NY BigLaw Partner Hit With $372,000
 Sanction, Five Year Suspension

By Leigh Jones
The National Law Journal
New York Lawyer
June 15, 2009

A federal appeals court has upheld a $372,000 sanction against a Crowell & Moring partner and affirmed his five-year suspension from practice in bankruptcy court in a big swath of Florida.

Peter R. Ginsberg, a white-collar defense attorney in Washington, D.C.-based Crowell & Moring's New York office and a former Assistant U.S. Attorney, lost his appeal of the sanctions on Thursday in the 11th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. A three-judge panel found that Ginsberg's attempts to have a bankruptcy judge recuse himself from a Chapter 11 case were in bad faith.

The appeals court affirmed the $371,517 monetary sanction imposed by the judge whom Ginsberg attempted to oust and upheld the judge's suspension of Ginsberg's license to practice for five years in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida. The district extends from the Georgia border to Florida's southwest coast and includes Jacksonville, Orlando and Tampa, Fla.

Ginsberg, reached by phone on Friday, said that he was disappointed in the decision. "We believe we properly represented our client against an abusive situation in the Florida court," Ginsberg said.

The sanction stemmed from the bankruptcy of Evergreen Security Inc., which, according to Thurday's decision, the bankruptcy court deemed was part of a Ponzi scheme. Ginsberg represented one of principals of Evergreen, who in 2006 was found liable for $8 million for receiving fraudulent transfers of Evergreen's assets. U.S Bankruptcy Judge Arthur B. Briskman presided over the Evergreen case.

Following the judgment against Ginsberg's client, Ginsberg sought Briskman's recusal, alleging that the judge was not impartial. Specifically, Ginsberg alleged that Briskman engaged in misconduct in another case involving one of the Evergreen defendants and that he participated in ex parte communications with the attorney representing Evergreen. Ginsberg also alleged professional misconduct by Evergreen's attorney.

Briskman, who presided over the recusal motion and the sanctions hearings, found that Ginsberg failed to establish any legal or factual support for the allegations and that he had filed the recusal motion as a delay tactic.

In affirming Briskman's decision, the appeals panel found that Ginsberg's conduct was "egregious" and included overzealous litigation tactics and factual inaccuracies. The panel also found that he demonstrated disrespectful behavior and bad faith. The panel noted that Ginsberg's first comments to Briskman during the recusal hearing were, "Your honor has compromised my health, your honor has compromised my immune system."

The appeals panel found that "Ginsberg was extremely difficult to deal with and disrespectful to the court," and that "he refused to answer the court's questions, treated the court as an adversary and continually made inflammatory statements."

The panel determined that the monetary sanctions, based on the attorney fees incurred by the Evergreen Security, were appropriate, and that the five-year suspension from practicing in a Florida bankruptcy court was reasonable for a New York attorney.

Ginsberg joined Crowell & Moring in 2007. He was an Assistant U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of New York for seven years and previously practiced at Gold & Wachtell in Washington. He holds a law degree from Columbia Law School and a master of science degree from the London School of Economics and Political Science.

He has not determined his next step in the Evergreen case, he said.

The judges in In Re: Evergreen Security v. Ginsberg, No. 6:08cv00046, were Stanley F. Birch Jr., Frank M. Hull and Peter T. Fay, who wrote the decision.

Famous Lawyer Loses Fight for Right to Criticize Judges

By Ed White
The Associated Press
New York Lawyer
January 21, 2009

A federal appeals court threw out a lawsuit Tuesday by Geoffrey Fieger, who claims his criticism of Michigan judges is protected by the First Amendment.

The court, in a 2-1 decision, overturned a significant ruling that had gone in Fieger's favor in a long-running clash between the outspoken and often unbridled trial lawyer and the Michigan judiciary.

Fieger got in hot water in 1999 when he gave a blistering critique of three state judges who reversed a $15 million malpractice verdict against his client.

"I declare war on you," he said on a radio show -- and much more.

The Michigan Supreme Court said Fieger violated rules of professional conduct. But a federal judge in Detroit found the civility rules overly broad and unconstitutional.

The 6th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals has reversed that ruling, saying, in part, that Fieger can't show any harm from a reprimand.

And the "threat of future injury arising from a general desire to criticize the Michigan judiciary is significantly diminished" by the state Supreme Court's narrow rules, the 6th Circuit said.

"The Michigan Supreme Court emphasized that Fieger violated the rules, not because he criticized judges, but because he made vulgar, personally abusive comments about participants in a pending case," the appeals court said.

Fieger said the judges who reversed his medical-malpractice verdict were "three jackass ... judges." He likened them to Nazi leaders and said Judge Jane Markey was "Eva Braun," wife of Adolf Hitler.

Fieger agreed to a reprimand while reserving his right to go to court to challenge certain rules of professional conduct for Michigan lawyers. A message seeking comment was left at his office Tuesday.

In a dissent, Judge Gilbert Merritt of the 6th Circuit said there's nothing "narrow" about Michigan's rules for lawyers.

"Comparing judges to Hitler and Goebbels evidently falls on the wrong side of the line," he said. "But would it be permissible to ... say that the judges 'behaved dictatorially?'

"Saying that a judge is a 'jackass' appears to be impermissible -- despite the fact that the word is a non-vulgar name for a donkey," Merritt wrote.

"But would it be permissible," he added, "to vary the 'form and manner' and say that he is a 'stubborn idiot,' a 'right-wing radical,' a 'doctrinaire ideologue' or 'driven by party politics?'"

Former Michigan Supreme Court Chief Justice Cliff Taylor, who in 2006 wrote the 4-3 opinion reprimanding Fieger, said he was trying to address conduct "at the very center" of incivility.

"I want lawyers to speak about what the court has done professionally, not as vulgar backroom brawlers," Taylor

"Witch" Glitch: Attorney Argues His Blog
Post About Judge Was Protected Speech

By Jordana Mishory
Daily Business Review
New York Lawyer
July 16,2008

Fort Lauderdale, Fla., criminal defense attorney Sean Conway agreed he was in the wrong when he called a controversial Broward judge an "evil, unfair witch" and "seemingly mentally ill" two Halloweens ago.

But following the intervention of the Florida Supreme Court, Conway is attempting to get his conditional guilty plea tossed on the basis that the First Amendment protected his comments.

An attorney should be able to have some liberty in expression and not face disciplinary action, lawyers argued in Florida Supreme Court briefs.

"Questioning a judge's qualifications for an elected position lies at the core of our First Amendment freedoms," the American Civil Liberties Union wrote on behalf of Conway.

He faces Florida Bar discipline for writing disparaging comments about controversial Broward Circuit Judge Cheryl Aleman on a popular law blog. But a deal with the Bar requiring a guilty plea in exchange for a public reprimand was called into question last month by the state's high court.

The justices directed both parties to file briefs by Monday on whether his comments are protected speech under the First Amendment.

The court raised the speech issue but also has been pushing for greater professionalism in the legal community.

In several recent cases, the Supreme Court has stiffened suggested penalties in an effort to make the point that it's getting tough on lawyer misconduct.

Conway and the ACLU, which filed an amicus brief, contend his comments on JAABlog were exaggerated opinions, which are constitutionally protected.

"On Halloween 2006, the respondent referred to Judge Aleman as a mean-spirited witch," Conway's attorney b wrote. "His comment that Judge Aleman was a 'witch' is an example of figurative speech."

Wrubel also noted the limiting word "seemingly" in Conway's phrase about mental illness "falls squarely into the category of cautionary terms" and should be protected by the First Amendment. Both Conway and ACLU attorneys Randall Marshall and Maria Kayanan defended Conway's remarks as permissible hyperbole.

Aleman did not respond to a call for comment by deadline.

Wrubel said Conway was exercising a freedom exulted by founding father James Madison, and the court should reject his client's guilty plea and dismiss the Bar complaint.

In an interview, Conway said he pleaded guilty out of concern for the outcome in his case.

"With so many years of stagnant, unchanged, old-school policy, I had no faith that justice would make an appearance in my case in a South Florida courtroom," Conway said. Conway also pointed to the fact that Aleman had changed the policy that he blogged about, so he had accomplished the goal of his posting and now needed to move on with his life.

Wrubel said in an interview that just because Conway admitted in writing that he violated a Bar rule doesn't mean that he actually did. The ACLU of Florida contended the Bar's case against Conway "imperils the core values of the Constitution."

And the Supreme Court, which brought up the free speech question on its own, was also apparently troubled. In its order to show cause, the justices directed both parties to address "whether any of the respondent's comments should be considered protected speech under the First Amendment."

The Florida Bar did not see it the same way. Asserting the practice of law is a privilege, the Bar contended free speech rights don't shield an attorney from discipline. The Bar argued Conway did not have any reasonable objective basis to support inappropriate comments about a member of the judiciary. Conway, "as an officer of the court, made statements that directly attacked the qualifications or integrity of a judge," the Bar wrote.

He was accused of violating Bar rules forbidding attorneys from impugning the qualifications of a judge and making statements known to be false or in reckless disregard to the truth. But attorneys claim that you cannot measure the truth of hyperbole.

Nova Southeastern University constitutional law professor Robert Jarvis, who is not involved with the case, said Conway's statements don't mean that Aleman casts spells, wears black hats or flies on a broomstick. He said that just because a theater critic says a play is the worst show ever doesn't mean it's true. He said most readers would know that the critic had not seen and judged every play ever created but could say it for dramatic effect.

The Bar noted Conway agreed to a conditional guilty plea that hinged on him acknowledging his remarks about Aleman were either false or made with reckless disregard. But that does not mean the justices have an obligation to accept the Bar's findings. The Supreme Court has the final word.

Jarvis said the high court's order to show cause indicates that the justices want to take a closer look at this issue instead of rubberstamping the Bar's findings. Jarvis called this case a "no brainer."

"Lawyers are people, too," Jarvis said. "If you cut us, do we not bleed? And just because you become a lawyer doesn't mean you give up your First Amendment rights."

However, he added that Conway's colorful language on the blog diminished his criticisms. He said Conway should have turned to more tangible facts to criticize Aleman than name-calling. Conway also is in trouble for saying Aleman had an "ugly, condescending attitude," was "unfit for her position" and there was "nothing honorable about that malcontent."

In his brief, Conway claimed his statements were all protected opinions rather than false. His comments surfaced in a blog posting claiming Aleman forced defendants to waive their right to a speedy trial by setting trials just a few weeks after arraignment.

Aleman is one of Broward's most controversial judges -- making headlines since she was sworn in more than six years ago. The 4th District Court of Appeal overturned her in several high-profile cases for overstepping the "wide latitude" afforded judges and sentencing a defendant in excess of the statutory maximum. Last February, the Judicial Qualifications Commission, which regulates judges, filed formal charges against Aleman for threatening to hold or holding attorneys in contempt of court and not removing herself from cases where she had prior problems with attorneys.

The state JQC recommended she receive a public reprimand for engaging in a pattern of arrogant and discourteous conduct. She appealed the ruling to the court, which has not weighed in yet. Both Conway and ACLU attorneys maintained Conway was exposing a potential problem in Aleman's courtroom. If Conway were sanctioned, the ACLU contended his First Amendment rights -- and the rights of the public -- would be trampled.

Both Conway and the ACLU noted a 2001 disciplinary case cited in the Supreme Court's order to show cause. The justices in the old case noted attorneys "play an important role in exposing valid problems within the judicial system." Attorneys should only be prohibited from making false statements that would "erode public confidence" without publicizing "problems that legitimately deserve attention."

Conway and the ACLU said the Bar never challenged Conway's account of what happened in Aleman's courtroom, and his referee never conducted any evidentiary hearings to vet the truthfulness of Conway's claims. They argued his comments can be seen only as opinion because the referee never found that Conway lied about what happened.

The ACLU went a step further saying that even if Conway's statements were false, they should not violate the Bar rules unless Conway knew what he was saying was wrong or reckless. "In short, Judge Aleman's rulings provided the respondent with an objectively reasonable basis in fact to express the opinions which he posted the following day on JAABlog," Wrubel wrote.

The Bar countered that the reason the claims were never vetted was because of Conway's plea agreement. The Bar also claimed his intent was not to expose a wrong but to lash out at Aleman. He "never sought redress by any other means other than posting his blog on the Internet," the Bar wrote. "The respondent never sought judicial review of the judge's continuance policy through an appeal nor did he file any complaint of judicial misconduct with the appropriate agency." Conway said he filed a Judicial Qualifications Commission complaint against Aleman and interviewed with the JQC's special counsel who was prosecuting Ale>man.

Conway said he is shocked that the Bar would misrepresent that in a brief, when they could easily check with the JQC. However, the state Constitution maintains that JQC complaints are confidential until probable cause is found against the judge. Citing case law, the Bar said courts have ruled vile attacks and angry outbursts "by their very nature are likely to indicate a reckless disregard for the truth of what is being said and not protected free speech under the First Amendment." The Bar pointed to a 2003 Minnesota case where that state's Supreme Court rejected the argument that a lawyer had a First Amendment right to state a judge won election to the bench "by appealing to racism." The court wrote, "merely cloaking an assertion of fact as an opinion does not give the assertion constitutional protection."

