|

Supreme
Court Rules Guantanamo
Prisoners Have Right to Sue in U.S. Courts
Michael Doyle
McClatchy Newspapers
June 12, 2008
WASHINGTON — A sharply
divided Supreme Court ruled Thursday that Guantanamo Bay detainees
can challenge their extended imprisonment in federal court, and
struck down as inadequate an alternative review system that
Congress set up.
Repudiating a key tenet of the Bush administration's
war-on-terrorism policy, the court's 5-4 majority concluded that
foreigners held at the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba,
retain the same rights as U.S. residents to seek writs of habeas
corpus. The landmark ruling will permit several hundred accused
enemy combatants to see the evidence that justifies their
captivity.
"Some of these
petitioners have been in custody for the past six years with no
definitive judicial determination as to the legality of their
detention," Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote. "Their access to the
writ is necessary to determine the lawfulness of their status,
even if, in the end, they do not obtain the relief they seek."
The long-awaited ruling
in the combined cases known as Boumediene v. Bush and Al Odah v.
United States is the latest in a string of judicial defeats for
the Bush administration. It marks the third time in four years
that the Supreme Court has repudiated the administration's efforts
to exclude foreign prisoners from traditional legal protections.
The twin cases, which
Kennedy noted "lack any precise historical parallel," also mark
the first time in U.S. history that constitutional habeas corpus
rights have been extended to alien fighters detained overseas. The
ruling covers some 270 men currently held at Guantanamo. It
doesn't directly address the 20 or so men who now are facing
trials before separate military commissions.
"It's been a long
struggle," said Michael Ratner, the president of the Center for
Constitutional Rights, which filed the first lawsuits challenging
the detentions. "It's a major vindication."
David Cynamon, the lead
attorney for a detainee named Fawzi Khalid Abdullah Fahad al Odah,
added that the ruling was a "complete victory not only for our
clients but for all Americans and citizens the world over."
The court's conservative
wing — comprising Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Justices
Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito — dissented, at
times with sharp words of its own.
"The nation will live to
regret what the court has done today," Scalia warned.
Justice Department
spokesman Peter Carr said the department was disappointed in the
decision and would review it. Carr noted that the decision didn't
touch directly on the military commissions now under way.
Al Odah, a Kuwaiti
native, Algerian native Lakhdar Boumediene and their fellow
detainees were seized abroad and have never been held on the U.S.
mainland. The long-awaited ruling doesn't question the Bush
administration's authority to detain the men. Instead, it resolves
a long-running fight over what legal protections cover them.
In 2004, the Supreme
Court ruled that the Guantanamo Bay detainees had a right to
challenge their detentions under a statute passed by Congress.
Congress responded by stripping federal courts of their
jurisdiction, thereby blocking further habeas corpus petitions.
The Supreme Court next ruled that the 2005 law didn't apply
retroactively to Guantanamo Bay petitions that already had been
filed.
Congress returned with
the Military Commissions Act of 2006, blocking all Guantanamo
habeas corpus cases.
In Latin, habeas corpus
means "produce the body." A legal principle dating perhaps as far
back as the 13th century, it enables prisoners to demand in court
the legal justification and factual basis for their detentions.
"The (Constitution's)
framers viewed freedom from unlawful restraint as a fundamental
precept of liberty," Kennedy wrote, amid a lengthy historical
recitation in his 70-page opinion, "and they understood the writ
of habeas corpus as a vital instrument to secure that freedom."
The Bush administration
contended that the men don't have habeas corpus rights because
they're foreigners and aren't imprisoned on U.S. soil. The United
States has leased the 45-square-mile Guantanamo Bay property from
Cuba since 1903, and the court noted that the United States
maintains an "objective degree of control" over the overseas
facility.
"Our basic charter cannot
be contracted away like this," Kennedy wrote. "The Constitution
grants Congress and the president the power to acquire, dispose of
and govern territory, not the power to decide when and where its
terms apply."
While traveling in Italy,
Bush said: "We'll abide by the court's decision. That doesn't mean
I have to agree with it. It's a deeply divided court, and I
strongly agree with those who dissented."
One key White House ally,
Republican Sen. Lindsey Graham of South Carolina, added that the
court's ruling was "tremendously dangerous and irresponsible," and
he complained that the civilian justices didn't understand
military necessity.
Currently, the Guantanamo
prisoners go through three-member combatant status review
tribunals. These panels determine whether the detainees are
properly considered enemy combatants. The military panels can rely
on classified evidence that isn't given to the prisoners. The
prisoners have "personal representatives," but not lawyers. The
tribunals' officers are required to assume that the government's
information is genuine and accurate
The U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit then can review the
tribunal's proceedings. The combatant status tribunals can
continue under the court's ruling. Now, though, the prisoners also
will be able to challenge their detentions through the traditional
habeas corpus route of going to a single federal judge. The
court's majority concluded that the narrower review process is "an
inadequate substitute" for the traditional habeas corpus review.
"The detainee has limited
means to find or present evidence to challenge the government's
case against him," Kennedy noted, further noting that the
tribunals aren't permitted to release prisoners even if evidence
is found to be insufficient. Federal courts can, however. To read
the case of Boumediene et Al. V. Bush, President
of the United States, et al.click on
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/cgi-bin/getcase.pl?court=US&navby=case&vol=000&invol=06-1195
To read the comments
click here
Bill May
Remove 'Loaded'
Words Psychologists' Guidelines at Risk
By M.C. Moewe
Daytona Beach News
May 12, 2008
Thinking they can stop
divorcing parents from fighting in court, state officials want to
rewrite the laws to replace loaded terms like "custody" with
"parenting plan."
To do that, though, they'll
strip out guidelines for psychologists that are designed to protect
the children.
"It dumbs down the
criteria," Coral Gables psychologist Jerome Poliacoff said of the
proposal to replace American Psychological Association's guidelines
with "standards that a reasonable psychologist would use."
"Who gets to be the
reasonable psychologist?" Poliacoff said. "I think it leaves a lot
of room for poor work."
The bill, sponsored by Sen.
Evelyn Lynn, R-Ormond Beach, passed both the House and Senate last
week and is waiting for Gov. Charlie Crist's signature.
The bill's supporters say
it's designed to lessen the conflict in some of the state's nastiest
divorces.
"The intent was never to
limit the standards," said Elisha Roy, who worked on the bill for
four years as a member of the family law section of The Florida Bar.
"The goal of the bill is to limit litigation."
In contentious divorce
cases involving children, psychologists often act as court experts
who make recommendations to judges on issues such as where the child
should live, how often the other parent sees the child and any
mental health treatment the family might need.
Currently, psychologists
are presumed to be acting in good faith if they follow the American
Psychological Association's guidelines when making recommendations.
Roy said she believes those
are the standards psychologists will continue to follow. "That is
how I would interpret it," she said.
"I would assume that's what
they'd use," added Lynn.
Assumptions, though, leave
a lot of wiggle room and, without specific guidelines, judges and
lawyers working with the psychologists would have a more difficult
time determining the quality of the reports, Poliacoff said. Also,
bringing a legal case against a psychologist who did a poor job of
considering a child's best interest in an evaluation would also be
more difficult.
Adele Guadalupe, president
and a founder of Families Against Court Travesties, said standards
for psychologists working as court experts are already difficult to
enforce, yet the decisions can put heavy and expensive burdens on
families.
"You have to dance to the
tune of these so-called favored experts and favoritism is constantly
rearing its ugly head," said Guadalupe, whose organization for the
past four years has sent impartial court watchers to hearings to
monitor family court cases. "The poorer parent can't afford to pay
all these experts, so usually it's the parent with the money that
wins."
