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N.J.
Appeals Court: Client's
Illegitimate Purpose Isn't Necessarily the Lawyer's
Henry Gottlieb
New Jersey Law Journal
August 6, 2007
A New Jersey
state appeals court cleared a law firm of malicious civil
prosecution on Wednesday in a decision that champions the right of
lawyers to advocate zealously even when they know a claim is
baseless.
Giordano,
Halleran & Ciesla represented a beach club owner in a failed
defamation suit against a neighbor. The neighbor, having won,
countersued the club owner and the Middletown, N.J., firm, alleging
the first suit had no purpose but to stifle her free speech rights
maliciously.
The appeals
court found, however, that lawyers cannot be liable for malicious
prosecution unless they are acting for an illegitimate purpose of
their own. And the fact that a client has an illegitimate purpose
does not automatically mean the lawyer does too, the three-judge
panel said in Lobiondo v. Schwartz, A-4325-04.
The decision
"insures that representation will be available when the client's
claim has only marginal merit and may be pursued by the client for
other than legitimate purposes," the court said.
Judges Jack
Lintner, George Seltzer and Christine Miniman, writing per curiam,
said they could find no reported decision on the issue. Their own
opinion is not published either, but lawyers in the case say it
should be.
"I think it is
a significant opinion and not just for Giordano, Halleran but for
all attorneys in New Jersey because the Appellate Division has now
provided attorneys with a bright-line test for malicious use of
process, says the firm's lawyer, David Bauman of Bressler, Amery &
Ross in Florham Park, N.J.
"The effect of
it is going to allow lawyers to discharge their primary obligation
of zealous representation of their clients without fear of being
held liable as ensurers of the quality of the case," he says.
Giordano,
Halleran's client, James Lobiondo Jr., owner of Surfrider Beach Club
in Sea Bright, N.J., sued neighbor Grace Schwartz in 1991 for
defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress and
tortiuous interference after she publicly complained about the club
to other neighbors and to local and state regulatory bodies.
She
countersued for malicious prosecution, but that action was dismissed
and a jury that was given copies of Schwartz's flyers and letters
damning the club found her liable. Lobiondo won $66,000 in damages.
The award was
reversed on appeal. Schwartz was engaged in legitimate public
protest, not defaming the plaintiff, the Appellate Division ruled in
a decision that is often cited favorably by critics of strategic
lawsuits against public participation, Lobiondo v. Schwartz,
323 N.J. Super. 391 (App. Div. 1999), certif. denied, 162 N.J. 488
(1999).
The appeals
court ruled that Schwartz could pursue a counterclaim against
Lobiondo for malicious prosecution and on remand they both brought
Giordano, Halleran into the case. Lobiondo defended himself by
saying he was acting on the firm's advice and Schwartz said the firm
was complicit in the malicious prosecution.
During an
appellate hearing last October, Schwartz's lawyer, Ira Karasick of
Sweeney Lev in Montclair, N.J., argued that the firm should be
punished with the client for advising him to sue.
"How can this
be anything but malicious use of process?" Karasick asked. And Judge
Lintner wanted to know, too. "If an attorney truly believes a
lawsuit has been filed with malicious purpose, is there an
obligation to ask to be removed as counsel?" the judge asked at the
argument.
The answer, in
his opinion is, no.
For attorneys
to be liable they have to know the client's case was baseless and
then they have to litigate for their own improper purpose. To rule
otherwise would open lawyers to litigation whenever a client with a
weak case and with great animus toward an opposing litigant lost on
summary judgment, the court suggested.
This does not
mean lawyers will have carte blanche to harm adverse parties without
probably clause, in their clients' interests, the judges said.
Attorneys remain liable for frivolous suit sanctions and discipline
for violation of rules of professional conduct, the court said.
Karasick says
no decision has been made on seeking review by the state Supreme
Court.
"Lawyers
should have a higher standard, not a lower one because they know
what probable cause is," he says.
Co-counsel
Joan Pransky, who has a firm in Montclair, adds: "This court has
just said that a lawyer cannot be held liable for malicious use of
process even though anybody else can be liable for the very same
thing. That's a pretty outrageous position to take."
The ruling
makes it hard to imagine a realistic scenario that would put a
lawyer in jeopardy of being liable for malicious prosecution,
Pransky says.
First the
client would have to tell the lawyer the case against the adversary
has no merit. Then, the lawyer would have to say, in effect, that's
OK because I have an axe to grind with the adversary, too, she says.
The court
remanded the case for trial on Schwartz's claim against Lobiondo and
he can raise the defense that he was acting on advice of counsel.
That means,
ironically, that Lobiondo could theoretically be found not liable
because he took his lawyer's advice, while the lawyers cannot be
held liable for pursuing the case.
"They have
created a situation where a client goes to a lawyer and says, 'I
want to file a defamation action even though there was nothing said
about me that was untrue and I have an improper motive,'" Pransky
says.
The lawyer can
then file the lawsuit and neither of them is liable, she says.
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