The Bar also cited a 2000 case where the Delaware Supreme Court found that a lawyer's statements claiming a judge "suffered a progressive mental disability" causing "mood swings and injudicious conduct" was not protected because they were made with reckless disregard to the truth. The Bar pointed to Conway's comments that Aleman was "seemingly mentally ill," saying that he did not have the medical background to make such a claim.

Fieger Wins, and Campaign Cash Still Rules

Editorial
Free Press of Detroit
June 4, 2008

Campaign finance laws exist for two reasons: one, to ensure disclosure of the influence of money on the political process; and two, to soften the effects of that influence by enacting limits on contributions and other restraints.

There is no doubt that Southfield attorney Geoffrey Fieger completely subverted those aims when he essentially laundered through employees of his law firm hefty contributions to the 2004 presidential campaign of John Edwards.

But can you make a federal case out of it? A U.S. District Court jury didn't think so, refusing Monday to convict Fieger and law partner Vernon (Ven) Johnson of doing anything illegal. So congratulations to Fieger for gaming the system and then beating it.

But that doesn't make what he did right.

The problems with money and politics should, by now, be quite clear. Too much of the political process is dictated by who has money, who gives it and how public policy decisions are made with respect to the money trail. Right now, we're in the midst of the most expensive presidential campaign in history, which will be true only until the next one, four years from now.

Campaigns on the merits, in which the candidate with the strongest ideas wins, regardless of financial backing, are a pipe dream.

The obvious solution is some sort of public financing that puts everyone on equal footing. Remove private money from the process altogether and let the candidate have at each other on the issues.

No surprise, there's tons of moneyed opposition to such a system. And there are constitutional questions looming over any mandatory public finance system that prohibits contributions, which are still deemed a form of political expression, though they often seem more like naked commerce.

But even without such stark reforms, the system ought to have some integrity, and the limits established by law ought to be enforced. Fieger got around them by being clever, pleading ignorance, then getting a jury to see it his way. It certainly helped that the local U.S. attorney's office had been frighteningly aggressive in its pursuit of Fieger, and that he had the cash to hire an attorney who reputedly has never lost a case. Yes, money matters in criminal justice at least as much as it does in politics.

No doubt, Fieger's acquittal gives a little more mettle to other fat cats who want to skirt the law. It's a victory for him, but a step back for the political process.

Fieger Is Cleared in Campaign Fund Case
Lawyer Was 'Scared to Death' of Guilty Verdict
 

Paul Egan and Doug Guthrie
The Detroit News
June 3, 2008

DETROIT -- Southfield attorney Geoffrey Fieger and his celebrity attorney, Gerry Spence, embraced and kissed jurors on the courthouse steps Monday after they acquitted Fieger and his law partner Ven Johnson of all criminal charges.

The joyous scene outside the federal courthouse in Detroit contrasted sharply with the mood inside, where federal prosecutors left U.S. District Judge Paul D. Borman's courtroom after being handed a major defeat in a high-profile case. "We're very disappointed," said Assistant U.S. Attorney Lynn Helland.

Fieger, 57, and Johnson, 46, were indicted by a federal grand jury last year on conspiracy and illegal campaign contribution charges, accused of illegally reimbursing more than $100,000 in political donations made by employees, employee relatives and law firm vendors to the 2004 presidential campaign of Democrat John Edwards. Fieger also was charged with obstruction of justice, a 10-year felony.

The acquittals represent the latest in a string of high-profile setbacks for the U.S. Attorney's Office in Detroit and the U.S. Justice Department, including the voluntary reversal in 2004 of convictions won in the "sleeper cell" terrorism trial, the acquittal of former Macomb County Prosecutor Carl Marlinga in 2006 and the acquittal of former federal prosecutor Richard Convertino in 2007.

After more than 18 hours of deliberations spanning four days, jury foreman Scott Duquette, a Macomb Township auto technician, stood in a packed courtroom and pronounced "not guilty" verdicts on all 10 counts.

"I hope this will put an end to political prosecutions in the age of Mr. Bush," Fieger said, referring to the U.S. president whose administration he accused of targeting him.

The key issue in the case was whether Fieger and Johnson knowingly broke the law. Fieger took the stand in his own defense, telling jurors he carefully researched the law and concluded the reimbursements were legal.

"I was scared to death," Fieger said after the verdict. "It would have been the end of my career. It would have been the end of my family as I know it. It would have been the end and I would have gone to prison."

Prosecutors alleged Fieger's firm illegally reimbursed donations to Edwards campaign totaling $127,000, a figure that was adjusted downward to $113,000 at the end of the trial.

Jurors said they decided to acquit Johnson last week and eventually reached a unanimous decision that the government never proved a case against Fieger, either.

Juror Al Rollins, 51, said he believed politics played a part in the decision to go after Fieger. Congress should make it more clear what is legal and what isn't, he said.

"The government was after them and they didn't do a very good job of it," Rollins said. "He (Fieger) clearly didn't know what he did was illegal. He thought it was legal."

Another juror, Burlrando Pearce, said he began jury deliberations Wednesday believing Fieger should be convicted but eventually came around to the majority view and voted for acquittal.

He and other jurors said discussions sometimes became heated to the point they believed they could be heard outside the jury room.

"It was kind of volatile," said Pearce, a 33-year-old autoworker who said he is satisfied with the verdict ultimately reached. "It was unforgettable," he said. "It's something I don't ever want to go through again."

Jury: Feds Didn't Prove Case

Duquette and most other jurors interviewed said they didn't know if the prosecution was politically motivated but did not believe the government proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt.

The trial began April 24 and heard 18 days of evidence.

Fieger was a 1998 Democratic candidate for governor who rose to prominence in the 1990s representing assisted suicide advocate Jack Kevorkian.

Fieger alleged he was the victim of a partisan Republican U.S. Justice Department, a charge Helland denied.

Spence, 79, the legendary Wyoming attorney who announced during his closing argument that the Fieger case would be his last, hugged jurors outside the courthouse, telling Duquette that he was the one juror Spence did not feel he could get a read on which way he was leaning.

"I knew this jury would never convict," Spence said after the verdict. "They were a good, solid American jury and the evidence wasn't there."

Spence, who has written several books on criminal defense, defended former Philippine first lady Imelda Marcos, Idaho separatist Randy Weaver in the Ruby Ridge case, and the family of corporate whistle-blower Karen Silkwood.

Spence boasts he has never lost a criminal case and it appears he will now retire with his record intact.

West Bloomfield labor attorney Lester Owczarski, a former state administrative law judge who sat through most of the trial, said prosecutors failed to present a case jurors could care about. "It was too much inside baseball ... this thing was just too technical," he said of the Fieger case.

Steve Fishman, Johnson's Detroit attorney, admitted to jurors his initial confidence in an acquittal began to wane as the deliberations dragged on. Fishman told Duquette jurors they could have saved Johnson grief by returning his "not guilty" verdicts last week and continuing to deliberate over Fieger.

Feds: Case is Not Political

The frequently bombastic Fieger, who has used harsh language to castigate former Michigan Gov. John Engler and state appellate judges, was relatively reserved in his comments following the verdict, mostly expressing gratitude to the jurors who acquitted him.

But Johnson, Fieger's partner, filled the temporary void, denouncing the federal grand jury system as a secret "star chamber" that facilitated a "witch hunt" and needs a total overhaul. "This case proves it," Johnson said.

"I will fully investigate a malicious prosecution claim against these prosecutors of the U.S. government for what they've done to us," Johnson said.

The trial heard evidence that the 80 federal agents who searched parts of Fieger's Southfield law offices and questioned Fieger employees on Nov. 30, 2005, represented the largest such force ever assembled for a campaign finance case.

But Helland noted Borman rejected defense claims that the case was political.

"This was not in the least a politically motivated prosecution," he said. "The case was handled from the beginning by line level attorneys working with line level discretion and established guidelines."

An unusually large number of FBI agents were needed on the night of the raid because it was an unusual case that required a lot of people to be interviewed in a hurry, he said.

"Very few crimes have this many participants," Helland said. "We needed to talk to them before they could get their stories straight."

Immediately after the verdict, Fieger kissed his wife, Keenie, who wept.

"This has felt like a bad dream," she said. "It's like we've been held prisoner all this time and now, suddenly, we are free again. I think it's clear that the jurors recognized what was going on."

Famous Lawyer, Partner on Trial
 Dodging Campaign Finance Laws

By David Runk
The Associated Press
New York Lawyer
April 24, 2008

DETROIT (AP) _ A federal prosecutor says outspoken lawyer Geoffrey Fieger and a law partner knowingly dodged campaign finance laws to boost contributions to Democrat John Edwards' 2004 presidential campaign.

Assistant U.S. Attorney Lynn Helland delivered his opening argument Thursday in the trial of Fieger and Ven Johnson.

Both men have denied the charges. Their lawyers are scheduled to deliver their opening statements later in the day in Detroit federal court.

Helland told the jury the case was about illegal fundraising. He says both defendants "took steps to try to make these illegal contributions look legal."

The 56-year-old Fieger and 46-year-old Johnson are accused of making $127,000 in illegal contributions to Edwards' 2004 campaign

Taxpayer Advocate Richard Fine Faces Disbarment

The National Law Journal
Legal Pad LA
January 31, 2008

Tarzana attorney Richard Fine is charged with moral turpitude with a recommendation by California State Bar Court Judge Richard Honn that Fine be disbarred, the Los Angeles Daily News reports.

Honn alleges in state bar documents that Fine "filed meritless lawsuits" to retaliate against judges who ruled against him. Fine alleged L.A. Superior Court judges hadn't disclosed the nearly $40,000 paid to them annually by the county, on top of their salary, in cases where the county was a party.

Fine argued his case at state Supreme Court, who haven't ruled yet.

Fine told the Daily News that the state bar began action against him because he filed cases against judges - rather than his earlier cases against the state legislature and governor. According to the newspaper, "legal observers say the case against Fine is unusual." What do you think?

The state Court of Appeal in San Diego will hear oral arguments in February in a lawsuit, filed by Judicial Watch alleging the nearly $40,000 given by the county to judges as a extra benefit are a gift and waste of public funds.

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Bar Rules Should Protect Rights, Not Judges

Michael Mayo
South Florida Sun-Sentinel.com
January 6, 2008

The nerve of attorney Sean Conway, who faces disciplinary action from the Florida Bar for calling Broward Circuit Judge Cheryl Aleman an "evil, unfair witch" in an October 2006 Internet posting.

Where did he think he was, a free country with a First Amendment?

Nope. He's in Florida, where the Bar has been lowered with overly restrictive rules that protect judges at the expense of attorneys' freedom

 
Free Speech Advocate Conway         speech

For sure, Conway's post on a local judicial Web site (http://jaablog.jaablaw.com) was crude and inflammatory. While criticizing Aleman for setting trial dates for two weeks after arraignment, he called her "seemingly mentally ill" and wrote that "she is clearly unfit for her position."

He said he doesn't regret the strong language. "Defendant's right to a fair trial was being trampled on," Conway said Friday. "I thought it was my duty to expose it.... If I used other words, the situation might not have gotten the attention it deserved. I believe it got the message across, because her policy changed the next week."

But the message has put his livelihood at risk.

Conway's blog post triggered an investigation by the Florida Bar's grievance committee, which in November found probable cause that he violated five Bar rules, including impugning the qualifications and integrity of a judge.

Conway could be reprimanded, fined, suspended or disbarred for his actions.

"This has put more stress on me than I want to deal with," said Conway, 36. "I want to go back to running a small, one-person firm. I don't even have a secretary."

He said he's heard from lawyers all over, including one in Ohio suspended six months and fined $18,000 by the Ohio Bar for denigrating a judge.

Part of Conway wants the matter to go away by reaching some sort of settlement. But another part wants to fight for the bigger principles, seeing as how the Florida Bar is a branch of the Florida Supreme Court.

"The right of every lawyer to expose injustice is at stake," Conway said. "The Bill of Rights is at stake. And my license to practice law is at stake."
Last year, a U.S. district court in Michigan found that state's Bar rules overly restrictive in a case involving an attorney who called judges "Nazis" in a radio interview.

Wrote U.S. District Judge Arthur J. Tarnow: "The vague and overbroad courtesy provisions that enforce silence in the name of preserving the dignity of the bench does not override an attorney's right to speak her mind against public institutions, especially an elected judiciary, regardless of whether that speech is in good taste."

Most state bars have rules prohibiting attorneys from making statements that undermine public confidence in the judiciary. Conway agrees that lawyers shouldn't be allowed to make reckless allegations about judges. "I shouldn't be able to just spout off that so-and-so is on the take," Conway said. "But in this case I was trying to protect my clients."

Aleman, meanwhile, has been transferred from criminal to civil cases and awaits the outcome of a recent hearing by the state Judicial Qualifications Commission for possible misconduct in other cases. Morrie Levine, a Hollywood attorney who was chairman of the Florida Bar grievance committee when it found probable cause against Conway, said the committee was aware of the Michigan ruling but thought it was legally irrelevant in Florida.

"We followed Florida law and Florida Bar rules in making our decision," Levine said. "Whether the rules are overly broad or restrictive on free speech is not up to us.... I'm proud of our committee."e
Levine said this was the first case he was aware of involving the Internet.