The thought behind taking
out the standards was because those rules contain the word "custody"
and the bill is removing those words from the law, said Roy, the
Florida Bar representative, who worked with psychologists in helping
to write the bill.
Taking away terms like
"primary custody" and replacing them with the term "parenting plan"
will stop parents from fighting, she said: "The whole purpose behind
(the bill) is to reduce litigation by the removal of labels that
don't mean anything."
That the proposed law was
vetted by lawyers and psychologists doesn't alleviate Guadalupe's
concerns.
"These are the very people
who stand to profit," said Guadalupe explaining the costs associated
with these court experts often run into the thousands of dollars.
"It can leave a parent financially decimated."
Scalia
Speaks Out in "60 Minutes" Interview
By Tony Mauro
Legal Times
New York Lawyer
April 28, 2008
WASHINGTON - In his remarkable appearance on "60 Minutes" Sunday
night, Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia acknowledged he
has had "down times" on the bench, periods when he felt he was
repeating himself in dissents and unable to move Court doctrine. It
was Scalia's first extended broadcast interview in his 22 years on
the Court.
In one of the more dramatic
moments during the segment, CBS correspondent Lesley Stahl read from
Scalia's 1996 letter written to the late Justice Harry Blackmun
in which he voiced his melancholy about the preceding term -- a term
that had produced Romer v. Evans, a victory for gay rights
advocates, and United States v. Virginia, which said the
state-run Virginia Military Institute could not admit only males.
Scalia said he "hadn't
remembered" writing the letter, which is included in the Blackmun
papers at the Library of Congress. But he did say that the final
months of a Supreme Court are "usually a disappointment." He also
said the situation, from his point of view, was "less dire in more
recent years."
When he first joined the
Court in 1986, Scalia said he planned to leave the Court "as soon as
I could," when he turned 65 and could retire at full pay. But now at
72 and "working for free," Scalia says he is not thinking about
retiring any longer. "I can't think what I would do for an encore."
Scalia's tenor during the
lengthy segment was, by turns, wary, gently combative, and downright
gleeful, as Stahl asked him about his originalism, his religion, and
his upbringing in Elmhurst, Queens, in New York City. When Stahl
pointed out Scalia was an only child, Scalia said, "Come on, lay
off. Yes, I was spoiled." The two visited his neighborhood and even
P.S. 13, his elementary school, where he was shown his perfect
report cards. His wife Maureen, whom he married in 1960, also
appears briefly. If she had married anyone else, she said, "I would
have been bored." Justice Scalia added, "Whatever my faults are, I'm
not wishy-washy."
It was an overall positive
piece, with Scalia's charming side in full display. The segment also
spent some time on the book he co-authored, titled, "Making Your
Case: The Art of Persuading Judges," which was the occasion for the
interview. Co-author Bryan Garner recounted how suprisingly
deferential Scalia was during the writing.
First reported in
The BLT: The Blog of Legal Times.
Justices
Make It Tougher to Sue Medical Device Makers
By Linda Greenhouse
The New York Times
February 21, 2008
WASHINGTON — Makers of
medical devices like implantable
defibrillators or breast
implants are immune from liability for personal injuries as long as
the
Food and Drug Administration
approved the device before it was marketed and it meets the agency’s
specifications, the
Supreme Court ruled on
Wednesday.
The 8-to-1 decision was a
victory for the Bush administration, which for years has sought
broad authority to pre-empt tougher state regulation.
In 2004, the administration
reversed longstanding federal policy and began arguing that "premarket
approval" of a new medical device by the F.D.A. overrides most
claims for damages under state law. Because federal law makes no
provision for damage suits against device makers, injured patients
have turned to state law and have won substantial awards.
The Bush administration
will continue its push for pre-emption in another F.D.A. case that
the court has accepted for its next term, on whether the agency’s
approval of a drug, as opposed to a device, pre-empts personal
injury suits. Drugs and medical devices are regulated under separate
laws.
The case before the court
concerned only medical devices that had gone through the premarket
approval process specified by the Medical Device Amendments of 1976.
Most devices now available reached the market through a different
process, under which the F.D.A. found them to be "substantially
equivalent" to those marketed before the 1976 law took effect.
The Supreme Court ruled in
1996 that this less rigorous approval process does not pre-empt
state damage suits against the manufacturers of "grandfathered"
devices.
Devices subject to the
premarket approval process, and thus affected by the court’s
opinion, tend to be more technologically advanced, expensive and, in
some instances, risky.
Examples of devices that
have been the subjects of recent lawsuits include an implantable
defibrillator, a heart pump, a spinal cord stimulator, a drug-coated
stent, an artificial heart
valve, and prosthetic hips and knees.
It was not immediately
clear how many of the thousands of lawsuits against medical device
manufacturers would be affected, though some pending cases will
almost certainly be nullified.
The decision, for example,
does not foreclose lawsuits claiming that a device was made
improperly, in violation of F.D.A. specifications. Cases may also be
brought under state laws that mirror federal rules, as opposed to
supplementing them.
Next Monday, the court will
hear another F.D.A. pre-emption case, on whether a state case can be
based on the claim that a drug maker committed fraud by
misrepresenting or withholding information from the agency during
the approval process. The administration is supporting the
manufacturer in that case, Warner-Lambert Co. v. Kent, No. 06-1498,
which concerns the
diabetes drug Rezulin.
Writing for the majority in
Wednesday’s case, Riegel v.
Medtronic Inc., No. 06-179,
Justice
Antonin Scalia said that
permitting state juries to impose liability on the maker of an
approved device "disrupts the federal scheme," under which the F.D.A.
has the responsibility for evaluating the risks and benefits of a
new device and assuring that it is safe and effective for its
intended use.
A jury, looking only at the
injured plaintiff, will tend to weigh only the dangers of a device
and "is not concerned with its benefits," Justice Scalia said,
adding, "the patients who reaped those benefits are not represented
in court."
The decision affirmed the
dismissal of a lawsuit by a patient who was injured during an
angioplasty when a balloon
catheter burst while being inserted to dilate a coronary artery. The
device won F.D.A. premarket approval in 1994, two years before the
incident. The patient, Charles R. Riegel, died after the lawsuit was
filed, and the case was carried on by his widow, Donna.
The medical device statute
contains a pre-emption clause that bars states from imposing "any
requirement" related to a medical device that is "different from, or
in addition to" a federal requirement. The question of statutory
interpretation at the heart of the case turned on what Congress
meant by "any requirement."
Justice Scalia said that
state tort law, by imposing duties of care on product makers,
amounted to such an additional requirement. He said the 1976 law
"speaks clearly to the point at issue," regardless of the federal
government’s previous or current positions.
Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the
solitary dissenter, said the court had misconstrued Congress’s
intent in adding the pre-emption clause to the 1976 law. The
purpose, she said, was to prevent individual states from imposing
their own premarket approval process on new medical devices. Devices
were not regulated under federal law at the time, and California and
other states had stepped in to fill the vacuum by setting up their
own regulatory systems.
That was all that Congress
had in mind, Justice Ginsburg said, not "a radical curtailment of
state common-law suits seeking compensation for injuries caused by
defectively designed or labeled medical devices." She said that
Congress had passed the 1976 law "to protect consumer safety," not
to oust the states from "a domain historically occupied by state
law." The decision was at odds with the "central purpose" of the
1976 law, Justice Ginsburg added.
Crucial Democratic
lawmakers appear to agree with Justice Ginsburg, including Senator
Edward M. Kennedy, Democrat
of Massachusetts, who heads the Health, Education, Labor and
Pensions Committee and was the sole Senate sponsor of the 1976
legislation in question.
