, an original
co-sponsor of the bill four years ago. Senator Susan Collins,
R-Maine, also pushed for the law.
The National Employment
Lawyers Association, one of a coalition of groups that fought for
the bill, was also celebrating this week.
"We are thrilled that
Congress saw the wisdom of relieving individuals from having to pay
taxes on fees that are paid to their attorneys, where the attorneys
are already taxed on those same fees," said Bruce Fredrickson, vice
president of public policy.
Mr. Fredrickson said the
bill was supported by groups ranging from AARP to the National
Whistleblower Center and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Even though
they are on the other side of affected litigation, businesses did
not like the double taxation policy because it would jack up the
cost of settling suits to compensate for the extra tax payments.
"This tax issue complicated
nearly every employment discrimination settlement we dealt with,"
said Mr. Fredrickson.
The fact that groups across
the political spectrum sought the change, he added, was a big factor
in the legislation's success.
The old tax policy began to
show signs of weakness when appeals courts began siding with
taxpayers who challenged it. The IRS, in turn, sought to defend the
policy in a pair of cases now before the Supreme Court:
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Banks and Commissioner of
Internal Revenue v. Banaitis. Both won awards in employment
disputes and challenged tax bills based on the full amount.
The fact that Congress has
now overturned the disputed policy has thrown those cases into
uncertainty, though they do not become entirely moot.
Jerome Libin of Sutherland
Asbill & Brennan in Washington, D.C., who wrote a brief in the
Supreme Court cases on behalf of several civil rights groups, said
his understanding of the new provision is that it is prospective and
that it may only cover contingent fees in litigation under specific
laws listed in the legislation.
"There is still a broader
issue of other kinds of litigation," Mr. Libin said.
Since Banks and
Banaitis involve two taxpayers among the hundreds who have been
levied the disputed tax in the past, their cases might still be
alive.
"There are lots of people
in that position who might not be affected by a prospective law,"
said University of Washington School of Law professor Eric Schnapper,
lawyer for Sigitas Banaitis, who challenged his tax bill on an $8.7
million settlement he won in an employment dispute, even though $3.8
million went to his attorneys. Mr. Schnapper said it was too soon to
assess the full impact of the congressional enactment on the pending
Supreme Court cases.
It is also possible that in
light of the new preferences expressed by Congress, the IRS would
drop its pursuit of taxes under the old policy, Mr. Libin said,
"though that is doubtful."
Mr. Libin said the old
policy was especially harmful because the alternative minimum tax
does not allow taxpayers to deduct attorney's fees from income. In
cases where attorney's fees exceeded the damage awards 覧 such as in
public interest litigation where relief is injunctive or awards are
minimal 覧 a client could be forced to pay more in taxes than he or
she won in the award.
"Congress cannot have
intended the tax laws to produce a result that would clash so
directly with its intentions in the civil rights area," Mr. Libin
wrote in his brief before the Court.
Among the groups joining
the brief were the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law,
the Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, and the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People.
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