The irony is if Conway hid behind anonymity or a pseudonym, as most Internet posters do, he probably wouldn't have gotten in trouble. "My nature is not to hide," Conway said.

By being a stand-up person and putting his name to his post, he's opened himself to harsh consequences.

Where's the justice in that?

http://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/local/broward/sfl-flbmayocol0106sbjan06,0,6957463.column?coll=sofla_tab01_layout

Attorney Who Called Judge an
"Evil Unfair Witch" on Blog Fights Ethics Probe

New York Lawyer
December 20, 2007
By Jordana Mishory
Daily Business Review

Do lawyers check their free speech rights at the courthouse steps?

That's exactly what some are wondering after it was disclosed that a criminal defense attorney is facing Florida Bar ethics charges for critical comments he posted on a Web log about a controversial Broward, Fla., judge.

A number of constitutional experts claim attorneys give up the full force of the First Amendment when they join the Bar, but other lawyers say they have every right to speak their mind.

The debate resurfaced after the Bar found probable cause against Fort Lauderdale, Fla., criminal defense attorney Sean Conway for calling Broward Circuit Judge Cheryl Aleman an "evil, unfair witch" who is "seemingly mentally ill" on a blog about the courthouse. Formal charges against Conway are pending.

Bar rules ban attorneys from making statements that impugn the integrity of a judge or the judiciary. Attorneys who violate the rules of professional conduct could face discipline ranging from a reprimand to disbarment.

Conway's attorney, Fred Haddad, claims the First Amendment protects his client's online comments posted on JAABlog in October 2006. The post criticized Aleman for allegedly forcing defendants in her courtroom to choose between the right to a speedy trial and the right to a well-prepared defense.

The controversial judge is facing her own disciplinary proceedings.

Haddad said Conway's situation is "absolutely absurd."

"You don't give up any constitutional rights when you become a lawyer," he said. "A lawyer has an obligation to educate the public. The choice of words is immaterial."

Attorney Louis Jepeway Jr., who represents lawyers before the Bar, said Conway should not be facing any sanctions. "Lawyers aren't second-class citizens," he said. "It is unfortunate the judge is so sensitive, but it's not a reason to violate [Conway's] First Amendment rights."

The Bar's Fort Lauderdale office, which found probable cause against Conway, did not return a call for comment by deadline Wednesday.

But several constitutional experts said an attorney's ability to speak about a judge ends when the statements cross from criticism about a judge's conduct or decisions to a personal attack. The intent is to ensure public confidence in the judiciary and the courts system, but it could undermine public trust in court operations.

Lida Rodriguez-Taseff, a Miami attorney and a former president Miami chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union, said the Bar can mandate ethical rules as a condition for admission, and the rules can limit First Amendment rights. "The practice of law is considered a privilege," Rodriguez-Taseff said. "When lawyers choose to be admitted to the practice of law, they do so because they know they have to abide by rules of conduct of The Bar."

Rodriguez-Taseff, who declined to comment specifically about Conway's case, said the rules aren't designed to muzzle attorneys. She said attorneys are still able to comment on the qualifications of judges and the merit of legal rulings. "The Bar can regulate the decorum in which you express opinions," the Duane Morris partner said. "As lawyers, we have to be careful that in seeking to bring unfairness to the forefront that we do so in a manner that elevates the profession."

Nova Southeastern University law professor Robert Jarvis, who teaches classes in constitutional and ethics issues, echoed Rodriguez-Taseff's position that the Florida Bar has a right to limit First Amendment rights as a condition of a law license. Jarvis said attorneys can talk about the qualifications of the judiciary but shouldn't resort to name-calling.

Conway should have turned to the chief judge or Judicial Qualifications Commission if he believed Aleman's actions were wrong, Jarvis said. Conway said he filed a JQC complaint against Aleman."The purple prose is designed to inflame the passion of the public against this judge, which has the effect of inflaming the passion of the public against all judges," Jarvis said.

Both Jarvis and Rodriguez-Taseff note the Bar has the power to limit lawyers' commercial speech in advertising and client recruitment.

Florida has one of the nation's most stringent rules regulating attorney advertising. Attorney Barry Richard, a partner at Greenberg Traurig in Tallahassee who has advised the Bar in disciplinary appeals, said the Bar rarely reviews claims of attorneys bad-mouthing judges in public. "Only since the advent of Internet and blogs did things get widely disseminated that at one time would be discussed at a cocktail party," Richard said.

"Most lawyers are usually pretty cautious to avoid that kind of public commentary out of respect for the system, even if they don't respect the individual judge."

Conway acknowledged he may be a test case for the Bar.

Constitutional attorney Rick Ovelmen, a Miami partner with Jorden Burt, said Conway has some "strong First Amendment defenses" to the anticipated Bar charges. He said the rule barring false and reckless statements by attorneys against judges is based on the defamation rule for public officials and follows accepted constitutional law against libel of a public figure.

But Ovelmen said opinion is protected speech. He said Conway would have defamed Aleman by saying she was accepting bribes. However, Ovelman thinks Conway has some good defenses on his "witch" remark.

"I pray to Aleman's God that the right result will come out. I just wish they would leave me alone," Conway said. "I wish Judge Aleman would stop reading the blog and get back to work."

In Conway's case, he used his name on JAABlog when he complained about Aleman's "new (illegal) 'one week to prepare' policy" setting felony trials one to two weeks after arraignment. Conway claimed the judge was forcing defendants to choose between a speedy trial and the right to a fully prepared defense.

JAABlog is a popular legal blog run by a small band of Broward criminal defense attorneys. The blog focuses on claims of judicial abuse and misconduct as well as courthouse happenings.

In an October post, Conway wrote that Aleman had an "ugly, condescending attitude" a during proceeding he sat through." But as anyone who has been in [Aleman's courtroom] knows, she is clearly unfit for her position and knows not what it means to be a neutral arbiter," Conway wrote. For the Web site, he replaced Aleman's name with the words "evil, unfair witch" when transcribing one of his exchanges with the judge.

The Bar notified Conway in April that they opened an investigative file against him. The Bar's 17th Judicial Circuit Grievance Committee told Conway this month it found probable cause against him for violating five Bar rules. One requires that a lawyer not disparage the qualifications or integrity of a judge by saying something "the lawyer knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity." </P?

Another rule he is accused of violating states a lawyer can not "engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial to the administration of justice." The other counts allege violations of a rule requiring attorneys to uphold standards of professional conduct.

The grievance committee found probable cause against Conway as the state Judicial Qualifications Commission wrapped up a three-day hearing against Aleman. She faced charges claiming she behaved in a vindictive manner, used fear to control her courtroom and exhibited a pattern of arrogant, impatient and discourteous conduct.

Lansing Scriven, a Tampa, Fla., attorney prosecuting the JQC case, recommended a public reprimand for the judge, the lightest form of punishment for a judge. The commission's six-member hearing panel has not ruled.

Sanctions for judges found guilty of violating the code of judicial conduct range from a public reprimand to removal from the bench.

Conway stands by his actions. He said he was respectful and courteous before Aleman in court but felt the need to publicly expose her behavior. "Because our judges are elected, we should not have gag orders over the very people that work in front of those judges every day," Conway said. "When something illegal is going on, we expect those people to tell the public."

Conway said the Bar's probable cause finding against him indicates people would be better off posting anonymously instead of signing their name to their comments."But speaking from hiding is not free speech at all," he said. "I don't think the founders of our country intended us to use free speech from secret hiding spots."

Haddad contends the Bar is overstepping its bounds. He pointed to Aleman's hearing as evidence that his client's statements weren't unfounded." Conway didn't say anything that every other lawyer doesn't say in the elevator every day," Haddad said.

Lawyer Found Guilty of Unprofessional
Conduct for Calling Judge a Bigot

By Mike McIntyre
The Associated Press
New York Lawyer
December 20, 2007

A Winnipeg lawyer has been found guilty of professional misconduct for calling a judge a bigot in a letter sent to several colleagues.

The Manitoba Court of Appeal upheld the ruling in a decision released Tuesday.

Robert Ian Histed claimed he did nothing wrong and was simply exercising his freedom of expression under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

He also accused the Law Society of Manitoba of breaching his privacy rights by allowing the letter to be used as evidence against him when it was marked "strictly confidential."

Justice Freda Steel, writing for the appeal court panel, rejected both arguments.

Steel said the judiciary should be open to criticism, but to operate effectively, the legal system must operate with some degree of civility and respect.

Histed was slapped with $10,000 in fines and surcharges for his actions.

The incident dates back to 2004 when Histed was retained by several clients in residential school litigation against several parties, including the federal government.

Histed and opposing lawyers exchanged several letters as they attempted to agree on a Queen's Bench justice who could be oversee the case as it wound its way through the courts. Four specific judges were named as potential candidates.

Histed referred to one of the choices as a "bigot" and two others as "too right wing." He called the fourth choice "fair, intelligent and a really nice guy (who) would not move the matter forward on a timely basis."

Histed has refused to back down, claiming he was "simply stating the truth" with his comments.

Questioning Judge's Integrity Gets Local Lawyer Reprimanded

By Douglas S. Malan
The Connecticut Law Tribune
New York Lawyer
October 15, 2007

Hartford attorney Myles H. Alderman Jr. never admitted to violating any lawyer ethics rules by implying a judge was biased. But he also didn’t deny that his statements about the judge might lead to more serious professional discipline if he didn’t settle the matter with grievance officials.

Alderman has agreed to a reprimand based on comments he made during a July 22, 2002, deposition in his firm's lawsuit against a client to collect unpaid legal fees. In Alderman & Alderman v. Millbrook Owners' Association Inc., Alderman made statements about Superior Court Judge Julia L. Aurigemma during his deposition.

Aurigemma presided over a lawsuit involving United Technologies Corp. (UTC) that Alderman brought on behalf of Millbrook Owners' Association, which oversees a 79-unit condominium development in East Windsor. The association sued Hamilton Standard, a UTC subsidiary, for allegedly causing soil pollution at the condominium site. Aurigemma ultimately dismissed the case due to Alderman's delays in complying with court orders.

"My recollection is that a review of cases [Aurigemma] had decided, had indicated that more often than not UTC got a good outcome in front of her," Alderman said during the 2002 deposition. "Whether or not that was justified or not, I don't know."

Later, according to a transcript of the deposition, Alderman added, "I had an observation in the court, that it appeared to me that there was a presumption of credibility for UTC and UTC's counsel; and that I thought that the decision that was made by her [to dismiss the condo association's lawsuit] was in error."

Alderman had consulted with his counsel, Douglas Evans, before making that statement, which followed a question asking him if he believed Aurigemma's decision was based on a bias toward UTC. Evans did not object to the question. "In retrospect, I wish an objection had been interposed so I wouldn't have had to answer it," Alderman told the Law Tribune last week. "As a witness during a deposition, you can only answer with the honest answer."

"That is protected speech," opined Pepe & Hazard's Dan Klau, a neutral party observer. "To hold otherwise would be to punish a lawyer for a thought crime."

When asked during the deposition if he shared his opinion with any other parties, Alderman said, "I may have advised a representative of the [Millbrook] board that UTC had done well in prior matters before the court, which I think goes back to presumption of credibility."

He maintained last week that it is a lawyer's duty to research the past rulings of presiding judges, and that lawyers often discuss those rulings with their clients. He added that he never shared his comments in a public forum.

Alderman accepted grievance officials' recommendation of a reprimand. "[A] trier of fact could find by clear and convincing evidence that I violated one or more of the [state's lawyer-ethics] rules," which might lead to a different disposition that "could include a greater penalty…," he acknowledged in the affidavit accompanying his conditional admission and agreement to discipline.

Alderman told the Law Tribune it was easier to accept the reprimand than to examine "40 boxes of evidence" that would've come into play and dragged out the process, mainly because his wife and law partner, as well as their son, were going through difficult health issues. "If you'd asked me the day after the deposition if I'd said anything that offended anyone, it wasn't that," Alderman said last week. "I believe that I conducted myself in complete compliance to the letter and intent of the rules."

Rule 8.2(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct states that lawyers "shall not make a statement that the lawyer knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge … ."

Hartford Superior Court Judge Grant Miller found probable cause of a Rule 8.2(a) violation when ruling last year against a legal malpractice claim Alderman & Alderman brought against Evans, the lawyer it retained to represent it in the fee collection suit against Millbrook Owners' Association.

In other recent grievance cases:

• A mishandled bankruptcy filing earned Alvin E. Taylor, an attorney with McNeill & Associates of Bloomfield, a six-month suspension on Sept. 11 from Hartford Superior Court Judge James T. Graham. Taylor filed a notice of retirement with grievance officials last November.

Taylor was retained in July 2005 to file a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition for Alex M. Perry, but Taylor did not file it until October and did not adequately explain to Perry the status of the filing, according to grievance officials. Taylor also failed to file the proper state personal exemption, which was $75,000, and failed to record both the bankruptcy resolution, which occurred in December 2005, and the removal of certain liens on Perry’s personal residence.

Taylor agreed to reimburse Perry more than $56,000 for his mistake with the exemption but had not done so as of the time of the grievance hearing. Taylor neither answered the grievance nor attended a hearing in the matter.