"In enacting legislation on
medical devices, Congress never intended that F.D.A. approval would
give blanket
immunity to manufacturers
from liability for injuries caused by faulty devices," Mr. Kennedy
said in a statement. He added: "Congress obviously needs to correct
the court’s decision."
Representative Henry
Waxman, the California Democrat who is chairman of the House
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform and was on the House
panel that approved the 1976 bill, expressed a similar view.
"The Supreme Court’s
decision strips consumers of the rights they’ve had for decades,"
Mr. Waxman said. "This isn’t what Congress intended, and we’ll pass
legislation as quickly as possible to fix this nonsensical
situation."
The Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act of 1938, under which the F.D.A. regulates
pharmaceuticals, does not
contain a pre-emption clause. Nonetheless, the administration is
arguing in the case the court has accepted for its next term, Wyeth
v. Levine, No. 06-1249, that pre-emption is implicit in the
structure of the statute.
The Supreme Court’s
interest in pre-emption is not limited to the medical arena. In a
similar case decided on Wednesday, this one unanimously, the court
ruled that the federal law that deregulated the trucking industry in
1980 pre-empted two recent laws adopted by the State of Maine to
regulate the shipment of tobacco products into the state.
The state laws were
intended to prevent children who were not of legal age to buy
cigarettes from ordering
them over the Internet. The laws placed responsibility on shippers
and delivery companies to verify the recipient’s identity and age.
Justice
Stephen G. Breyer, writing
for the court in this case, Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor Transport
Association, No. 06-457, said the state law "produces the very
effect that the federal law sought to avoid, namely, a state’s
direct substitution of its own governmental commands for competitive
market forces" in a deregulated environment.
Barnaby Feder contributed
reporting from New York and Gardiner Harris from Washington.
Supreme
Court Says 401(k) Participants Can Sue
By the Associated Press
The New York Times
February 20, 2008
WASHINGTON (AP) -- The
Supreme Court ruled
Wednesday that individual participants in the most common type of
retirement plan can sue under a pension protection law to recover
their losses.
The unanimous decision has
implications for 50 million workers with $2.7 trillion invested in
401(k) retirement plans.
James LaRue of Southlake,
Texas, said the value of his stock market holdings plunged $150,000
when administrators at his retirement plan failed to follow his
instructions to switch to safer investments.
The issue in the LaRue case
was whether the Employee Retirement Income Security Act permits an
individual account holder to sue plan administrators for breaching
their fiduciary duties.
The language of the law
refers to recovering money for the ''plan'' rather than for an
individual, raising the question of whether a participant can sue
solely for himself.
Justice
John Paul Stevens, in his
opinion for the court, said that such lawsuits are allowed.
''Fiduciary misconduct need not threaten the solvency of the entire
plan to reduce benefits below the amount that participants would
otherwise receive,'' Stevens said.
The decision overturned a
ruling by the 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in Richmond, Va.
Unlike people enrolled in
traditional pension plans, employees in 401(k) plans, which have
exploded in number in the past two decades, choose from a menu of
options on where to invest their money. That puts workers squarely
in the middle of decision-making about their pensions and inevitably
leads to the kind of disputes LaRue has with his plan's
administrators.
''Defined contribution
plans dominate the retirement plan scene today,'' unlike when ERISA
was enacted in the mid-1970s, Stevens said.
Many traditional pension
plans guaranteeing a fixed monthly benefit have either been frozen
or terminated, and 401(k) plans are the main source of retirement
income, said the
Air Line Pilots Association,
which represents 60,000 pilots at 41 air carriers.
The Bush administration
argued in support of workers. The government said the appeals court
ruling barring LaRue's lawsuit would leave 401(k) participants
without a meaningful remedy from any federal, state or local court
when plan administrators fail to live up to their duties.
Business groups supported
LaRue's employer. They argued that ERISA is aimed at encouraging
employers to set up pension plans, while guarding against
administrative abuses involving the plan as a whole. The law doesn't
permit individual lawsuits like LaRue's, the business groups said.
Congress enacted ERISA
after some widely publicized failures by companies and labor unions
to pay promised pensions. Workers in class-action lawsuits have long
relied on the law, most recently in the scandal-ridden collapses of
companies like Enron and its 401(k) plan for workers.
The term 401(k) refers to a
section of the Internal Revenue Code.
Participants in 401(k)
plans do not know how much money they will receive in retirement.
Employees invest a certain amount each month and how much they get
back depends on how well their chosen investments have performed.
The case is LaRue v.
DeWolff, 06-856.
Justice
Souter Considered Resigning
After Bush v. Gore, New Book Says
By Mark Sherman
The Associated Press
New York Lawyer
September 7, 2007
WASHINGTON -- Justice David
Souter contemplated resigning from the Supreme Court because he was
so upset by the decision that sealed the 2000 presidential election
for George W. Bush, a new book says.
Souter, one of the four
dissenting justices in the case, believed his five colleagues in the
majority acted in a "crudely partisan" manner in siding with Bush to
shut down the recount of votes in Florida in December 2000, author
Jeffrey Toobin writes in "The Nine, Inside the Secret World of the
Supreme Court." A day after the decision in Bush v. Gore,
Vice President Al Gore formally conceded the election.
"Souter seriously
considered resigning. For many months, it was not at all clear
whether he would remain as a justice," Toobin writes. "At the urging
of a handful of close friends, he decided to stay on, but his
attitude toward the court was never the same. There were times when
David Souter thought of Bush v. Gore and wept."
The reclusive Souter, 67,
typically returns to his home in New Hampshire as soon as the court
finishes work in late June and heads back to Washington only in time
for the start of the next term. He was named to the court by the
first President Bush in 1990.
Toobin does not say how he
learned that Souter thought about retiring, although he says
generally that his sources include the justices themselves.
But one of Souter's close
friends, former New Hampshire Sen. Warren Rudman, called Toobin's
account "absolutely false."
"It's laughable. Obviously
he dissented strongly. He felt the court was very wrong and he
didn't think it was good for the court, never mind the issue
itself," Rudman said in an interview. "But he never, ever considered
resigning over that or anything else."
Souter declined to comment
on the report, court spokeswoman Kathy Arberg said.
The book will be available
to the public beginning Sept. 18.
Justices
End 96Year-Old Ban on Price Floors
By Stephen Labaton
New York Times
June 29 , 2007
WASHINGTON— Striking down
an antitrust rule nearly a century old, the
Supreme Court ruled today
that it is no longer automatically unlawful for manufacturers and
distributors to agree on setting minimum retail prices.
The decision will give
producers significantly more leeway, though not unlimited power, to
dictate retail prices and to restrict the flexibility of
discounters.
Five justices said the new
rule could, in some instances, lead to more competition and better
service. But four dissenting justices agreed with the submission of
37 states and consumer groups that the abandonment of the old rule
would lead to significantly higher prices and less competition for
consumer and other goods.
The court struck down the
96-year-old rule that resale price maintenance agreements were an
automatic, or per se, violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act. In its
place, the court instructed judges considering such agreements for
possible antitrust violations to apply a case-by-case approach,
known as a "rule of reason," to assess their impact on competition.
The decision was the latest
in a string of opinions this term to overturn Supreme Court
precedents. It marked the latest in a line of Supreme Court
victories for big businesses and antitrust defendants. And it was
the latest of the court’s antitrust decisions in recent years to
reject rules that had prohibited various marketing agreements
between companies.
The Bush administration,
along with economists of the Chicago school, had argued that the
blanket prohibition against resale price maintenance agreements was
archaic and counterproductive because, they said, some resale price
agreements actually promote competition.
For example, they said,
such agreements can make it easier for a new producer by assuring
retailers that they will be able to recoup their investments in
helping to market the product. And they said some distributors could
be unfairly harmed by others — like Internet-based retailers — that
could offer discounts because they would not be incurring the
expenses of providing product demonstrations and other specialized
consumer services.
