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Lawyer
Presses RICO Suit Against
Other Attorneys Over Uncollected Fee
New York Lawyer
October 10, 2007
By Shannon P. Duffy
The Legal Intelligencer
Lawyers whose clients
refuse to pay their fees routinely file lawsuits and win judgments
against them. But attorney Ellen Marshall’s disputes with a former
divorce client have been anything but routine.
Then again, Warren
Matthei is no ordinary client.
Matthei, a millionaire
stockbroker from Summit, N.J., spent nearly a decade in jail — first
for refusing to pay child support to his ex-wife and later for
refusing to pay Marshall’s attorney fees.
Marshall obtained an
$85,000 judgment against Matthei, but court records show she has all
but given up on getting the money from Matthei.
Instead, in a separate
lawsuit, Marshall is pursuing RICO claims against lawyers in
Pennsylvania and London, England, who, she claims, have assisted
Matthei in hiding his assets from her.
Now a federal judge has
refused to dismiss the lawsuit in a scathing opinion that says "this
dispute exemplifies why there are reports of the public’s disdain
for lawyers."
In her 46-page opinion in
Marshall v. Fenstermacher, U.S. District Judge Gene E.K.
Pratter dismissed Marshall’s federal RICO claims, but found that she
may nonetheless have valid RICO claims under New Jersey law against
attorney Ronald Fenstermacher and his firm, High Swartz Roberts &
Seidel, in Norristown, Pa., and British attorney David Burgess and
his London law firm, Hetherington & Co.
To understand Marshall’s
claims against the Norristown and London lawyers, one first needs to
understand Marshall’s long history with Matthei.
In 1992, a judge had
ordered Matthei to pay $150,000 a year in child support to his three
children and ex-wife, Susan Kelley.
The case got ugly in 1993
when Matthei ignored a court order that he put half of a $2.8
million settlement from his former employer, Merrill Lynch, into an
escrow account, according to court papers. The money had come from a
wrongful-termination suit, and the judge was to decide how it should
be shared with his family.
Matthei fled the country
and stopped paying alimony and child support, according to court
papers.
But in 1996, Matthei was
arrested on a bench warrant in Newark, N.J., as he stepped off a
flight from London.
In the meantime, Marshall,
a solo practitioner from West Orange, N.J., had won a default
judgment against Matthei for $85,500 in 1995.
Matthei spent three years
in New Jersey jails for civil contempt, according to court papers.
When the New Jersey courts were poised to release him, federal
prosecutors took him into custody because he had been indicted on
criminal charges of violating the Child Support Recovery Act.
Ultimately, Matthei pleaded
guilty to a federal charge, acknowledged his child support debt and
began making monthly payments to his ex-wife, according to court
documents.
But his time in jail was
extended because Marshall had obtained a rare writ of capias ad
satisfaciendum that permits the jailing of debtors who refuse to
take part in proceedings to see whether they can pay.
In April 2006, Matthei was
set free after his new lawyer, Jeffrey Wild of Lowenstein Sandler in
Roseland, N.J., convinced Essex County Superior Court Judge Jared
Honigfeld that the only sums subject to the writ were the original
$85,000 plus a few years of interest.
Rather than spend more in
legal fees to prolong the case, Marshall consented to the release.
Instead, Marshall focused
on the Pennsylvania and London lawyers who, she alleges, assisted
Matthei while he was in jail in a scheme to hide his assets so that
Marshall could not collect her fees.
The suit, filed by attorney
Clark Alpert of Alpert Goldberg Butler Norton & Weiss in West
Orange, N.J., alleges that Fenstermacher prepared trust and
commercial documents for Matthei in 2001 while he was in the Federal
Detention Center in Philadelphia.
The suit accuses
Fenstermacher of fraud, alleging that the documents were designed to
create a false record that Matthei had transferred ownership of a $1
million flat in London years earlier to his second wife, Emma
Dawson.
Dawson, a British citizen
who is now divorced from Matthei, had called in a U.S. lawyer whose
communications would be privileged, the suit alleges, so that
Marshall and law enforcement officials would not find out about the
transactions.
The suit says that, in
2000, when Matthei was in Philadelphia, Dawson’s British solicitors
at Slough’s Hetherington & Co. contacted Fenstermacher, saying
Matthei needed a lawyer to handle his affairs in person because
federal authorities were intercepting his mail.
Matthei needed "someone to
actually visit him personally to discuss matters with him and get
him, if necessary, to sign any papers," the suit says, quoting the
letter.