• Instances of bank account overdrafts and disappearing settlement money led to presentment orders against West Haven attorney Carolyn Smith Stewart in late June and she has since gone on inactive status due to medical conditions.

Statewide Bar Counsel Michael P. Bowler filed two complaints against Stewart last fall after she twice wrote checks for $224.95 against her Interest On Lawyers Trust Account (IOLTA) funds when the balance was less than $60. Stewart failed to provide a written explanation of her activities following Bowler’s two separate requests for documentation pursuant to Practice Book Section 2-28. She also failed to file an answer to the grievance complaint.

In a separate grievance decision, Stewart was ordered presented to the Superior Court for not paying $1,000 in restitution to the victim of her client. In October 2004, Stewart told the court, in State v. Lewis, that her client, Ryan Lewis, had the money to cover the court’s decision. Based on her statements, the court vacated Lewis’s guilty plea to having no insurance. The victim’s attorney, Thomas F. Maxwell Jr., repeatedly sent letters to Stewart asking about the payment, which was never made. Stewart never responded to Maxwell’s letters, nor did she file an answer to the grievance complaint.

Famous Lawyer, Sanctioned for Likening Judges to Nazis and Jackasses Wins Appeal, But He's Not Out of the Woodshed Yet

By The Associated Press
New York Lawyer
September 5, 2007

DETROIT - A federal judge has sided with former assisted suicide lawyer Geoffrey Fieger on rules that sanctioned him for comparing state appeals court judges to Adolf Hitler and referring to them as jackasses.

U.S. District Judge Arthur J. Tarnow called the rules unconstitutional because they are "overly broad and vague" in his decision released late Tuesday, The Detroit News reported.

Tarnow's ruling "strengthens our democracy and allows us to speak out against the oppressive forces of corrupt state officials," Fieger said Wednesday in a statement.

Fieger had sued the Michigan Supreme Court over its Rules of Professional Conduct for attorneys after those standards were imposed on him for the comments he made in a 1999 radio interview.

Those rules say lawyers must treat everyone involved in the legal process with "courtesy and respect" and should "not engage in undignified or discourteous conduct" toward the bench.

The suburban Detroit lawyer had argued for his First Amendment right to use radio appearances to criticize the appellate judges who overturned a $15 million medical malpractice judgment he had won.

Shortly after the 1999 decision to overturn the judgment, Fieger called them "three jackass Court of Appeals judges" on his radio show. He also likened them to Hitler and other Nazis and in a separate tirade, declared "war" on the judges and made crude remarks about them.

A message seeking comment on the ruling was left Wednesday morning with the Michigan Attorney General's office.

Fieger currently faces federal charges of conspiracy, making illegal campaign contributions and causing false statements. An indictment, unsealed Aug. 24, states those charges involved about $127,000 in illegal campaign contributions made to Democrat John Edwards' 2004 presidential campaign.

Fieger has pleaded not guilty to those charges.

Fieger, who defended assisted-suicide advocate Jack Kevorkian, was the 1998 Democratic gubernatorial nominee.

Analysis: A Bit Of Thin Skin Peeks Out Of The Robes

By Adam Liptak
New York Times
April 7, 2007

When judges talk about threats to judicial independence, which is constantly, they sometimes make important points about the value of the rule of law in a democracy. Other times they are looking for a pay raise.

But lately, more and more, they seem to be saying their work should be above criticism. They have been lashing out at lawyers and even other judges who say harsh things about their decisions.

Boyd K. Dyer, for instance, got a little carried away in appealing decisions to the Utah Supreme Court. Mr. Dyer, a Utah lawyer, was upset that a state appeals court there had made what all concerned agree were errors of fact and law in ruling against his clients in two real estate disputes.

In his appeal, Mr. Dyer wrote that he believed the mistakes were intentional, saying, for instance, that the appeals court had ''simply fabricated'' evidence. In a particularly ripe comment during oral arguments, he compared the mistakes to ''a recent news development with respect to a little town in Iraq called Haditha,'' where marines killed 24 unarmed Iraqis.

The Supreme Court did not like Mr. Dyer's style, finding his accusations to be ''disrespectful of the judiciary,'' ''scandalous'' and ''offensive to propriety.'' It dismissed the appeal in January without deciding the case, effectively ruling against Mr. Dyer's clients, and it ordered him to pay his adversaries' legal fees, which were about $17,000.

An appeals court in Sacramento also got prickly when it learned about what it considered an insulting comment from a state trial judge. ''You can't offend the kangaroos up there in the kangaroo court,'' the judge, K. Peter Saiers, had said in a plea hearing.

The three judges on the appeals court panel gave sober and extended consideration to how offended they should be. ''This was a pejorative remark,'' they ruled in December, after consulting a dictionary that defined ''kangaroo court'' as one in which ''the principles of law or justice are disregarded or perverted.''

Judge Saiers, the appellate judges said, had violated a canon of the code of judicial ethics, which requires judges to ''uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary.''

Then, in a lovely moment in February, the appeals court had to reverse course. It turned out that Judge Saiers's remark about ''the kangaroos up there'' referred to a committee in the district attorney's office that met upstairs from his courtroom.

The district attorney, James P. Willett, had a more mature attitude about the comment. ''He has a knack for spotting the strengths and weaknesses of a case and discussing those factors, in plain talk, with the parties,'' Mr. Willett said of the judge in a letter to the appeals court. ''It is typically said with a pointed but jocular tone and certainly does not offend me.''

The Utah and California cases are only the latest in a series of judicial overreactions. A particular peeve in other courts is the accusation of intellectual dishonesty.

In 2005, Michael G. Brautigam, an Ohio lawyer, said a decision he was appealing to the Kentucky Supreme Court contained ''extreme intellectual dishonesty.'' For that, Mr. Brautigam was charged with violating a Kentucky ethics rule prohibiting false statements about ''the qualifications or integrity of a judge.''

He said fighting the charge was burdensome and frustrating. ''Whomever made the formal bar complaint against me — likely a Kentucky appellate judge — is protected from being identified by the bar complaint process,'' he said.

The complaint was eventually dismissed, and Mr. Brautigam is unrepentant. ''The 2-1 decision of the Court of Appeals was intellectually dishonest,'' he said. ''I said it. I meant it. I stand behind it.''

Michael A. Wilkins, an Indiana lawyer, had less luck. He was formally reprimanded a few years ago by the Indiana Supreme Court for saying in a footnote that an appeals court decision was so riddled with errors that ''one is left to wonder whether'' the court ''said whatever was necessary'' to reach the desired result.

A dissenting justice was left scratching his head. ''It seems to me no different from the attacks many lawyers and nonprofessionals have launched on many court decisions, including such notable ones as Bush v. Gore and Brown v. Board of Education,'' the justice, Theodore R. Boehm, wrote.

Mr. Dyer, who teaches law at the University of Utah, did not respond to requests for comment about his run-in with the State Supreme Court. But his adversary in the case, Edwin C. Barnes, said Mr. Dyer had promptly apologized and sent along a personal check for the full amount of Mr. Barnes's fees.

Mr. Barnes said his opponent had crossed a line. ''Lawyers suggest error all of the time — every time we object, every time we appeal,'' he said. ''But it can be done professionally, without assigning motives or impugning character.''

That is correct — as a statement of how to conduct effective advocacy. But, as Justice Hugo Black wrote in a 1941 decision reversing contempt citations against a newspaper and a labor leader, courts should be wary of policing speech critical of them.

''An enforced silence, however limited, solely in the name of preserving the dignity of the bench,'' Justice Black wrote, ''would probably engender resentment, suspicion and contempt much more than it would enhance respect.''

Fieger Wins Right to Fight Judges
Appeals Court: Southfield Attorney Can Challenge State High Court Justices' Refusal to Recuse Themselves

Paul Egan
The Detroit News
December 27, 2006

A federal appeals court Tuesday upheld lawyer Geoffrey Fieger's right to challenge the way the Michigan Supreme Court handles requests for judges to recuse themselves.

The decision of the 6th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals is a partial victory for Fieger and a setback for a Michigan Supreme Court that is battling internal dissension.

Fieger, the Southfield attorney known for his inflammatory comments and multimillion-dollar judgments, state's seven Supreme Court justices to recuse
themselves from his cases.

Fieger alleged Justices Maura Corrigan, Clifford Taylor, Robert Young Jr. and Stephen Markman demonstrated personal dislike and bias toward him.

The 6th Circuit upheld a lower court ruling that federal courts have no jurisdiction to overturn past refusals by the justices to recuse themselves. But the appeals court reversed the decision of U.S. District Judge Marianne O. Battani when it said federal courts may consider a challenge to the constitutionality of the recusal process.

"This is basically the end for them," Fieger said of the four justices. "They've basically considered themselves above the law and they're not answerable to anybody."

Michigan Supreme Court justices make their own decisions on whether to recuse themselves from cases and provide no review process. Fieger alleged that violates his due process rights.

Battani will proceed with discovery and a possible trial in federal court in Detroit on whether the recusal process is constitutional.

Michigan Supreme Court Justice Elizabeth Weaver, who has criticized her four colleagues for refusing to disqualify themselves from Fieger's cases, last week criticized them again in a dissenting opinion, saying they were advancing a policy of greater secrecy and less accountability.

Those justices have alleged Weaver is resentful over being replaced as chief justice.

Rusty Hills, a spokesman for the Michigan Attorney General's Office that argued the appeal for the Supreme Court, declined comment.

To read the petition for writ of certiorari in Fieger v. Michigan Grievance Administrator -- a case asking whether an attorney has a First Amendment right to publicly express non-defamatory personal criticism of a judge click here.

Top State Court Denies Fieger Request to Postpone Reprimand
Majority of Justices Say the Action Will Not Harm
 His Ability to Practice Law as He Makes an Appeal

David Eggert
Associated Press
December 22, 2006

Lansing-- The Michigan Supreme Court on Thursday denied lawyer Geoffrey Fieger's request to postpone disciplinary action against him for vulgar comments about judges, and the case again exposed the long-standing animosity among Republican justices.

The majority said Fieger would suffer no "irreparable injury" if his reprimand stays in place while he appeals to the U.S. Supreme Court.

The court in July had reprimanded Fieger, which doesn't affect his ability to practice law.

In her dissent Thursday, Justice Elizabeth Weaver accused four other GOP justices of imposing secrecy around the court's operations when they issued a Dec. 6 order to keep confidential justices' internal communications involving cases.

Weaver wrote that the order was a "gag order" showing the "majority of four's increasing advancement of a policy of greater secrecy and less accountability."

She accused them of using the order to suppress her dissent before changing their minds Thursday and allowing it to be published.

Chief Justice Clifford Taylor and Justices Maura Corrigan, Stephen Markman and Robert Young Jr. responded that Weaver improperly disclosed internal memorandums and deliberations in her "unprecedented" dissent.

Taylor wrote that he couldn't directly respond to Weaver's "selective and misleading disclosures" because of an obligation to honor confidentiality.

Taylor said the court will hold a hearing Jan. 17 on whether to retain the order keeping certain communications confidential.

He also said justices will consider what means of enforcement or sanction should be in place when a justices violates the rule.

Justices traditionally have not talked publicly about what is said during case deliberations.

Democratic Justice Michael Cavanagh said he didn't think Weaver's dissent violated the law.

The dispute partly stems from the high court's decision to reprimand Fieger for vulgar remarks he made on the radio about three state Court of Appeals judges.

At the time of the ruling, Weaver said Taylor, Corrigan, Markman and Young showed bias and prejudice against Fieger by not disqualifying themselves from the case.

The majority responded in the Fieger ruling that Weaver's criticism was "rooted in personal resentment."

In 2001, Weaver wanted to keep her job as chief justice, but Corrigan was chosen instead.

To Read Opinion on Fieger discipline a lengthy discussion on the First Amendment right of lawyers go to: 
http://www.courts.michigan.gov/supremecourt/Clerk/Opinions-05-06-Term/127547.pdf

Letter to the Editor:
the Absolute Duty of Judges Is to Follow, Uphold the Law

Henry M. Coxe, III
President, The Florida Bar
Tallahassee
The Stuart News
December 22, 2006

Regarding the editorial ("Is this any way to honor judges?" Nov. 28), and the guest column by Barry L. Crane ("News flash: Florida's judges play politics," Dec. 1), to paraphrase Voltaire, I may disagree with what you say, but will defend to the end your right to say it.

The Florida Bar respects the editorial's encouragement of greater education of the electorate in voting on judicial merit retention. We conduct a statewide poll of lawyers — who are most familiar with the qualifications of Florida's judges — prior to each retention election as a public service to voters.

But we continue to look for additional ways to evaluate judges in both their selection and retention, with the goal of having the highest quality judicial officers possible.

However, the Bar has no such respect for the guest columnist's attack on four respected judges of the 4th District Court of Appeal that suggests their decisions have been based on anything but the evidence and the law.

To suggest that any of these judges consistently take one side in a criminal case is nothing more than a skewed view of the writer. The opinions of each of these judges are a matter of public record and are based on the spirit of a fair and impartial judiciary devoid of political and special interest concerns.