A majority of the court
agreed that the flat ban on price agreements discouraged these and
other marketing practices that could be helpful to competition.
"In sum, it is a
flawed antitrust doctrine that serves the interests of lawyers — by
creating legal distinctions that operate as traps for the unaware —
more than the interests of consumers — by requiring manufacturers to
choose second-best options to achieve sound business objectives,"
the court said in an opinion by Justice
Anthony M. Kennedy and
signed by Chief Justice
John G. Roberts Jr. and
Justices
Antonin Scalia,
Clarence Thomas and
Samuel A. Alito Jr.
But in his dissent,
portions of which he read from the bench, Justice
Stephen G. Breyer said there
was no compelling reason to overturn a century’s worth of Supreme
Court decisions that had affirmed the prohibition on resale
maintenance agreements.
"The only safe predictions
to make about today’s decision are that it will likely raise the
price of goods at retail and that it will create considerable legal
turbulence as lower courts seek to develop workable principles," he
wrote. "I do not believe that the majority has shown new or changed
conditions sufficient to warrant overruling a decision of such long
standing."
During the period from 1937
to 1975 when Congress allowed the states to adopt laws that
permitted retail price fixing, economists estimated that such
agreements covered about 10 percent of consumer good purchases. In
today’s dollars, Justice Breyer estimated that the agreements
translate to a higher annual average bill for a family of four of
roughly $750 to $1,000.
The dissent was signed by
Justices
John Paul Stevens,
David H. Souter and
Ruth Bader Ginsburg.
The case involved an appeal
of a judgment of $1.2 million against Leegin Creative Leather
Products Inc. after it cut off Kay’s Kloset, a suburban Dallas shop,
for refusing to honor Leegin’s no-discount policy. The judgment was
automatically tripled under antitrust law.
Leegin’s marketing strategy
for finding a niche in the highly competitive world of small leather
goods was to sell its "Brighton" line of fashion accessories through
small boutiques that could offer personalized service. Retailers
were required to accept a no-discounting policy.
After the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in New Orleans, upheld the
judgment and said it was bound by Supreme Court precedent, Leegin
took the case to the Supreme Court. Unless it is settled, the case,
Leegin Creative Leather Products v. PSK Inc., will now be sent down
to a lower court to apply the new standard.
The Supreme Court adopted
the flat ban on resale price agreements between manufacturers and
retailers in 1911, when it founded that the Dr. Miles Medical
Company had violated the Sherman act. The company had sought to sell
medicine only to distributors who agreed to resell them at set
prices. The court said such agreements benefit only the
distributors, not consumers, and set a rule making such agreements
unlawful.
Justice Kennedy said today
that the court was not bound by the 1911 precedent because of the
"widespread agreement" among economists that resale price
maintenance agreements can promote competition.
"Vertical agreements
establishing minimum resale prices can have either pro-competitive
or anticompetitive effects, depending upon the circumstances in
which they are formed," he wrote.
But Justice Breyer said in
his dissent that the court had failed to justify the overturning of
the rule, or that there was significant evidence to show that price
agreements would often benefit consumers. He said courts would have
a difficult time sorting out the price agreements that help
consumers from those that harm them.
"The upshot is, as many
economists suggest, sometimes resale price maintenance can prove
harmful, sometimes it can bring benefits," he wrote. "But before
concluding that courts should consequently apply a rule of reason, I
would ask such questions as, how often are harms or benefits likely
to occur? How easy is it to separate the beneficial sheep from the
antitrust goats?"
"My own answer," he
concluded, "is not very easily."
Supreme
Court Oks Abortion Procedure Ban
By Mark Sherman
Associated Press
April 18, 2007
WASHINGTON
(AP) - The Supreme Court's conservative majority handed
anti-abortion forces a major victory Wednesday in a decision that
bans a controversial abortion procedure and set the stage for
further restrictions.
For the first time since
the court established a woman's right to an abortion in 1973, the
justices upheld a nationwide ban on a specific
(AP) Anti abortion
demonstrator
abortion
method, labeled partial-birth abortion
Joshua Alcorn stands
outside the
by
its opponents.
The 5-4 decision written by
Justice Anthony
Kennedy
said the Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act that Congress passed and
President Bush signed into law in 2003 does not violate a woman's
constitutional right to an abortion.
The law is constitutional
despite not containing an exception that would allow the procedure
if needed to preserve a woman's health, Kennedy
said. "The law need not give abortion doctors
(AP) National Clergy
Council President
unfettered choice in the course of their medical
Rev. Rob Schenck holds a
copy of the
practice," he wrote in the majority opinion.
Doctors who violate the law face up to two years in federal prison.
Kennedy's opinion, joined
by Bush's two appointees, Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice
Samuel Alito, was a long-awaited resounding win that abortion
opponents expected from the more conservative bench.
The administration defended
the law as drawing a bright line between abortion and infanticide.
Reacting to the ruling,
Bush said that it affirms the progress his administration has made
to defend the "sanctity of life."
"I am pleased that the
Supreme Court has upheld a law that prohibits the abhorrent
procedure of partial birth abortion," he said. "Today's decision
affirms that the Constitution does not stand in the way of the
people's representatives enacting laws reflecting the compassion and
humanity of America."
Justices Clarence Thomas
and Antonin Scalia also were in the majority.
It was the first time the
court banned a specific procedure in a case over how - not whether -
to perform an abortion.
Abortion rights groups as
well as the leading association of obstetricians and gynecologists
have said the procedure sometimes is the safest for a woman. They
also said that such a ruling could threaten most abortions after 12
weeks of pregnancy, although Kennedy said alternate, more widely
used procedures remain legal.
The outcome is likely to
spur efforts at the state level to place more restrictions on
abortions.
"I applaud the Court for
its ruling today, and my hope is that it sets the stage for further
progress in the fight to ensure our nation's laws respect the
sanctity of unborn human life," said Rep. John Boehner of Ohio,
Republican leader in the House of Representatives.
Said Eve Gartner of the
Planned Parenthood Federation of America: "This ruling flies in the
face of 30 years of Supreme Court precedent and the best interest of
women's health and safety. ... This ruling tells women that
politicians, not doctors, will make their health care decisions for
them." She had argued that point before the justices.
More than 1 million
abortions are performed in the United States each year, according to
recent statistics. Nearly 90 percent of those occur in the first 12
weeks of pregnancy, and are not affected by Wednesday's ruling. The
Guttmacher Institute says 2,200 dilation and extraction procedures -
the medical term most often used by doctors - were performed in
2000, the latest figures available.
Six federal courts have
said the law that was in focus Wednesday is an impermissible
restriction on a woman's constitutional right to an abortion.
The law bans a method of
ending a pregnancy, rather than limiting when an abortion can be
performed.
"Today's decision is
alarming," Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote in dissent. She said
the ruling "refuses to take ... seriously" previous Supreme Court
decisions on abortion.
Ginsburg said the latest
decision "tolerates, indeed applauds, federal intervention to ban
nationwide a procedure found necessary and proper in certain cases
by the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists."
Ginsburg said that for the
first time since the court established a woman's right to an
abortion in 1973, "the court blesses a prohibition with no exception
safeguarding a woman's health."
She was joined by Justices
Stephen Breyer, David Souter and John Paul Stevens.
The procedure at issue
involves partially removing the fetus intact from a woman's uterus,
then crushing or cutting its skull to complete the abortion.
Abortion opponents say the
law will not reduce the number of abortions performed because an
alternate method - dismembering the fetus in the uterus - is
available and, indeed, much more common.
