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NY Firm
Can Sue Client for Contingency Fee After Billing $18 Million,
Getting $5 Million in "Gifts"
By Anthony Lin
New York Law Journal
New York Lawyer
November 28, 2007
A 40-percent contingent-fee agreement between New York law firm
Graubard Miller and Alice Lawrence, the 83-year-old widow of real
estate developer Sylvan Lawrence, was not unconscionable on its
face, an appellate court said yesterday, even though the agreement
was executed in the final months of a decades-long estate litigation
in which the firm had already received $18 million in hourly fees
and three partners had further requested and received $5 million in
"gifts."
In
Lawrence v. Graubard Miller et al.,
603257/05, 4-1 majority of the Appellate Division, First Department,
denied Ms. Lawrence's motion to dismiss Graubard Miller's petition
to compel payment of the contingent fee and said further proceedings
would be needed to determine the propriety of the arrangement.
"[W]hile at first blush such agreement might arguably seem excessive
and invite skepticism, before any determination regarding
unconscionability can be made, the circumstances underlying the
agreement must be fully developed, including any discussions leading
to the agreement, as well as the prospects at that time of
successfully concluding the litigation in favor of Mrs. Lawrence,"
Justice Richard T. Andrias wrote for a majority that included
Justices David Friedman, George D. Marlow and Eugene Nardelli.
But in a blistering dissent, Justice James M. Catterson said he
would not only have found the fee agreement invalid on its face but
would also have referred the Graubard Miller lawyers to the
Departmental Disciplinary Committee.
"Regardless of the procedural aspects of the parties' negotiations,
no court can condone such an exorbitant fee," Justice Catterson
wrote.
Ms. Lawrence first retained the law firm then known as Graubard
Moskovitz McGoldrick Dannett & Horowitz in 1983 to represent her in
a suit against Seymour Cohn, her late husband's brother, business
partner and executor.
At the time of Mr. Lawrence's death in 1981, the brothers held a
12-million-square-foot real estate portfolio that included the
former Port Authority building at 111 Eighth Avenue and a number of
Wall Street office towers. It was estimated to be worth over $1
billion. Ms. Lawrence, who inherited 75 percent of her husband's
interest, sought the portfolio's sale, but Mr. Cohn, who died in
2003, long opposed her.
Over the next 20 years, some $350 million was distributed from the
estate, but the litigation dragged on until a final settlement was
reached in May 2005 by which the estate of Mr. Cohn would pay Ms.
Lawrence and her children $105 million. Graubard Miller is seeking
40 percent of this amount, or around $42 million. Ms. Lawrence has
sought rescission of the agreement as well as the return of all
previous fees on the grounds of unjust enrichment and breach of
fiduciary duty.
Though contingent fees of such magnitude are not uncommon in
personal injury cases, they are rarer in estate cases. Moreover,
such deals normally date from the beginning of the litigation and
are in lieu of hourly fees, meaning a law firm bringing a case on a
contingent-fee basis normally faces a risk of non-recovery.
But Graubard Miller's contingent-fee deal was signed in January
2005, only months before the settlement. The 1983 retainer agreement
in effect prior to that only specified hourly billing. In his
dissent, Justice Catterson said the contingent fee might have been
reasonable if agreed upon at the beginning of the case or if the
firm had agreed to refund its previous fees.
"Without the costs and risks generally associated with contingency
fee arrangements, such a fee agreement is nothing short of plain
greed," he wrote.
The contingent-fee arrangement was proposed to Ms. Lawrence by
Graubard Miller partner C. Daniel Chill. In 1998, Mr. Chill had also
allegedly asked Ms. Lawrence to pay him and two other partners
multi-million-dollar "gifts," telling her that such payments were
typical in longstanding attorney-client relationships.
Ms. Lawrence subsequently wrote a personal check to Mr. Chill for $2
million and also wrote $1.6 million and $1.5 million checks
respectively to Graubard Miller partners Elaine Reich and Steven
Mallis. At Mr. Chill's alleged request, she also paid $2.7 million
in gift taxes. She is also seeking the return of these payments.
But the appellate court majority said the propriety of both the
retainer agreement and the gifts depended upon Ms. Lawrence's
capacity at the time she entered into it, and that her advanced age
was not dispositive of the issue. In its decision, the court cited
the recommendation of a referee appointed by former Manhattan
Surrogate Renee Roth.
The referee, former Court of Appeals Judge Howard Levine, had
concluded that there was no legal authority for finding a contingent
fee unconscionable solely on the basis of its size and without any
inquiry into the discussions between client and attorney.
Mr. Levine was also last month appointed one of the administrators
of the late Brooke Astor's estimated $190 million estate. Yesterday,
the Manhattan District Attorney's Office announced criminal fraud
and larceny charges against Ms. Astor's son and his former lawyer.
In Ms. Lawrence's court filings, she claimed her capacity at the
time she agreed to the contingent fee was diminished because of a
recent surgery, for which she was taking pain medication.
Graubard Miller's lawyer, Mark Zauderer of Flemming Zulack
Williamson Zauderer, said yesterday that Ms. Lawrence was
sophisticated woman who had entered into the fee agreement with full
knowledge. He said the firm was delighted with the First
Department's decision.
"They affirmed Graubard's right to a hard-earned fee in a very
complex case," he said.
Leslie D. Corwin of Greenberg Traurig, the lawyer for Ms. Lawrence,
said yesterday that he strongly agreed with Justice Catterson's
dissent and felt the case should be decided on the law, with no need
to elicit further facts. Though he said he was still conferring with
his client on her options, he said the likelihood of an appeal was
strong.
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