Simply put, judges are bound to apply the laws as they now exist. Judges do not write laws; they must abide by them as they are written, even if they personally disagree with them. The bottom line is this: a judge's absolute duty is to follow the law and uphold it, and there are checks and balances in place to ensure judicial ethics are maintained.

China Suspends 3-Year Sentence
for Lawyer Who Posted Dissent Online

By Scott McDonald Associated Press Writer
New York Lawyer
December 22, 2006

BEIJING -- A Chinese activist lawyer was convicted of subversion for posting political essays on foreign Web sites and received a suspended three-year prison sentence, a state news agency reported Friday.

Gao Zhisheng was detained in August amid a crackdown on Chinese lawyers who represent clients with grievances against the government regarding corruption, land seizures and other complaints.

Gao was convicted based on nine articles posted on Web sites abroad, the Xinhua News Agency reported, disclosing the details of the charges against him for the first time. It said the articles "defamed and made rumors about China's current government and social system, conspiring to topple down the regime."

Xinhua did not say when the verdict was handed down. Phone calls to the Beijing No. 1 Intermediate People's Court, where Gao's trial took place, were not answered.

Gao will be under supervision for five years, and if he breaks the law during that period the three-year sentence will be reinstated, Xinhua reported. He also was stripped of political rights for one year. Under Chinese law, such rights include free speech and the ability to gather or protest.

Xinhua said Gao's sentence was lenient because he "voluntarily reported others' offenses and provided important clues for cracking other cases."

Gao's one-day trial took place two weeks ago, but his lawyer Mo Shaoping was barred from attending on the grounds that it involved official secrets.

"I have still not received the verdict from the court," Mo said. "I shouldn't comment before seeing the verdict, but for the sentence I can say it is not heavy and within my expectations. If the sentence is suspended, he could be released on bail very soon."

Xinhua said articles cited at Gao's trial had titles such as "Three Open Letters to Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao," referring to China's president and premier, and "The Regime Has Never Stopped Killing People."

It said they appeared on Web sites such as the Falun Gong-affliated Epochtimes.com.

Gao also gave interviews to foreign media "and the records of his seditious talks were made into audio programs and posted on their Web sites for online listening and downloading," Xinhua said.

The Chinese government has been tightening restrictions on lawyers this year in an apparent effort to contain a surge in politically sensitive cases. The new restrictions require lawyers to follow government guidance in handling cases, to avoid talking to foreign reporters and to discourage clients from protesting.

A group of more than 50 foreign scholars and human rights campaigners issued a public appeal in October for Beijing to stop harassing activists, citing the cases of Gao and others.

Lawyer Disciplined for Comparing Judges to Nazis

By David Eggert
The Associated Press
New York Lawyer
August 2, 2006

The Michigan Supreme Court on Monday reprimanded an outspoken lawyer for "vulgar and crude" attacks against appeals court judges, whom he likened during radio appearances to Nazis.

The court voted 4-3 to reprimand Geoffrey Fieger for twice appearing on Detroit-areas radio shows in 1999 and calling state Court of Appeals judges "jackasses" and other names. The judges had angered Fieger by overturning a $15 million medical malpractice judgment he had won.

Fieger -- best known for defending assisted-suicide advocate Jack Kevorkian -- also likened the judges to Adolph Hitler and other Nazis.

Fieger argued he and other lawyers have a First Amendment right to publicly criticize judges. The Michigan Attorney Discipline Board agreed in a 2004 ruling, but the grievance board that filed the complaint against Fieger appealed to the state's high court.

In the majority opinion, Chief Justice Clifford Taylor concluded Fieger's broadcast remarks were "nothing more than personal abuse."

The dissent said Fieger's speech was political and should be protected under the U.S. Constitution.

The reprimand does not affect Fieger's license to practice law. His attorney promised an appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court.

Supreme Court Places Attorney on Probation

By Robert Napper
Highlands Today
Mar 21, 2006

SEBRING, Fla. - A Sebring attorney has been reprimanded and placed on probation by the Florida Supreme Court for swearing at prosecutors and writing a scathing letter to a local judge on an open case, according to court documents.

The Florida Supreme Court formally reprimanded longtime Sebring defense attorney Steve Kackley and placed him on two years probation with the Florida Bar.

Kackley is still allowed to practice law in the state of Florida, but has been ordered to complete the conditions of his probation, according to Kenneth Bryk, who investigated Kackley for the Florida Bar.

The Florida Supreme Court ruled Kackley must contact Florida Lawyers Assistance Inc. for an evaluation. Florida Lawyers Assistance provides "assistance to bar members who suffer from substance abuse, mental health, or other disorders which negatively affect their lives and careers," according to its Web site.

If treatment is recommended as a result of the evaluation, the court ordered Kackley to enter into a rehabilitation contract with Florida Lawyers Assistance.

The Supreme Court also ordered Kackley pay a registration fee of $250 and probation monitoring fee of $100 a month to the Florida Bar. Kackley was also ordered to pay the Florida Bar $2,805.48 for investigative costs.

The Florida Bar’s investigation documents a letter Kackley wrote to then Highlands County Judge Peter Estrada on Dec. 12, 2003, expressing outrage over a ruling Estrada made against his client, putting her jail. Estrada has since been appointed as circuit judge in Highlands County.

At the time of the letter, the case was still pending in front of Estrada, which violated Florida Bar rules, according to court documents.

"Judges like yourself still think like prosecutors, the easiest answer is to put them in jail rather than take the time and give each and every case the attention it deserves," Kackley’s letter to Estrada said, according Bryk’s report.

"You are more concerned with pleasing the probation officer than doing your job as an impartial judge," the letter said.

Kackley wrote to Estrada that his ruling "was not only a miscarriage of justice, it was downright immoral."

The reprimand and probation also stemmed from two incidents in 2003 when Florida Bar officials say Kackley yelled and swore at state prosecutors and a probation officer with regard to cases he worked on.

Kackley expressed frustration over the ruling, pointing out to the Florida Bar numerous cases in which attorneys did much worse without punishment. He said completing probation will not be a problem.

"They do what they have to do. I felt like my client was being mistreated and lost my temper. Sometimes it goes with the territory if you are a good defense attorney. I am sorry it happened," he said.

Kackley said he sent the letter to Estrada as a concerned citizen and made a mistake by referencing a pending case.

"I was not trying to influence him on the case. I just wanted to set up a meeting to discuss some concerns I had with the judicial system in Highlands County. I know all of the judges in Highlands County, have practiced in front of all of them, and have the highest respect for them," said Kackley.

This story can be found at: http://www.highlandstoday.com/MGB503BG1LE.html

Lawyer's Insults of Judges Escalate Into Speech Case

By Tresa Baldas
The National Law Journal
March 20, 2006

A constitutional battle involving a lawyer's right to insult a judge has been joined at the Michigan Supreme Court, which could set new limits on what lawyers say and do outside the courtroom.

And at the center of it all is Geoffrey Fieger, the outspoken former attorney for assisted-suicide doctor Jack Kevorkian.

Fieger faces a reprimand from the Michigan Attorney Grievance Commission for insulting three state appellate judges on a radio talk show in 1999 after the judges overturned a $15 million verdict he won in a medical malpractice case.

According to the grievance commission, Fieger used numerous obscenities, called the justices "three jackass court of appeals judges," declared war on them and referred to them as "Nazis."

Big deal, argued Fieger's lawyer, Michael Alan Schwartz, maintaining that Fieger's comments outside the courtroom are protected by the First Amendment.

"There's no law that says you've got to be dignified," said Schwartz of Schwartz, Kelly & Oltarz-Schwartz in Farmington Hills, Mich. "Why are they looking to Fieger and what did he do that was so terrible? He made some uncharitable comments about a couple of judges in the course of a radio program."

MICHIGAN'S UNIQUE RULES

But according to the grievance commission, Fieger violated two Michigan rules regarding professional conduct, including a "courtesy rule," which is unique to Michigan and requires that lawyers treat judges with respect and courtesy.

"We all agree that attorneys have the right to criticize judges. There's no doubt about that ... . They just have to do so in a professional way," said Robert Edick, deputy administrator for the grievance commission.

Edick said the commission is asking the state high court to draw the line between an attorney's right to free speech and an attorney's obligation to courtesy and professionalism.

"This is more of a very pure courtesy case," said Edick, adding that the commission also wants clarity on whether it can "prosecute lawyers for repeated public acts of discourtesy."

In 2004, the state Attorney Discipline Board ruled that Fieger's comments were protected by the Constitution. But the grievance commission believes Fieger went too far with his antics and has appealed to the Michigan Supreme Court, which heard arguments from both sides last week.

Attorney George Kuhlman, ethics counsel with the American Bar Association, said there is no ABA rule that specifically says that a lawyer's statements cannot be disrespectful of the court. He noted that there is an ABA rule that prohibits lawyers from using reckless disregard or making a false statement about a judge's integrity.

Kuhlman also noted that disciplinary boards can call into question the private conduct of lawyers, particularly if it reflects on their fitness to practice law.

"Of course you can go after somebody for saying something about somebody outside a courtroom," Kuhlman said. "It doesn't matter where it occurred. It could be on an island [in] the south Pacific. If it reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law ... it could be a violation of the rules of professional conduct."

In the Fieger case, Kuhlman said that it will be up to the court to decide whether Fieger's comments were protected by the First Amendment. He said case law on such matters tends to go in the direction of the First Amendment.

Kuhlman cited a 1995 ruling from the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, which cleared an attorney, who had called a judge anti-Semitic, of any wrongdoing. The 9th Circuit held that the accusation of anti-Semitism was protected because the lawyer gave a factual basis for his opinion. Standing C Committee on Discipline v. Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430.

Meanwhile, Schwartz said he too has plenty of case law to back up Fieger's First Amendment claims.

He cited the U.S. Supreme Court's 1947 Craig v. Harney decision, in which the high court ruled in favor of a group of individuals who were held in contempt for publishing derogatory articles about a judge.

Schwartz said that if the Michigan Supreme Court rules against Fieger in this case, that would have "a chilling effect on an attorney's ability to engage in criticism of government officials.

"That's what we're talking about here. Judges are government officials, and once we allow people to be harmed for criticizing government officials, we've lost an enormous bunch of freedoms," Schwartz said. "That's pretty, pretty, pretty bad."

Lawyer's Criticism of Judge on "Secure"
Internet Site Lands Him in Ethical Thicket

By Dan Lynch
New York Lawyer
Miami Daily Business Review
November 9, 2005

Brian F. Labovick was shocked to receive a letter from Palm Beach Circuit Judge Diana Lewis, saying that she’d received a copy of a critical note about her that the Jupiter attorney had posted on a confidential Internet forum.

In the letter, Lewis who was presiding over an auto negligence case Labovick was handling  indicated that she had received a copy of Labovick’s Web posting from an anonymous source. She included the posting with her letter, but offered no comment on it.

In the posting to the 200-member discussion group run by the Palm Beach County Trial Lawyers Association, Labovick criticized a modified voir dire procedure the judge had used.

Now the posting, and Judge Lewis’ response, have triggered an unusual ethics controversy. The Palm Beach County Trial Lawyers Association has hired a forensic expert to investigate who may have breached the Web discussion group’s confidentiality rules. The association’s board is considering lodging a complaint against the perpetrator with Chief Palm Beach Circuit Judge Kathleen Kroll.

The association also is considering seeking Florida Bar sanctions against the perpetrator. The association declined to say on what formal grounds it might bring its complaint. All members of the discussion group, called Trial Talk, had signed an oath promising not to disclose anything from the Web site to nonmembers.

""If a lawyer did it and lied about it, he could be subject to discipline," said site founder Walter C. Jones IV, a Palm Beach Gardens lawyer. "He wouldn’t be disbarred or anything, but the candor of the site is compromised when its security is violated.""

The underlying auto negligence case, Guertin-Sykes v. Jinn, was tried in September. It concluded with a jury verdict for the defense. The defense has filed a post-trial motion for attorney fees and costs.

Judge Lewis declined to comment on any aspect of the controversy on the grounds that the auto negligence case is pending. The Daily Business Review could not obtain either Lewis’ letter or Labovick’s Web posting.

In an interview, Labovick declined to go into any detail about his Web criticism of Judge Lewis or her new voir dire procedure, saying his comments were confidential. Since receiving her letter, he said, he has had no discussion with the judge about the posting.

"I don’t know how the judge gained access to it," Labovick said. "She sent me a very factual note that said to one effect or another that she had seen it. I would not speculate on her motives in sending me that note."

Labovick said Judge Lewis also sent the letter and enclosure to the other lawyer in the case. "So it might be that she was simply adhering to judicial ethics that forbid her from ex parte communication with anybody in a case before her," he said.

Neither of the two defense lawyers in the case James Munsey of North Palm Beach and Cymonie S. Rowe of Boca Raton returned a call for comment.

Coral Gables attorney David Deehl, of Deehl & Carlson, who served for a decade on The Florida Bar’s professional ethics committee, said Judge Lewis "probably" behaved appropriately in notifying both sides in the case that she had received a communication from a third party regarding Labovick.

But Deehl, who’s not involved in the case, said that without knowing the precise content of Labovick’’s Web posting and Lewis’ letter he couldn’t say whether any Bar ethics rule was violated.