In 2000, the court with key
differences in its membership struck down a state ban on
partial-birth abortions. Writing for a 5-4 majority at that time,
Justice Breyer said the law imposed an undue burden on a woman's
right to make an abortion decision in part because it lacked a
health exception.
The Republican-controlled
Congress responded in 2003 by passing a federal law that asserted
the procedure is gruesome, inhumane and never medically necessary to
preserve a woman's health. That statement was designed to overcome
the health exception to restrictions that the court has demanded in
abortion cases.
But federal judges in
California, Nebraska and New York said the law was unconstitutional,
and three appellate courts agreed. The Supreme Court accepted
appeals from California and Nebraska, setting up Wednesday's ruling.
Kennedy's dissent in 2000
was so strong that few court watchers expected him to take a
different view of the current case.
Kennedy acknowledged
continuing disagreement about the procedure within the medical
community. In the past, courts have cited that uncertainty as a
reason to allow the disputed procedure.
"The medical uncertainty
over whether the Act's prohibition creates significant health risks
provides a sufficient basis to conclude ... that the Act does not
impose an undue burden," Kennedy said Wednesday.
While the court upheld the
law against a broad attack on its constitutionality, Kennedy said
the court could entertain a challenge in which a doctor found it
necessary to perform the banned procedure on a patient suffering
certain medical complications.
The law allows the
procedure to be performed when a woman's life is in jeopardy.
The cases are Gonzales v.
Carhart, 05-380, and Gonzales v. Planned Parenthood, 05-1382.
Kennedy
Recuses From Antitrust Case
Involving Son's Company
Tony Mauro
Legal Times
March 21, 2007
Supreme Court Justice
Anthony Kennedy's son Gregory is a managing director of Credit
Suisse, the investment banking firm that is a party in a major
antitrust case set for argument before his father's court March 27.
It is apparently because of
his son's employment that Kennedy on Monday suddenly recused in the
case, Credit Suisse v. Billing, after having participated in
the decision last December to grant review.
Kennedy's late-stage
recusal triggered an unusual sequence of events in the case,
announced on an otherwise routine order list Monday. The Court
vacated its December grant of review in the case, "having been
advised by Justice Kennedy that he now realizes that he should have
recused himself from participation in this case, and does now recuse
himself."
But then, the order
continued, the Court reconsidered the Credit Suisse petition,
without the participation of Kennedy or Chief Justice John Roberts
Jr., who had previously recused. Minus the two justices, the Court
granted review again, and the case will be argued as previously
scheduled -- though before a seven-member Court. At issue in the
case is whether investment firms and underwriters like Credit Suisse
are immune from antitrust lawsuits over alleged manipulation of
prices of stocks sold in initial public offerings.
Kennedy, like most
justices, never publicly explains his reasons for recusal. But his
son's employment is almost certainly the cause, since no financial
conflict of interest is apparent from Kennedy's latest financial
disclosure form. Gregory Kennedy, who works in Credit Suisse's New
York offices, declined comment and referred calls to the firm's
public relations office, which also declined comment. Mayer, Brown
Rowe & Maw partner Stephen Shapiro, who will argue the case for
Credit Suisse next week, says he was not aware that Kennedy's son
worked for the firm.
What is unclear so far is
why Justice Kennedy did not recuse in the Credit Suisse case
last December, even though his son has been a managing director at
Credit Suisse since August 2005.
Kennedy was among seven
justices who signed a statement in 1993 specifying that in cases in
which their lawyer-spouses or lawyer-children had a connection, they
would recuse only when the justices knew their relative had an
interest that could be "substantially affected," or when the
justice's impartiality "might reasonably be questioned."
Gregory Kennedy, a 1992
graduate of Stanford Law School, formerly practiced law at Sullivan
& Cromwell in New York. At that time he, like Eugene Scalia, a son
of Justice Antonin Scalia who works at Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher,
structured his compensation so that it was not dependent on Supreme
Court litigation.
But once the younger
Kennedy left the law for Wall Street, the 1993 agreement no longer
applied. The statute governing the recusal of federal judges makes
it unnecessary to recuse in most cases in which a judge's close
adult relatives are involved in a case before the judge.
Northwestern University
judicial ethics expert Steven Lubet says that in such a situation
the judge must recuse only if the relative is "known by the judge to
have an interest" that would be substantially affected by the
outcome of the case. Typically, if a relative of a judge is a
salaried employee of a company in a case that falls short of
life-or-death importance for that company, recusal is not required,
Lubet says.
But on Wall Street,
managing directors are typically compensated with a combination of
salary and stock. A Credit Suisse spokesman declined to say if
Gregory Kennedy's compensation includes stock.
But assuming that is the
case for the young Kennedy, his father may have decided to act
because the outcome of the Credit Suisse case could conceivably
affect its stock value, Lubet says.
"He probably came to the
belated conclusion that his son had an interest that could be
substantially affected by the case," Lubet says.
Lubet says Kennedy "was
prudent to be concerned" about the ethical issue, though he wishes
Kennedy -- and his colleagues -- would be more open in their
decision-making. "It is frustrating, baffling, and unjustifiable
that they make this all so mysterious."
Roberts did not explain his
recusal in the Credit Suisse case last December, but his 2005
disclosure form reveals he has investments with several of the firms
connected to the case, including: Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith; Fidelity; and Janus.
Case of the
Dwindling Docket Mystifies the Supreme Court
Linda Greenhouse
The New York Times
December 7, 2006
WASHINGTON, Dec. 6 — On the
Supreme Court’s color-coded master calendar, which was distributed
months before the term began on the first Monday in October, Dec. 6
is marked in red to signify a day when the justices are scheduled to
be on the bench, hearing arguments.
The courtroom,
however, was empty on Wednesday, and for a simple reason: The court
was out of cases. The question is, where have all the cases gone?
Last year, during his
Senate confirmation hearing, Chief Justice
John G. Roberts Jr. said he
thought the court had room on its docket and that it "could
contribute more to the clarity and uniformity of the law by taking
more cases."
But that has not happened.
The court has taken about 40 percent fewer cases so far this term
than last. It now faces noticeable gaps in its calendar for late
winter and early spring. The December shortfall is the result of a
pipeline empty of cases granted last term and carried over to this
one.
The number of cases the
court decided with signed opinions last term, 69, was the lowest
since 1953 and fewer than half the number the court was deciding as
recently as the mid-1980s. And aside from the school integration and
global warming cases the
court heard last week, along with the terrorism-related cases it has
decided in the last few years, relatively few of the cases it is
deciding speak to the core of the country’s concerns.
The reasons for the decline
all grow out of forces building for decades. The federal government
has been losing fewer cases in the lower courts and so has less
reason to appeal. As Congress enacts fewer laws, the justices have
fewer statutes to interpret. And justices who think they might end
up on the losing side of an important case might vote not to take
it.
In a divided court, in a
divided country, the court’s reduced role is perhaps not surprising,
nor is it necessarily a bad thing. "In the post-Bush v. Gore era,
the court may be concerned about taking the wrong case and making an
unpopular decision," said Frederick Schauer, a professor at the
John F. Kennedy School of Government
at
Harvard, in an interview.
Professor Schauer argued in
a recent and much-discussed Harvard Law Review article that the
court’s work "had only minimal direct engagement with the central
issues of the nation’s public and policy agenda." In an interview,
he said, "I think they like being under the radar."
In private conversations,
the justices themselves insist that nothing so profound is going on,
but rather seem mystified at what they perceive as a paucity of
cases that meet the court’s standard criteria. The most important of
those criteria is whether a case raises a question that has produced
conflicting decisions among the lower federal courts.
But there are still plenty
of lower-court conflicts that go unresolved, said Thomas C.