Among the papers needed
were documents confirming that Matthei had, years earlier, signed
over to Dawson shares of a Bahamian company that owned the posh
London apartment. And after the documents were filed with a London
court in 2003, Dawson was able to sell the apartment for $900,000,
the suit says.
Dawson and Hetherington &
Co. are also named as defendants in Marshall’s suit.
Fenstermacher’s lawyer,
Arthur W. Lefco of Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin, argued
in court papers that Marshall’s RICO claims should be dismissed
because she cannot satisfy the U.S. Supreme Court’s test for
establishing liability.
Under the high court’s 1993
decision in Reves v. Ernst & Young, Lefco argued, there
cannot be any RICO liability for Fenstermacher and his firm because
there is no evidence that they "participated" in the "operation and
management" of any alleged RICO enterprise.
Pratter agreed, finding
that Marshall failed to muster enough evidence to pursue a federal
RICO claim against Fenstermacher.
"Mr. Matthei, the main ‘bad
actor,’ is not a defendant; Ms. Dawson, the only person who arguably
benefited here by obtaining any assets of value that belonged to Mr.
Matthei, apparently is no where to be found; and Mr. Burgess, Mr.
Fenstermacher’s English counterpart, who was involved in this matter
long before Mr. Fenstermacher became involved, has died," Pratter
wrote.
"That leaves Mr.
Fenstermacher and High Swartz as the only viable defendants in this
case, even though, by any reading of the facts presented, Mr.
Fenstermacher had a relatively minute role in the alleged ‘scheme,’
and had the least to gain," Pratter wrote.
Pratter found that, even
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Marshall, she
"cannot establish the existence of an ‘enterprise’ for federal RICO
purposes."
And even if a viable
"enterprise" existed under federal RICO laws, Pratter said, Marshall
"has not established that Mr. Fenstermacher or High Swartz conducted
or participated in the ‘operation or management’ of any such
enterprise’s affairs."
Lefco argued that New
Jersey courts construe the New Jersey RICO statute and the federal
RICO statute in the same way, and that the same arguments would
therefore lead to dismissal of those claims.
But Alpert argued that New
Jersey courts have interpreted its RICO statutes more broadly than
the federal law. The Reves "operation or management" test is not
applied under New Jersey’s RICO statute, he argued, and under the
New Jersey courts’ more lenient interpretation of what constitutes
an "enterprise," any one of Marshall’s alleged alternative
enterprises would satisfy New Jersey’s standard.
Pratter sided with Alpert,
finding that "the New Jersey courts have interpreted New Jersey
RICO’s definition of an ‘enterprise’ to be more broad than the
federal counterpart."
As a result, Pratter said,
it is "quite conceivable that one could fail to satisfy a federal
RICO cause of action, yet meet the requirements for a successful New
Jersey RICO claim."
Pratter said Lefco "made no
effort to argue that, despite some differences between courts’
interpretations of the federal RICO statute and New Jersey’s
counterpart, Ms. Marshall has still failed to prove the existence of
a viable ‘enterprise.’"
But Alpert, she said, "has
noted these differences in some detail and argued that [Marshall’s]
alternative enterprises satisfy New Jersey’s more liberal tests."
As a result, Pratter
concluded that summary judgment on the New Jersey RICO claims was
inappropriate because the defendants had "put forth no real
arguments as to why summary judgment should be granted in their
favor" on those claims.
But in a footnote, Pratter
hinted that she remains skeptical of Marshall’s chances of
ultimately proving RICO liability, even under New Jersey’s more
liberal test.
"The court suspects that,
even under New Jersey’s more liberal definition of ‘enterprise,’ the
‘hallmarks’ of an enterprise nevertheless easily could prove to be
missing from each one of Ms. Marshall’s alleged ‘enterprises,’"
Pratter wrote in the footnote.
Pratter said the
"association-in-fact" of Matthei and Dawson "lacks the elements of
an ‘organization’" that the New Jersey Supreme Court requires,
citing a decision that called for proof of a division of labor and
separation of functions necessary to "engage in a high degree of
planning, cooperation and coordination."
Pratter said in the
footnote that Marshall "has not offered any evidence that would
indicate that any degree of planning was involved, that the
participants performed discrete roles in carrying out the scheme, or
that would indicate any semblance of coordination among the
participants involved in implementing decisions.
Neither Lefco nor Alpert
could be reached for comment.
The New Jersey Law Journal
contributed to this report.
(Copies of the 46-page
opinion in Marshall v. Fenstermacher, PICS No. 07-1564, are
available from The Legal Intelligencer. Please call the Pennsylvania
Instant Case Service at 800-276-PICS to order or for information.
Some cases are not available until 1 p.m.)
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