Anthony Alfieri, director of the University of Miami law school’s Center for Ethics and Public Service, said there are at least four levels of ethics issues that need to be explored in the case Labovick’s original Web posting, the disclosure of the posting, whether opposing counsel participated in the disclosure, and whether Judge Lewis’ letter to the lawyers violated judicial canon.

Another ethics question is whether Labovick told his client in the auto negligence case about the incident with Judge Lewis and the potential for it to impact the case. One lawyer who did not want to be identified said Labovick is obligated to consult with the client. Labovick did not return a second phone call to discuss this issue.

Critical of Lewis’ treatment

According to one attorney who did not want to be identified, the issue raised by Labovick in his Web posting centered on how Judge Lewis chose to interview prospective jurors.

Normally, the members of the jury pool are interviewed in one large group, and if a juror makes a comment that could taint the rest of the pool, the judge will call that individual up for private questioning by the plaintiff and defense sides.

But given the courts’ budget and time constraints, judges face growing pressure to avoid having an entire jury pool tainted by an individual’s comments and then being forced to call another large bloc of potential jurors for voir dire.

To avoid that situation, Judge Lewis reportedly asked potential jurors to come up individually for questioning on hot-button issues such as their feelings about insurance companies, then she had them return to the general pool for other types of questions. That apparently is what Labovick complained about.

Judge Lewis, 52, a former shareholder at Carlton Fields who was elected to the bench in 2002, attended Notre Dame University law school with a number of current members of the trial lawyers’ discussion group.

West Palm Beach attorney David Prather said that he has high regard for Judge Lewis but said his view is not universally held in the Palm Beach County Trial Lawyers Association, of which he is a member.

Some members who have appeared before Lewis, he said, have been critical of their "perceived treatment" in her courtroom. He declined to elaborate.

In the Palm Beach County Bar Association’’s 2005 survey of its members’’ views of local judges, 29.5 percent of respondents rated Lewis’ demeanor and courtesy to lawyers excellent, while 36.5 percent said she needs improvement. Only three other judges received higher "needs improvement"" scores on demeanor.

On knowledge of the law, Lewis was rated excellent by 46.8 percent, and on impartiality was rated excellent by 46.2 percent.

Site not hackable

The Trial Talk Web site started by the Palm Beach County Trial Lawyers Association on Yahoo! about five years ago is supposed to be secure and access limited to members of association members, Jones said.

Members can get access only through use of a private password, and they’re sworn to secrecy about its contents, said Prather, a plaintiff lawyer and associate at Lytal Reiter Clark Fountain & Williams.

The Web site is similar to professional discussion sites operated by trial lawyer groups in Florida and around the country, and similar to sites operated by professionals in other industries, Jones said.

The site’s purpose, Prather said, is to provide members with information and insights that can help them serve clients. Only lawyers who solely represent plaintiffs are permitted to use the site.

"It’s not a forum designed for people to criticize judges, although you might see some constructive criticism on it occasionally," Prather said.

Its purpose, he said, is to "promote the free flow of productive information information on orders, on the tendencies of certain judges in certain sorts of rulings, on how various judges handle jury selection. It provides information on expert witnesses. People can ask other members if any of them have depositions from this expert or that one."

"It’s a secure site," Jones said. "The FBI could get in, I suppose. But the average person couldn’t hack that site."

"I do think the integrity of the site has been impaired," Prather said.

A letter describing the incident has gone out to all members of the discussion group. Prather said he considers the breach of confidentiality to be an ethical violation by the perpetrator.

"We’re concerned now that if we say things [on the Web site], it’s going to be leaked to everyone, including the news media," Jones said. "It definitely puts a chill on it."

Labovick said his posting did not represent "a personality issue" between himself and Judge Lewis. It was "a warning to other members that this is the way Judge Lewis is now doing this in her courtroom. That’s all it was."

Law editor Harris Meyer provided additional reporting for this article.

Associate Can't Be Fired for Following Ethics Rules

By Thomas B. Scheffey
New York Lawyer
The Connecticut Law Tribune
August 15, 2005

In Connecticut’s first case on the subject, a judge has ruled that a lawyer should not be fired for trying to follow the Rules of Professional Conduct, because doing so constitutes an "important public policy" exception to the employment-at-will doctrine.

New Haven Superior Court Judge Carmen Lopez rejected the arguments of Guilford-based Delaney, Zemetis, Donahue, Durham & Noonan, which fired associate Bruce Matzkin after he sought to grieve another lawyer for suspected witness tampering.

"Because the legal profession is self-regulated and relies upon its members to police itself, no lawyer’s employment should be conditioned upon turning a blind eye to violations of the Rules which are applicable to all lawyers," Lopez wrote.

Matzkin claimed a firm partner told him "we do not grieve other lawyers," when he attempted to get permission to report to bar authorities that a trial opponent called witnesses Matzkin had subpoenaed, telling them they need not come to court.

Matzkin says he considered it witness tampering, and believed he had a duty under Rule 8.3(a), which requires reporting any violation of the ethics rules "that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer ..."

Special Responsibility

The firm, represented by name partner Patrick M. Noonan, argued in its motion to strike that the ethics rule "does not rise to the level of ‘an important public policy’’" that would warrant making an exception to employers’ basic right to fire an employee without any grounds.

Noonan noted that no Connecticut court had ever found the Rules of Professional Conduct are significant enough to create a public policy exception and provide grounds for a wrongful termination suit. He noted they do not give rise to a civil claim for money damages, and contended the public was only indirectly impacted by Matzkin alleged inability to report another lawyer’s ethical misconduct.

In her July 29 opinion, Lopez found otherwise. She quoted the preamble to the Rules, which says, "A lawyer is a representative of clients, and officer of the legal system and a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice."

If a lawyer could be fired with impunity for following the self-policing requirement of the professional rules, Lopez concluded, "this would compromise the autonomy of the profession." The judge rejected the idea that it mattered whether Matzkin followed through and actually filed a grievance. In the leading case on "public policy" exceptions to the at-will rule, Sheets v. Teddy’s Frosted Foods, there was no evidence in the record that plaintiff ever reported his employer to health authorities. But the majority concluded that the important part of the Sheets case is that the employee confronted his employer as a whistleblower, and was fired for it.

Our Debate: Do Lawyers Have Free Speech?

CrainsDetroit.com
August 08, 2005

How much freedom of speech should lawyers be allowed to comment about judges? That’s an issue being weighed in a legal battle between prominent plaintiff attorney Geoffrey Fieger and the state’s attorney-discipline system.

The dispute arose in August 1999 after Fieger made remarks on a radio program he hosted about three Michigan Appeals Court judges who had reversed a judgment for a Fieger client.

The Attorney Grievance Commission filed a case against Fieger in 2001. Last November, the Attorney Discipline Board set aside a reprimand against Fieger and dismissed the charge. The commission appealed to the Michigan Supreme Court earlier this year, and Fieger’’s lawyers removed the case to U.S. District Court in June. Fieger insists he cannot get a fair hearing before state judges.

Links to case documents are in the online version of this report at www.crainsdetroit.com under "This Week’s Issue" in the gray navigation bar.

U.S. District Judge Marianne Battani has scheduled a Sept. 14 hearing on whether the case should be heard in federal or state court. Crain’s asked two legal scholars to argue both sides of the question:

Yes - By Robert Sedler, constitutional-law professor, Wayne State University.
No  - By Stephen Safranek, professor, Ave Maria School of Law.

http://www.crainsdetroit.com/cgi-bin/article.pl?articleId=27543

Read the related document from the Attorney Discipline Board.

Two Bar Disciplinary Rules Challenged in Federal Court

The Florida Bar News
By Gary Blankenship
June 15, 2005

An Orlando attorney has asked a federal court to declare unconstitutional two Florida Bar rules, claiming they violate lawyers’ rights to free speech.

Steven G. Mason, who is represented by fellow Orlando lawyer Jerome Hennigan, said the action is needed because he faces a Bar grievance investigation for violating Rules 4-8.2(a) and 4-8.4(d). He said those rules violate the First, Fifth, and 14th amendments to the U.S. Constitution.

The Bar has responded by filing a motion to dismiss Mason’s suit.

The case stems from two different trials in which Mason was involved earlier this year and comments he made in two different Orlando Sentinel stories.

In one case, he represented the Democratic Party which was opposing a call for a special mayoral election in Orlando. After a local judge ruled the election should proceed, Mason was quoted as saying he would seek an appeal and "It’s an illegal election . . . . We’ll find some judges on the appellate court who aren’t afraid of the political heat and we’re going to win this thing."

The other case involved a jury ruling against his client in a racketeering case, and Mason was quoted as saying, "Unfortunately, this jury got absolutely buffaloed. They got snookered, beyond snookered. . . . I would like to see their faces when they find out another jury in this courthouse found these people not guilty of every single charge based on the exact same facts."

Rule 4-8.2(a) prohibits lawyers from making false statements or statements made with a reckless disregard on whether they are true or false, about the parties in a cases, including judges and jurors. Rule 4-8.4 bars conduct by a lawyer that is prejudicial to the administration of justice "including to knowingly, or through callous indifference, disparage, humiliate, or discriminate against litigants, jurors, witnesses, court personnel, or other lawyers on any basis . . ."

Rule 4-8.2(a), Mason’s suit says, is "vague and far too broad and thus overbroad in violation of the First Amendment. The rule prevents comments and criticism concerning any official, judges, etc. (e.g. a ‘‘public legal officer’’) and directly impinges upon free speech including unabashed discussions and frank opinions of lawyers either in a private or public forum. Likewise, Rule 4-8.4(d) impinges upon free speech because it prohibits an attorney from advocating or offering comments on any subject that can be characterized as a violation of the terms within the rule. . . .
"Based upon its broad terms, the rule is vague and overbroad and, hence, violates the First, Fifth and 14th amendments to the United States Constitution."

Tallahassee attorneys Barry Richard and Laureen E. Galeoto, who prepared the Bar’s motion to dismiss Mason’s case, noted that no conclusion had been reached in the disciplinary case and that Mason did not, in his suit, deny making the statements.

"Mason cannot meet the high threshold required by the U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence to establish vagueness and over breadth, the motion said. "In fact, as discussed herein, the ample law interpreting and applying the rules at issue, and comparable rules from other jurisdictions, have clearly placed Mason on notice of the proscribed conduct."

The motion argued that the Florida Supreme Court, the U.S. Supreme Court, and various courts around the country have held in similar cases that such language is neither vague nor overbroad and is easily understood given the traditions of the practice of law. Those rulings also held that unwarranted derogatory statements about participants in the legal system are not protected by the First Amendment.

"Mason . . . can, with the exercise of ordinary common sense, sufficiently understand and comply with Rules 4-8.4(d) and 4-8.2(a)," the motion said.

Mason filed his case in the U. S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida. It is case no. 6:05-CV-627-ORL-28.

Lawyer Fights Florida Bar Inquiry

By Anthony Colarossi
Orlando Sentinel Fl.
May 12, 2005

In a town where many lawyers find virtue in keeping their names out of the newspaper, Steven G. Mason doesn't mind so much seeing his name in print.

The veteran Orlando attorney also isn't afraid of taking on government, commenting on judicial improprieties or just plain speaking his mind.

"I've been fighting for the underdog my entire career," Mason says. "And I'm not going to stop now."

But Mason's penchant for speaking frankly about court decisions he disagrees with might have finally caught up with him. Soon after he was quoted in the Orlando Sentinel in early April at the height of the mayoral-election debacle, The Florida Bar began a grievance inquiry against him based on his published comments.

And now it appears two 9th Judicial Circuit judges called the Bar concerning his comments, according to a letter Mason's lawyer wrote to a Bar attorney.

The inquiry will determine whether Mason violated rules of professional conduct and made disparaging comments about a judge in one case and a jury in another.

Mason, who insists that the complaint was handled inappropriately, has fired back.

He filed a federal lawsuit late last month, arguing that Florida Bar rules under which he was cited "unconstitutionally inhibit free speech."

The outcome of the lawsuit could have broader implications on what Florida lawyers may say publicly and privately about judges, jurors and one another.

But for Mason, this fight is very much a personal one.

"I have been representing clients for years who have fought with the government," he said. "And now I feel like the government is coming after me to muzzle me. And if they can muzzle me, that's the next best thing to killing me."

On a practical level, a Florida Bar complaint is something any attorney needs to take seriously.

It could lead to a quiet dismissal of the inquiry, a reprimand, a suspension or even disbarment.

Mason's problems began soon after he was quoted twice in an April 2 article. In the newspaper piece, Mason said he planned to appeal Orange Circuit Judge Jay Cohen's decision to allow a special election for mayor.

At the time, Mayor Buddy Dyer was under indictment, suspended and facing a criminal charge of paying someone to collect absentee ballots. Since then, the charges against Dyer and three others have been dropped.

Mason, recruited by local Democrats, had challenged the legality of the special election to find Dyer's temporary replacement.

After Cohen's decision, Mason was quoted in the Sentinel as saying, "We'll find some judges on the appellate court who aren't afraid of the political heat, and we're going to win this thing."

Mason said he was quoted accurately in the article, but he added that he meant no disrespect to Cohen.

After receiving the Florida Bar inquiry April 15, Mason said he was initially unable to confirm who initiated the complaint.