Goldstein, a Supreme Court practitioner and close student of court
statistics who wrote last week on the popular Scotusblog that the
justices were "on the cusp of the greatest shortfall in filling the
court’s docket in recent memory, and likely in its modern history."
"I don’t think we’re at the
end of history and have fixed all the problems," Mr. Goldstein said
in an interview.
One theory is that the
court is so closely divided that neither the liberals nor the
conservatives want to risk granting a case in which, at the end of
the day, they might not prevail. To grant a case takes four votes,
which can be a heartbreaking distance from the five votes it takes
to win. Scholars of the court call this risk-averse behavior
"defensive denial."
While such behavior may
account for a portion of the shortfall, it can hardly provide a
global explanation, because only a relative handful of the 8,000
appeals that reach the court each term are ideologically charged.
Other, more neutral
explanations provide likely pieces of the puzzle.
One is the decreasing
number of appeals filed on behalf of the federal government by the
solicitor general’s office. Over the decades, the Supreme Court has
granted cases filed by the solicitor general’s office at a high
rate. In the mid-1980s, the office was filing more than 50 petitions
per term. But as the lower federal courts have become more
conservative and the government has lost fewer cases, the number has
plummeted, opening a substantial hole in the court’s docket.
As recently as the court’s
2000 term, the solicitor general filed 24 petitions, of which 17
were granted. Last term, it filed 10, of which the court granted 4.
This term, the solicitor general has filed 13 petitions; the court
has granted 5, denied 3 and is still considering the rest.
Another explanation lies
across the street from the Supreme Court, in Congress.
Over the years, about half
the court’s docket has been made up not of constitutional cases, but
of cases requiring the justices to interpret federal statutes.
Statutes from the 1970s, including major environmental laws,
antidiscrimination laws and Erisa, the employee-benefits law, have
been staples of the court’s docket for decades. But as Congress’s
willingness to pass new laws has waned, the flow of statutory cases
has begun to dry up.
Another possible
explanation is the method by which the justices screen the thousands
of petitions. Eight of the justices, all except Justice
John Paul Stevens, pool
their law clerks and have only one clerk make the initial
recommendation for each case.
The recommendation is not
binding, of course. But there is a built-in "institutional
conservatism" in which law clerks are afraid to look overly
credulous and so are reluctant to recommend a grant, according to
Stephen M. Shapiro, a former deputy solicitor general who practices
law in Chicago with Mayer, Brown, Rowe and Maw.
"Perhaps the clerks have
been trained to be naysayers for so long that they don’t know any
other way," Mr. Shapiro said in an interview.
The sharpest drop in
opinions came after
William H. Rehnquist became
chief justice in 1986. He had made clear his belief that the court
under Chief Justice Warren E. Burger was taking too many cases, and
Congress assisted in 1988 by eliminating from the court’s
jurisdiction a category of "mandatory" appeals to which the justices
collectively had long objected.
In the early 1990s, after
the number of decisions dropped to 107 from 145 in the space of five
terms, Chief Justice Rehnquist responded to reporters’ questions by
commenting wryly that the Supreme Court would be the first
institution of American government to fulfill Karl Marx’s prophecy
of the withering away of the state.
He was kidding, of course.
The late chief justice believed in a muscular role for the court,
and went on to show that he could accomplish more with less.
The question now, on a
docket dominated by cases that only a law professor could love, is
how much less.
"It’s not obvious to me
that the court should be doing more," said Orin Kerr, a visiting
professor at the
University of Chicago Law
School who wrote on his blog that constitutional law scholars "are
kind of bored these days."
In an interview, Professor
Kerr said that while it was easy to say that the court should be
doing something different, "no two people would agree on how it
should change."
Alito
Urges Judges to Show Restraint
By Mark Sherman
The Associated Press
New York Lawyer
November 17, 2006
WASHINGTON -- Supreme Court Justice Samuel Alito on Thursday called
for judicial restraint, saying courts are not "the center of the
universe" when it comes to legal questions.
"Life-tenured, appointed
judges must exercise restraint in construing" the constitution,
Alito told a meeitng of the Federalist Society in a hotel ballroom
packed with prominent conservatives.
Alito
joined the court earlier this year, helped by society members who
mounted an aggressive campaign to build support for his confirmation
in the Senate.
The newest justice proudly
called himself a 20-year member of the group and embraced its ideal
of limited government.
He said the executive and
legislative branches of government should play an active role in
determining the constitutionality of proposed laws and enforcement
actions and not leave that function solely to the judiciary.
"It is wrong to think that
the courts are the center of the universe when it comes to all legal
questions," Alito said.
He spoke after the group
marked Justice Antonin Scalia's 20th anniversary on the court. Alito
jokingly complained that after Scalia's 98-0 confirmation in 1986,
he expected all Italian-American jurists from New Jersey to have an
equally smooth path to the court.
"It didn't quite turn out
that way, but what's 40 votes?" Alito asked, recalling opposition to
his nomination from liberal groups and some Democratic senators.
Alito
was confirmed in the Senate by a vote of 58-42 earlier this year.
Alito
and a half dozen other federal judges nominated by President Bush
are taking part in the Federalist Society's annual convention, a
measure of the conservative organization's influence in the nation's
legal system.
Solicitor General Paul
Clement, the Bush administration's lawyer at the Supreme Court,
kicked off the meeting Thursday morning with the prediction that
with two new Bush-appointed conservative justices, the high court
will have ample opportunity in coming years to spell out its views
on limited government, a Federalist Society hallmark.
Clement said an early test
for the court would be the upcoming case in which 12 states, three
cities and environmental groups are trying to compel the
Environmental Protection Agency to recognize carbon dioxide and
other greenhouse gas emissions from cars as harmful pollutants that
should be regulated.
Clement said he will be
defending the government's "discretion not to regulate" in this
area. The administration has been strongly criticized by
environmentalists and others for its lack of action to address
global warming.
The Federalist Society for
Law and Public Policy Studies was founded in 1982 as a debating
society by students who believed professors at the top law schools
were too liberal. It now claims 35,000 members, including prominent
members of the Bush administration, the federal judiciary and
Congress.
Vice President Dick Cheney
and Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff are scheduled to
address the convention Friday.
Abortion
Cases Draw Throngs to High Court
Lawyers Focus on Justice Kennedy in Arguments
By Joan Biskupic
USAa Today
November 9, 2006
WASHINGTON — The Supreme
Court was packed and demonstrators gathered outside under drizzly
skies Wednesday as the justices heard arguments in what probably
will be two of the most significant abortion rights cases in
decades.
The disputes over Congress'
ban of a procedure it calls "partial birth" abortion represent a key
test of whether the court led by Chief Justice John Roberts will
take a harder line against abortion rights now that Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor, a key supporter of such rights, has retired.
However, as the two-hour
court session played out, neither Roberts nor the conservative
justice who replaced O'Connor, Samuel Alito, were the key players.
Instead, everything seemed choreographed around Anthony Kennedy, the
justice who is at the ideological center of the divided, nine-member
court. Kennedy, who has supported abortion rights but voted against
striking down a state ban on "partial birth" abortion six years ago,
is widely viewed as the key vote in the cases.
As he seemed to struggle
with whether the Republican-led Congress' ban on the midterm
procedure should be upheld, lawyers in the case focused on him in
their arguments. Liberal justices such as Ruth Bader Ginsburg and
John Paul Stevens suggested the ban restricted the right to abortion
and appeared to try to lure Kennedy to their side by asking leading
questions of lawyers.
In 2000, the court rejected
state bans on "partial birth" abortion that did not include an
exception for situations in which a woman's health was in danger. A
key issue Wednesday was whether Congress can outlaw the procedure by
declaring that it is "never" necessary for maternal health.