But after Mason filed the federal lawsuit and retained attorney Jerome Hennigan, the Bar confirmed that Cohen himself and Circuit Judge Frederick Lauten contacted the Bar by phone about Mason's comments.

Reached late last week, Cohen confirmed that he made the call to the Bar.

"I fully support Steve Mason's right to criticize the decision by the court and to appeal that decision," Cohen said. "However, I believe that when he goes beyond that and impugns the integrity of the court, that's inappropriate under the rules of professional responsibility."

Lauten could not be reached for comment.

Mason faces questions about his actions and speech, and he argues that they're protected.

His lawsuit seeks a declaratory judgment to find The Florida Bar rules used in his case are unconstitutional.

And it asks for a "permanent injunction" forever blocking the Bar from enforcing the rules.

Anthony Colarossi can be reached at acolarossi@orlandosentinel.com or 407-420-6218.

Orlando Attorney Sues Florida Bar — Again

By David L. Hudson Jr.
First Amendment Center
May 10. 2005

A Florida attorney has filed a lawsuit against the state bar because he says it’s trying to squelch his free speech.

After an "informal inquiry" from the Florida Bar regarding statements attributed to him in the press, Orlando-based attorney Steven G. Mason filed a federal lawsuit on April 26. He is challenging, on First Amendment grounds, the constitutionality of two Florida Bar rules.

Mason also seeks a declaratory judgment that the statements he made to the news media are protected under the U.S. Constitution.

Mason filed the lawsuit after receiving an April 14 letter from the state bar, the agency that regulates attorneys in Florida by authority from the Florida Supreme Court. The letter, from bar counsel Frances R. Brown-Lewis, said Mason needed to respond to the bar within 15 days with respect to whether statements attributed to Mason in The Orlando Sentinel "are true, complete and correct and whether said statements are a violation of Rules 4-8.2(a) and 4-8.4(d)."

Mason responded with his lawsuit, Mason v. Florida Bar, filed in Orlando.

The first rule Mason challenged, Rule 4-8.2(a), reads:

"A lawyer shall not make a statement that the lawyer knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the qualifications of a judge, mediator, arbitrator, adjudicatory officer, public legal officer, juror or member of the venire or candidate for election or appointment to judicial or legal office."

The second, Rule 4-8.4(d), provides that a lawyer shall not:

"engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law or in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial to the administration of justice, including to knowingly, or through callous indifference, disparage, humiliate, or discriminate against litigants, jurors, witnesses, court personnel, or other lawyers on any basis, including, but not limited to on account of race, ethnicity, gender, religion, national origin, disability, marital status, sexual orientation, age, socio-economic status, employment, or physical characteristics."

With respect to Rule 4-8.2(a), Mason contends the law is both vague and overbroad. "The rules prevent comments and criticisms concerning any public official, judges, etc. (e.g., a ‘public legal officer’) and directly impinge upon free speech including unabashed discussions and frank opinions of lawyers either in a private or public forum," he said in his lawsuit.

Mason’’s complaint also attacks Rule 4-8.4(d) on its face, particularly the clause "on any basis."

"These rules potentially control and curb a lawyer’s speech across the universe of possible comments,"" Mason told the First Amendment Center Online. ‘On any basis’ obviously means on any basis and that, in and of itself, violates the First Amendment. When I leave the courthouse, I am absolutely entitled to speak on any subject and offer my opinion even if it addresses a judge."

Attached to the bar’s April 14 letter to Mason were copies of two newspaper articles that apparently provoked the inquiry.

In a Feb. 2, 2005, Orlando Sentinel story, Mason was quoted as saying: "Unfortunately, this jury got absolutely buffaloed. They got snookered, beyond snookered. I would like to see their faces when they find out another jury in this courthouse found these people not guilty of every single charge based on the exact same facts."

The news story referred to a civil-forfeiture case brought against a former bingo-hall operator and two of his corporations. A jury found that Mason’s client had engaged in racketeering activities and could be subject to the forfeiture laws.

In an April 2, 2005, Sentinel story headlined "Special election can proceed, judge says," Mason said: "It’s an illegal election. We’ll find some judges on the appellate court who aren’t afraid of the political heat, and we’re going to win this thing."

These comments pertained to a different case, Orange County Democratic Executive Committee v. City of Orlando, in which Mason represented a local Democratic Party committee that objected to a special election for Orlando mayor after Florida Gov. Jeb Bush suspended Democratic Mayor Buddy Dyer. (The case became moot after election-law charges were dropped against Dyer and he was reinstated.)

The Florida Bar has not filed an answer to Mason’s complaint. Mason, however, has filed more legal papers, including a "motion to disqualify" the Florida Bar from instigating an inquiry into whether Mason violated its rules. Mason and his attorney, Jerome Hennigan, allege that the bar violated its own Rule 3-7.3(c), which requires that "All complaints, except those initiated by The Florida Bar, shall be in writing and under oath."

Mason says he and his attorney learned from the Florida Bar that the inquiry began after telephone complaints from two judges. Mason’s "motion to disqualify" says that "it is clear in this case that the Bar did not timely disclose to Mr. Mason that this inquiry was in fact initiated by two local judges in violation of Rule 3-7.3(c) and that this information only came to light after significant prodding on the part of Mr. Mason and [Hennigan]."

Mason describes the case so far as "a soap opera with a very powerful institution."

This is not the first time that Mason has tangled with the Florida Bar. He sued the bar in 1998 after it prohibited him from running a truthful ad saying he had received the highest rating from the Martindale-Hubbell legal directory. In 2000, a three-judge panel of the 11th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in Mason v. Florida Bar that the bar violated Mason’s commercial-speech rights when it refused his ad.

Mason vows he’s prepared to take his current case all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court, if need be: "My entire professional career I have been fighting for the rights of a lot of people, many of them underdogs to the establishment. It would be hypocritical of me to bow out and take the easy way. If necessary, I’ll knock on the door of Justice Ginsburg."

Related

Lawyer prevails in dispute with Florida Bar over Yellow Page ad
By David L. Hudson Jr. Orlando attorney Steven Mason says he feels 'vindicated' by federal appeals panel's ruling. 04.14.00

http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/news.aspx?id=15239

               Fla. Lawyer Loses Right to Practice in Miss.
     Chief Justice Calls Language in Motion Filed by Attorney Disrespectful

By Jimmie E. Gates
The Clarion Ledger
February 4, 2005

Mississippi - The state Supreme Court has revoked the rights of a Florida lawyer to practice in the state for a year because of language in a motion seeking the recusal of Justice Jess Dickinson.

The court ordered the sanctions against James R. Hubbard of West Palm Beach, Fla.

The motion asking for reconsideration of a court decision "contained unfounded and disrespectful charges against Dickinson," Chief Justice Jim Smith wrote in the order revoking Hubbard's legal privileges.

The court took exception to the phrase: "One of the two defendants in this case was the highest bidder in the election campaign of Justice Dickinson."

That statement was included in a motion filed by Jackson attorney Dana Kelly following a quotation from a June editorial in The Clarion-Ledger in which the newspaper said, "Our judicial elections have become highest-bidder exercises."

In September, Hubbard and Kelly argued Dickinson received a campaign contribution from one of the defendants in a lawsuit involving a stock dispute case, William D. Mounger II.

Mounger and his father each donated $5,000 - the maximum allowed by law - to Dickinson's campaign in 2002, according to records in the Secretary of State's office. The younger Mounger was a defendant in the case.

Kelly is also facing possible sanctions from the court. The court conducted a sanction hearing Jan. 13 on Kelly but has yet to file an order, court spokeswoman Beverly Kraft said.

Kelly couldn't be reached for comment.

Hubbard said the case was the only one he had handled in Mississippi.

"It's a sensitive issue; we thought the briefs were appropriate," Hubbard said Wednesday. "We were just representing our client. We didn't say anyone had done anything wrong. It was just the appearance of it."

Hubbard said in his 33 years of law practice he has never had anything like that happen to him.

"You don't like to be criticized by any court," Hubbard said.

Smith wrote: "When Mr. Hubbard was given an opportunity to disassociate himself with the language of the motion for reconsideration, he failed to do so; rather, he adopted in full the disrespectful language, without apology or an expression of regret."

Smith said the court's action was necessary to prevent recurrence of such behavior.

Hubbard and Kelly represented Edwin Welsh in the dispute with a former employer.

The state Supreme Court upheld a lower court's ruling that went against Welsh. The motion wanted the court to reconsider its decision, but the court rejected it.

Lawyer's "Vile," "Revolting"
Remarks About Judges Protected Speech

By The Associated Press
November 24, 2004

LANSING, Mich. -- The state Attorney Discipline Board has dismissed a charge of professional misconduct against Geoffrey Fieger, ruling that his ``revolting'' and ``vile'' out-of-court remarks about appeals court judges are protected by the First Amendment.

In an opinion published Nov. 8, the board voted 5-3 in favor of Fieger, a former candidate for governor whose clients have included assisted-suicide advocate Dr. Jack Kevorkian.

The charge stems from comments the combative lawyer made while hosting a radio show in 1999. According to the board, he used an obscenity for three Michigan judges who had ruled against one of his clients, and he likened them to Nazis.

Responding to a suggestion by a co-host that the court's opinion was ``innuendo,'' Fieger said: ``I know the only thing that's in their `endo' should be a large, you know, plunger about the size of, you know, my fist.''

Fieger, a partner at Fieger, Kenney and Johnson, pleaded no contest to the charge and agreed to a public reprimand on the condition he could appeal on constitutional grounds.

The board concluded that the First Amendment right to free speech protects lawyers from being disciplined for expressing their opinion outside the context of a legal proceeding.

However, the board described his language as "revolting'' and scolded Fieger for making ``base, vile, destructive ... and quite ineffective'' comments.

Fieger has previously been the subject of commission complaints over comments about other judges and one former prosecutor.

Sanctioned Lawyer Vows to Continue Feud With Judge

By Keith Griffin
The Connecticut Law Tribune
October 13, 2004

Joseph J. Notopoulos's enmity toward retired West Hartford Probate Judge John A. Berman hasn't diminished with the passage of the time, nor with defeats at the trial and appeals court levels.

In a decision officially released Oct. 5, the Appellate Court upheld the reprimand Notopoulos received for a poison-pen letter he wrote to Berman during a probate dispute over his mother's estate. But Notopoulos remains undeterred and hopes to bring his fight to the state Supreme Court, he said.

The Appellate Court split 2-1 over the issue. Judges Paul M. Foti and Anne C. Dranginis concurred that the Statewide Grievance Committee had proven there was "clear and convincing evidence" that Notopoulos, a Hartford Judicial District magistrate and non-practicing attorney, violated rule 8.2 (a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The rule bars lawyers from making statements intended to disrupt a tribunal and from engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.

Notopoulos had argued before the Appellate Court that his comments were made as a private citizen, not as an attorney, and that his free speech rights were violated as a result of the sanction.

"Regrettably, as was the case with the trial court, the Appellate Court has likewise proved to be an artful dodger of the controlling federal precedent placed before it," he said in a written statement to the Law Tribune.

Before the Appellate Court, Notopoulos cited a 1974 decision in Polk v. The State Bar of Texas. In that case, plaintiff Ed J. Polk, a licensed Texas attorney, was sanctioned by bar officials for comments he made to the news media following his arrest on drunk driving charges, which included calling a judge "perverse." A federal judge found the reprimand violated Polk's First Amendment rights.

In the majority opinion, Foti wrote that lawyer ethics rules apply to Notopoulos even if he was acting as a private citizen when he wrote his letter to Berman. "Because there is no indication that rule 8.2 (a) is applicable solely to an attorney acting in his or her professional capacity, we cannot conclude that the court improperly applied it to the plaintiff," he wrote.

In his dissent, Judge Barry R. Schaller said the SGC had the responsibility of proving that Notopoulos's claim that Berman was guilty of criminal extortion wasn't true. "The plaintiff's explanations of his observations and conclusions that charging fees, 'threatening' a mental examination of his mother and asserting that a substantial cash bond could be imposed were sufficient, in my view, to shift the burden of evidence back to the committee," Schaller wrote.

Foti disagreed with Schaller.

"The plaintiff must provide evidence of an objective, reasonable belief that the statements were true," he held.

Lawyer Sanctioned for Critical Barbs
Calls One Judge’s Decision ‘‘Disgrace to the Human Race’’

By David L. Hudson Jr.
American Bar Journal
October 1, 2004

A Tennessee lawyer who compared a ruling in one of his cases with the Dred Scott decision upholding slavery crossed the line into "the quagmire of unprotected speech," the Tennessee Supreme Court recently ruled.

A lawyer who criticizes the judicial system and its officers in courtroom proceedings may be sanctioned for intemperate speech, the court said in ordering a two-year suspension for lawyer Edward A. Slavin Jr. Board of Professional Respon-sibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee v. Slavin, No. M2003-00845-SC-R3-BP (Aug. 27).

However, the court said Slavin may apply for reinstatement after one year. That doesn’t satisfy Slavin, who says he will try to take his case to U.S. Supreme Court. "I still believe in a place called hope, and I look forward to vindication by the courts and by history," he says.

The controversy concerns several complaints about Slavin, who has been licensed to practice law in the state of Tennessee since 1987 and has represented numerous whistle-blowers battling federal agencies.

Among those who filed complaints against Slavin were a chancellor for the Sixth Judicial District in Tennessee, a federal district court judge and two administrative law judges.

Among other things, the complainants accused Slavin of:

•• Filing pleadings that called a recommended decision "a stench in the nostrils of the nation" and claiming that an administrative judge "disgraces his judicial office."

•• Asserting that an administrative review board decision "ranks with the Dred Scott decision among the injustices of American history" and is "a disgrace to the human race."

Slavin was also accused of ignoring orders of a court, making false statements, failing to communicate with clients and using the judicial peer review process to try to win reversals on questions of law.

Before the case reached the Tennessee Supreme Court, Chancellor Richard E. Ladd of the Second Judicial District found Slavin in violation of nearly all the charges. He concluded Slavin’s actions were not protected by the First Amendment and ordered that he be suspended from law practice for three years.

In its Aug. 27 opinion, the Tennessee Supreme Court agreed that Slavin’s comments were not protected speech. The court cited a 1996 Kentucky Supreme Court opinion for its language: "There can never be a justification for a lawyer to use such scurrilous language with respect to a judge in pleadings or in open court."

"Accordingly, we conclude that Slavin’s in-court remarks were not protected by the First Amendment," the Tennessee Supreme Court wrote. "By this holding, we intend to limit an attorney’s criticisms of the judicial system and its officers to those criticisms which are consistent in every way with the sweep and the spirit of the Rules of Professional Conduct."

The court concluded: "Although we are much impressed with Slavin’s intellect and legal skill, what does not impress us is his apparent defiance in refusing to respect the line separating, in the judicial context, tolerable criticism from unacceptable speech. He has trampled upon that line, and indeed by so doing has propelled himself into the quagmire of unacceptable speech."

The court distinguished its 1989 decision in Ramsey v. Board of Professional Responsibility, 771 S.W.2d 116, which held that an attorney’s out-of-court statements to the media regarding judicial proceedings were protected by the First Amendment. In Slavin’s case, the court said, his statements were instead made during in-court judicial proceedings and could be sanctioned.

Laura L. Chastain, the deputy chief disciplinary counsel for the Tennessee Board of Professional Responsibility, who argued the case, was pleased that the court had made a distinction between out-of-court and in-court statements. "The state’s interest in this case involved the integrity of the judicial system," she says. "The judicial system itself becomes suspect in the public’s eye when the judiciary is subjected to such criticism and personal attacks, without a reasonable basis."

Slavin disagreed with the decision and the characterization that his statements were in-court statements. "Many, if not all, of the statements in question were out-of-court statements," he says. "Their complaint is that I complained. There is abroad in the land today a movement by large organizations to stifle criticism."

He questioned whether the Tennessee Supreme Court decision gives proper guidance to attorneys as to what they can and cannot say. "What attorney reading this decision would know what they could and couldn’’t say when representing a whistle-blower or any other person going up against a large organization?"

Nahum Litt, former chief judge of the Department of Labor, supports Slavin, one of his former law clerks.

"My position is that he has been unfairly persecuted," says Litt, who was a fact and expert witness for Slavin in the case. "He is a difficult advocate and will confront judges. But he should have the right to confront judges."

"I think the decision is a definite loss for lawyers’’ speech," says David A. Stuart, a Clinton, Tenn., attorney who is assisting Slavin with his case. "I think it sends a pretty powerful message about what lawyers cannot say about judges and how they say things about judges and other lawyers."

One legal expert questioned whether the decision gave enough guidance as to what attorney speech crosses the line.

"I think the opinion doesn’t necessarily provide the clearest line of demarcation between what is acceptable criticism and what is unacceptable criticism of the judiciary, because in this area those lines are oftentimes murky," says Peter Joy, a law professor at the Washington University in St. Louis. "The opinion, while it cites a lot of instances of Slavin’s critical speech, doesn’t draw the line clearly enough about which statements of Slavin's crossed the line and which did not."

Joy adds that "statements that directly attack a judge’s ability to handle a case or do his or her job are generally considered off-limits.

                    NY Lawyer Fights Disciplinary Probe

By John Caher
New York Lawyer
New York Law Journal
September 30, 2004

ALBANY  An ethics complaint against attorney John A. Aretakis is raising questions about a disciplinary body's ability to litigate what amounts to a slander allegation, and the right of an attorney to publicly disseminate a misconduct complaint.

Mr. Aretakis, a Manhattan and Albany area plaintiff's attorney specializing in clergy abuse cases, this week challenged the Third Department's Committee on Professional Standards.

He contends the disciplinary agency has neither the jurisdiction nor the capacity to determine the validity of what at its core is a defamation action. And he also claims, contrary to the committee's position, that he has a right to make such a complaint public.

The dispute stems from comments made by Mr. Aretakis at a May meeting of the Coalition of Concerned Catholics of the Albany Diocese, a conservative group that has been critical of the diocesan leadership.

At that meeting, Mr. Aretakis accused the Reverend Carl A. Urban of numerous sexual improprieties and implicated the diocese and its bishop in a cover-up. Mr. Aretakis does not deny making those accusations and has publicly repeated them on several occasions.

Reverend Urban contends the allegations are "absolutely false" and defamatory. However, instead of commencing a slander action  which Mr. Aretakis dared him to do at the meeting  the priest took his complaint to the Third Department's Committee on Professional Standards.

"My purpose is to ask this Committee to investigate the conduct of this man and to protect innocent persons, like myself, from his public pronouncements of vindictive hate and salacious lies," Reverend Urban said in a complaint that was made public by Mr. Aretakis.

Often, observers said, an ethics complaint predicated on an underlying tort is left to the Civil Court since a disciplinary panel could then rely on the court action to prosecute a misconduct charge.

In the case of Mr. Aretakis, the Third Department panel has apparently decided to proceed in the absence of a civil action. That means the committee may have to prosecute a defamation case, acting in essence as counsel for the complainant.

In his Sept. 27 response to the ethics complaint, Mr. Aretakis observes that truth is an absolute defense and notes that the committee cannot find him guilty of misconduct without first finding that he slandered the priest. That, he said, it is neither authorized nor equipped to do.

         No First Amendment Protection for Lawyer's Rants

Scott Brede
The Connecticut Law Tribune
October 13, 2003

An attorney's poison-pen letter to former West Hartford Probate Judge John A. Berman is not protected free speech, a Connecticut Superior Court judge ruled late last month, upholding a reprimand lodged against Joseph Notopoulos.

The West Hartford, Conn., lawyer had argued that he wrote and sent the letter in his capacity as a private citizen, not a member of the bar, and therefore shouldn't be disciplined under ethics rules prohibiting attorneys from engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice or making statements intended to disrupt a tribunal.

But ruling in Notopoulos v. Statewide Grievance Committee, New Britain Superior Court Judge William P. Murray found otherwise. "The Rules of Professional Conduct bind attorneys to uphold the law and to act in accordance with high standards in both their personal and professional lives," wrote Murray citing appellate rulings in Statewide Grievance Committee v. Egbarin and Statewide Grievance Committee v. Scluger.

Murray also disagreed with Notopoulos' claim that his criticisms -- which included his contention that Berman had "prostituted the integrity of his office" -- were absolutely protected under the First Amendment. "In the context of disciplinary proceedings, an attorney's right to free speech must be balanced with the state's interest in preserving the integrity of the judicial system," Murray wrote. " ... Here, the significant state interest in preserving public confidence in the judicial system outweighs the free speech rights of Notopoulos to make reckless accusations about the integrity of a probate judge."

In an interview, Notopoulos said the decision amounts to unlawful censorship, and ignores controlling federal case law.

In his decision, Murray didn't address the main case Notopoulos cited in appealing the grievance committee's reprimand: the 1974 federal court ruling in Polk v. The State Bar of Texas. In that case, plaintiff Ed J. Polk, a licensed Texas attorney, was sanctioned by bar officials for comments he made to the news media following his arrest on drunk driving charges, which included calling a judge "perverse." Finding Polk's reprimand violated his free-speech rights, U.S. District Court Judge Robert M. Dunn wrote, "This court rejects the contention...that in order to maintain the general esteem of the public in the legal profession ... conduct of an attorney in all matters must be above and beyond that conduct of nonlawyers."

Murray's decision, Notopoulos warned, could have negative implications for non-practicing lawyers who, in seeking elective office, engage in political mudslinging or take governmental entities to task. "I can safely predict that the more vocal non-practicing Connecticut lawyers, such as Bill Curry, Ralph Nader and Joe Lieberman, will be astonished to learn that they've surrendered their First Amendment rights to the state of Connecticut as punishment ... for having passed the state bar," he said.

Murray, however, noted that Notopoulos had other more effective options at his disposal, such as bringing his complaints about Berman to the Council on Probate Judicial Conduct, but failed to avail himself of them.

Angered by Berman's 1999 decision to appoint a former accountant as his dying mother's conservator, Notopoulos fired off correspondence to the West Hartford Probate Court in September 2000 accusing Berman of running "a financial spoils system for the cronies he calls his 'professional conservators.'" Notopoulos also sent copies of the letter to his brother and a local physician, according to the reviewing panel that heard the complaint subsequently lodged by Berman.

Murray said Notopoulos may have escaped the grievance committee's ire had his criticisms stuck to his concerns over the conservator's appointment. "Notopoulos, however, personally attacked Judge Berman and the West Hartford Probate Court and ascribed actions and motives to Judge Berman totally unsupportive of any evidence," Murray wrote.

Notopoulos denied his claims were unsubstantiated. He is considering a further appeal, but acknowledged the reprimand has "little consequence to me because I'm a non-practicing lawyer." He serves as a Hartford Judicial District magistrate, he said.

"I'm tempted to let [Murray's ruling] stand," Notopoulos added, "as a monument to flawed jurisprudence."

                       Footnote Gets a Lawyer Suspended
              State Justices Rule it Impugned Appeals Panel
 

By Gary Young
Staff Reporter
National Law Journal
November 11, 2002

A sharply worded footnote in a legal brief has cost an Indiana attorney a one-month suspension from the practice of law.

In a 3-2 decision, the Indiana Supreme Court said that Michael A. Wilkins impugned the integrity of the Indiana Court of Appeals by suggesting that one of its opinions was results-driven.

Under Indiana rules, Wilkins, a partner in the Indianapolis firm Ice Miller, must notify his clients of the suspension and close up shop for one month. In re Wilkins, No. 49S00-0005-DI-341 (Oct. 29, 2002).

The case has drawn controversy not only because it raises questions about the free-speech rights of attorneys, but because one of the judges who voted for Wilkins' suspension, Justice Robert D. Rucker, served on the Court of Appeals until 1999 and had a hand in the decision that Wilkins criticized.

Rucker told the Indianapolis Star on Nov. 5 that he might have removed himself from the case if he had recalled his involvement. Wilkins' attorney, G. Daniel Kelley Jr., also of Ice Miller, said that he did not ask Rucker to recuse himself, but declined to comment why.

In 1997, Wilkins signed on as local counsel to Michigan Mutual Insurance Co. in a dispute with an Indiana bowling alley over insurance coverage. A three-judge panel of the court of appeals ruled against Michigan Mutual in 1999, with Rucker concurring. Michigan Mutual's lead counsel, Jeffrey R. Learned of the Southfield, Mich., firm Morrison, Mahoney & Miller, wrote a brief urging the Supreme Court to take review. In a footnote, Learned wrote that the court of appeals opinion "is so factually and legally inaccurate that one is left to wonder whether the Court of Appeals was determined to find for [Michigan Mutual's opponent] and then said whatever was necessary to reach that conclusion."

The Supreme Court declined to review the case and struck the brief from the record, describing the footnote (in 1999) as "a scurrilous and intemperate attack on the integrity of the Court of Appeals."

Soon after, the Supreme Court's Disciplinary Commission began an investigation. In its Oct. 29 decision, the Supreme Court acknowledged that Wilkins was not the author of the footnote, but said he took responsibility by signing and submitting Learned's brief. Charges are still pending against Learned. His attorney, Kevin P. McGoff of Indianapolis' Kiefer and McGoff, said that Learned has agreed to accept a public reprimand, but that the Supreme Court has not yet approved the deal.

Wilkins was suspended under a disciplinary rule drawn from the ABA's model code and widely adopted by state and federal courts. Indiana Professional Conduct Rule 8.2(a) states that a "lawyer shall not make a statement that the lawyer knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge."

In briefs, Kelley attacked on several fronts. He argued, among other things, that the footnote did not fall under the rule because it was statement of opinion, not of fact. He claimed that "result-

driven" was commonly understood by lawyers and judges as a criticism of a certain kind of legal reasoning, not of the integrity of the reasoner. He also argued that a suspension would violate Wilkins' First Amendment right to free speech.

In their opinion, the Supreme Court majority did not address the fact/opinion distinction or the degree to which the lower court's opinion may in fact have been results-driven and claimed that Wilkins had adduced no authority in support of his First Amendment argument.

W. Bradley Wendel, a professor at Washington and Lee School of Law, has argued in a law review article that court-crafted restrictions on attorney speech often infringe the First Amendment.

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