Kennedy expressed concern
about how often the banned method — known medically as "intact
dilation and evacuation" or "dilation and extraction" — is used and
whether alternatives are readily available. The procedure involves
removing a fetus so it partially emerges from the vagina intact,
rather than dismembering the fetus in the uterus.
The court's 350-seat
courtroom was filled; members of the public began lining up at 3:30
p.m. Tuesday for a chance to hear the arguments. Scores of
protesters from both sides of the abortion debate, along with TV
news crews and others who failed to get a prized seat inside,
gathered in front of the building.
The arguments were
jarringly broken 40 minutes into the session by the screaming of a
spectator who opposed abortion. Several police officers wrestled him
out of the courtroom.
Roberts, who appeared to
support the ban, asked several questions, but the court's other
conservatives were unusually quiet. Alito said nothing; the usually
talkative Antonin Scalia made few queries. (Another conservative,
Clarence Thomas, was absent because of illness; Roberts said Thomas
would still participate in the case.)
The conservatives seemed
content to let U.S. Solicitor General Paul Clement defend the 2003
ban. "Congress was entitled to make a judgment … to ban a
particularly gruesome procedure that blurred the line between
abortion and infanticide," he said.
Kennedy, who often votes
with the conservatives, has vacillated on abortion. In 1989, he
joined an opinion that would have undermined Roe v. Wade. In
1992, he reversed course and became the critical fifth vote to
uphold Roe. In 2000, he split from his abortion rights
colleagues and dissented from the ruling that said states could not
ban the procedure without a health exception.
Kennedy's comments
Wednesday suggested he is not locked into that position, but it was
unclear how he might vote. "In how many … instances is there serious
health risk to the mother that requires the procedure, as opposed to
(it) simply being an elective procedure?" he asked.
Priscilla Smith,
representing Nebraska physician LeRoy Carhart, said no hard data
exist. But she said that for some doctors whose patients face
cancer, hemorrhaging or other serious medical conditions, the
procedure is common.
Lawyer Eve Gartner,
representing Planned Parenthood Federation of America, said that
although the number of women affected by the ban might not be high,
"in some cases, this procedure averts catastrophic health
consequences for the woman."
Some of Kennedy's questions
suggested he was worried about the risks to women who might not have
access to the procedure some physicians say is more protective of a
woman's uterus. He also seemed concerned that doctors might
inadvertently violate the law by starting to do one procedure, then
ending up doing the banned one.
Half of
New Supreme Court Cases Term Touch on Business
By Mark H. Anderson
Market Watch
September 29, 2006
WASHINGTON (MarketWatch) --
The U.S. Supreme Court so far has filled half of its 2006-2007
docket with business cases, cutting a wide swath across important
legal issues for the corporate world.
Topping the list is a
punitive damages case that is being closely followed across business
sectors. But the justices have also taken up several cases on
antitrust, intellectual property and environmental regulation,
continuing a recent trend where the court has shown particular
interest in these areas.
"When the Supreme Court
returns from its summer recess, it will hear a great number of cases
important to the business community," said Robin Conrad, senior vice
president at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce's litigation unit. "We
applaud the Supreme Court for recognizing that business cases belong
on its docket and deserve to be addressed."
Mark Levy, an appellate
lawyer at Kilpatrick Stockton LLP, said that by his count the
Supreme Court is reviewing 19 business-related appeals of the 38
issues taken up so far for the 2006-2007 term set to begin on
Monday, Oct. 2. The Supreme Court's accepts between 70 and 80 cases
each term and will fill the second half of the docket between now
and January 2007.
Levy said last year the
court's docket was about 30% business matters. "The difference
between 30% and 50% is significant," he said.
Earlier this week the
justices added several more business cases when they granted nine
new cases from almost 2,000 appeals that were filed with the high
court over the summer. Among those appeals is a case on the
"willfulness" liability test in the Fair Credit Reporting Act. The
justices, reviewing class-action lawsuits on credit scoring and
insurance coverage, will be deciding the standard for when insurance
companies must tell consumers when low credit scores have resulted
in higher quoted rates for coverage.
Here is a look at some of
the important business cases already slated for review this fall:
- In late October the
Supreme Court will hear an appeal filed by Altria Group Inc.'s (MO)
Philip Morris USA unit challenging a $79.5 million punitive damages
award to a smoker's widow. Punitive damages cases against companies
is a high-profile legal business issue and how the court rules in
this case is being closely watched by a number of corporate
interests.
In addition to further
clarifying limits on the size of punitive damages in relation to
actual damages in liability suits, Levy said this case is well
positioned to provide additional insights on how new Chief Justice
John Roberts Jr. and Justice Samuel Alito will reshape the Supreme
Court.
The last Supreme Court
decision on punitive damages came in 2003 on a vote of 6-3 in the
court's State Farm decision. Two of the majority votes came from
former Chief Justice William Rehnquist and former Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor, who declined to join the most conservative members of the
court in rejecting limits on punitive damages.
"We don't know what they
think about punitive damages," Levy said of Roberts and Alito. He
added the case could say something about how far the new justices
will go in respecting legal precedent, or stare decisis, which was a
major issue during their confirmation hearings last year.
An incremental approach to
punitive damages by the two justices would extend limits imposed by
State Farm by the courts moderate and liberal justices. A vote with
conservatives who have rejected judicial limits on jury awards could
overturn the recent precedent that generally limits punitive damages
to single digit ratios with actual damages.
- The Supreme Court will
continue a recent trend of reviewing patent law and intellectual
property rulings out of the Federal U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, a
special Washington-based court that rules on patent law appeals.
The most significant patent
case is the Supreme Court's review of so-called obviousness
standards in patent law, which determines when an invention is too
obvious to warrant patent protection. In the case before the court,
Teleflex Inc. (TFX) has claimed KSR International Inc. of Canada has
violated patents it owns for gas pedal designs. Teleflex's claims
were initially dismissed, but the Federal Circuit ruled additional
analysis was necessary and spelled out what some patent experts
believe are lower standards for obviousness claims.
- The justices have also so
far taken up two cases that continue another recent trend of
reviewing antitrust case law. Additional antitrust appeals that
could be granted are in the pipeline. One case already on the
docket, however, is a civil antitrust lawsuit against regional phone
companies Verizon Communications Inc. (VZ), BellSouth Corp. (BLS),
AT&T Inc.'s (T) SBC Communications unit and Quest Communications
International Inc. (Q).
The issue in the phone
company case is what the plaintiffs must prove in arguing the
companies engaged in an anti-competitive conspiracy that violated
civil antitrust law before their case can proceed to legal
discovery. The phone companies argue the 2nd U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals, New York, issued a ruling that set the standards too low
and will expose corporations to more costly litigation if allowed to
stand.
The other antitrust case
reviews a $78.77 million judgment against Weyerhaeuser Co. (WY) for
allegedly engaging in predatory buying in the Pacific Northwest
lumber market. The case could alter standards for what triggers an
antitrust violation when a company buys up raw materials at inflated
prices with the aim of choking off competition.
- The court is also hearing
a pair of environmental regulation appeals that simultaneously
review federal clean air regulation standards and probe presidential
administration powers. "They both fit into a political template,"
Levy said of the clean air regulation appeals.
The first case involves an
appeal from 12 states and several environmental groups that are
trying to force the Environmental Protection Agency to regulate
automobile emissions under the Clean Air Act. The second case probes
whether plant upgrades by Duke Energy Corp. (DUK) are subject to EPA
regulations to limit pollution at coal-fired power plants
In Loss
for Bush, Supreme Court
Blocks War-Crimes Trials at Guantanamo
New York Lawyer
By The Associated Press
June 29, 2006
Washington - The Supreme
Court ruled Thursday that President Bush overstepped his authority
in ordering military war crimes trials for Guantanamo Bay detainees.
The ruling, a rebuke to the
administration and its aggressive anti-terror policies, was written
by Justice John Paul Stevens, who said the proposed trials were
illegal under U.S. law and Geneva conventions.
The case focused on Salim
Ahmed Hamdan, a Yemeni who worked as a bodyguard and driver for
Osama bin Laden. Hamdan, 36, has spent four years in the U.S. prison
in Cuba. He faces a single count of conspiring against U.S. citizens
from 1996 to November 2001.
Two years ago, the court
rejected Bush's claim to have the authority to seize and detain
terrorism suspects and indefinitely deny them access to courts or
lawyers. In this followup case, the justices focused solely on the
issue of trials for some of the men.
The vote was split 5-3,
with moderate Justice Anthony M. Kennedy joining the court's liberal
members in ruling against the Bush administration. Chief Justice
John Roberts, named to the lead the court last September by Bush,
was sidelined in the case because as an appeals court judge he had
backed the government over Hamdan.
Thursday's ruling
overturned that decision.
Courtroom
Camera Bill Stirs Debate
By Matthew Chayes
Chicago Tribune
May. 03, 2006
WASHINGTON - As far as
opinions go, Justice David Souter has made it clear what he thinks
of TV cameras in Supreme Court hearings.
"I think the case is so
strong," Souter told a House subcommittee in 1996, "that I can tell
you the day you see a camera come into our courtroom it's going to
roll over my dead body."
But now a bill sponsored by
Sen. Arlen Specter, R-Pa., and approved by the Senate Judiciary
Committee he leads would force the Supreme Court to let cameras into
its hallowed halls, one of the few public spaces in Washington,
along with other federal courts, where cameras are banned.
That prospect miffed two
other justices, Anthony Kennedy and Clarence Thomas, who told a
House subcommittee early this month that if Congress authorized the
use of cameras at the court, it would mar the Supreme Court's
decorum, endanger the justices' personal security and raise
constitutional questions over the proper role of each branch of
government.
Supporters of cameras in
the Supreme Court, including Sen. Dick Durbin, D-Ill., say that
opening the court to cameras would teach the nation an important
civics lesson.
"Unfortunately, a lot of
people think this is all about Judge Judy, and that is not how
justice is handed down in America," Durbin said, referring to the
television judge. "This is an institution, one of the most important
in our government, a government that prides itself on being open and
accessible. Eliminating the mystery of these proceedings will help
people understand what justice really means."
Laurence Tribe, a Harvard
law professor who supports cameras at the high court, agreed, noting
that only the "privileged few" get to witness the justices in court.
"Unfortunately, only the
most naive idealist believes that the general public reads the
court's opinions," said Tribe, whose first argument before the
Supreme Court in 1980 established that the Constitution guarantees
the public's right to attend criminal trials.
The move to allow cameras
comes after Chief Justice John Roberts Jr. said in his confirmation
hearings that he would be willing to consider televising Supreme
Court sessions.
Last year, when the courts
refused to step in to order that Terri Schiavo be kept alive,
lawmakers demanded more accountability from the courts. When Specter
introduced his camera measure in September, he complained that the
Supreme Court has become a "virtual super legislature."
The same week, Sen. Charles
Grassley, R-Iowa, and Rep. James Sensenbrenner, R-Wis., chairman of
the House Judiciary Committee, proposed separate measures to install
a watchdog over the nation's courts, that would "provide for the
detection and prevention of inappropriate conduct in the federal
judiciary."
Judge Boyce Martin of the
6th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals based in Cincinnati said,
"Televising proceedings is one of the more important new innovations
that's gonna help the judiciary be appreciated more by the public as
a whole."
Supporters of courtroom
cameras dismiss Kennedy's assertion on legal grounds that forcing
cameras into the court would raise separation-of-powers concerns.
They note that Congress sets the judiciary's budget, its
jurisdiction and the number of justices.
"For him to say that we
couldn't say that you have cameras in the courtroom is just
idiotic," said Grassley, who has proposed legislation that would let
judges decide whether to televise proceedings in their courtrooms.
The Specter measure would force the nine justices to admit cameras
into the court although they could on a case-by-case basis have them
banned.
Judge Alex Kozinski, who
sits on the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals based in California,
where cameras film some appellate proceedings, said he believes that
giving jurists the choice is the right approach. But he opposes
having legislators force it on the judiciary.
"I think cameras work fine
if the judges involved are comfortable with having them there," he
said, but he insists it should be an evolution in their thinking,
not a mandate.
The Supreme Court now makes
audio recordings and transcripts of the oral arguments available
later each term. Recordings for noteworthy cases are released
immediately after a hearing.
Kozinski said that
televising all federal court proceedings is probably inevitable but
that the push should come from the judiciary.
At the state level,
numerous states allow cameras and televising of trials.
Several Supreme Court
justices have at various times said they don't want cameras in the
courtroom because they value their privacy, helping protect them
from people who might physically attack them because they disagree
with decisions.
But attacks on Supreme
Court justices are rare.
Justice Byron White, during
a speech in Utah in 1982, was punched by a screaming man critical of
the court's decisions on school integration and pornography. Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg and retired Justice Sandra Day O'Connor recently
disclosed they got death threats.
White suffered minor
bruising, but some attacks on judges have ended tragically,
including last year's murders in Chicago of the husband and mother
of U.S. District Judge Joan Lefkow by a disgruntled plaintiff.
But lawmakers pushing for
televised court proceedings say judges would be in no more danger
than members of the other two branches of government.
"Since I live in a world of
televised Senate proceedings and vote on controversial bills and
make speeches on a regular basis, I don't think that that
jeopardizes my security," Durbin said.
Plus, camera supporters
argue, the identities of most federal court jurists are publicly
available anyway.
"Anybody who really wants
to know what I look like can just put my name into Google," Kozinski
said, "and a Google image will come up with any number of pictures
of what I look like."
Ginsburg
Calls Proposed
Congressional Watchdog for Courts "Scary"
By Gina Holland
The Associated Press
May 3, 2006
WASHINGTON -- Supreme Court
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg said Tuesday that a Republican proposal
in Congress to set up a watchdog over the federal courts is a
"really scary idea."
Ginsburg told a gathering
of the American Bar Association that lawyers should stick up for
judges when they are criticized by congressional leaders.
"My sense now is that the
judiciary is under assault in a way that I haven't seen before," she
said.
As an example, she
mentioned proposals by senior Republicans who want an inspector
general to police judges' acceptance of free trips or their possible
financial interests with groups that could appear before them.
"It sounds to me very much
like the Soviet Union was .... That's a really scary idea," said
Ginsburg, who was put on the court by President Clinton and is one
of its liberal members.
Ginsburg said her
confirmation hearings in 1993, and those the following year for
Justice Stephen Breyer, were long but friendly. "That bipartisan
spirit has broken down," she said.
Sen. Charles Grassley,
R-Iowa, said last week that the judiciary wasn't doing enough
policing of itself. His plan would create an inspector general to
oversee federal courts including the Supreme Court. The inspector
general would be directed to report any judicial misconduct to the
Justice Department.
House Judiciary Committee
Chairman James Sensenbrenner, R-Wis., has proposed a separate plan
to cover lower federal courts only.
Ginsburg said her concerns
were about the legislative branch setting up a so-called guardian
for the judicial branch. She also said there have been discussions
in Congress about limiting the scope of courts.
American Bar Association
President Michael Greco asked Ginsburg what lawyers could do. She
said attorneys can speak up and "say these efforts are wrong."
Judges, she said, cannot lobby on their own behalf.
http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/judgeIGintro42706.pdf
|